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On December 29, 2014, the US President and Secretary of Defense announced the formal 
end to Operation Enduring Freedom, its combat mission in Afghanistan, which had begun 
in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 attacks. They also stated that the US would 
begin its follow-on mission, Operation Freedom's Sentinel, at the start of 2015.  
The President and the Secretary of Defense made these announcements with all the usual 
rhetorical flourishes and statements about success, future commitments, and host 
government progress of the kind top US officials made at the end of the Vietnam and Iraq 
conflicts. The President also implied that this Transition had ended America’s longest war, 
although Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel made it clear that relabeling the mission did 
not fully end America’s military role: 1 
Operation Freedom's Sentinel, the United States will pursue two missions with the support of the 
Afghan government and the Afghan people. We will work with our allies and partners as part of 
NATO's Resolute Support Mission to continue training, advising, and assisting Afghan security 
forces. And we will continue our counterterrorism mission against the remnants of Al-Qaeda to 
ensure that Afghanistan is never again used to stage attacks against our homeland. 
US officials announced this Transition in Afghanistan without issuing any meaningful 
assessment of what some thirteen years of war had accomplished. They did so without any 
public attempt to provide a meaningful strategic assessment of the future US role and 
commitments in Afghanistan or the region, and without providing any meaningful public 
analysis or metrics of the combat situation. They did not issue any assessment of the 
political and economic prospects for Afghan security, and did not make any attempt to link 
its posture in Afghanistan to what was happening in Pakistan and Central Asia. 
Their announcements came after the US had completed the withdrawal of almost all of its 
combat forces from Afghanistan. They came after the US had also announced that it would 
reduce its troop presence some 10,800 personnel in 2015, plus a small counterterrorism 
force, then cut that total in half that by the beginning of 2016, and finally reduce it to a few 
hundred men in a small office of military cooperation by the beginning of 2017.  
Ignoring Costs  
No mention was made of the cost of the war in terms of casualties and dollars. The US 
Department of Defense reported that the total number of US dead had reached 2,356 – 
including 1,846 killed in action -- and the total number of wounded had reached 20,066.2 
Other allied dead included 453 British dead and 676 other allied dead – for a total of 3,486 
US and allied dead -- but comparable estimates of the wound were not available.3 While 
some estimates are available of Afghan killed and wounded, and are discussed in Chapter 
IV of this analysis, there are no estimates that cover length of the war that have any 
credibility.  
As for the dollar cost, no estimates exist for the total cost to all allied forces or the Afghan 
government. The US government has never published an official estimate of the direct 
costs of the war at point from 2001 to 2014, but an estimate by Amy Belasco of the 
Congressional Research Service put the direct costs at $557 billion from FY2001 to 
FY2012, with $523.5 billion for the Department of Defense, $29.4 billion for the State 
Department and US Aid, and $4.2 billion for Veteran’s Administration. 4  US budget 
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documents indicate that the US spent at least an additional $167 billion for the Department 
of Defense, $4 billion for the State Department and US Aid, and $3 billion for Veteran’s 
Administration.5  
This would put the total cost of the Afghan War to the US alone at a minimum of $724 
billion through the end of FY2014, but this does not include the full calendar year for 
Transition, the cost of destroyed equipment and equipment transfers to the Afghans during 
the US withdrawal, the cost of reequipping US forces for many combat losses, and the 
years of additional medical expenses for military personnel with lasting medical issues and 
disabilities.6 Some estimates that include the cost of the added federal debt, opportunity 
costs, and lifetime costs of those requiring continuing medical are in the trillions. 
As might be predicted, no US official addressed any of these issues, or addressed the full 
nature of the strategy the US was pursue in Afghanistan after 2014. No attempt was made 
to explain or justify the future expenses called for in the FY2015 budget submission that 
was still before Congress at the time of Transition, or projected in the FY2015 to FY2019 
defense program. And, as usual, no one in the Congress chose to ask. 
Understating Risks 
Both the President and the Secretary of Defense sharply understated the risks inherent in 
the US approach to Transition. Secretary Hagel did not mention the risks involve at all, and 
President Obama made claims that the war had succeeded in “devastating the core al-Qaida 
leadership, delivering justice to Osama bin Laden, disrupting terrorist plots and saving 
countless American lives,” and “helped the Afghan people reclaim their communities, take 
the lead for their own security, hold historic elections and complete the first democratic 
transfer of power in their country's history.” His only reference to the threat was a short 
comment that, ““Afghanistan remains a dangerous place, and the Afghan people and their 
security forces continue to make tremendous sacrifices in defense of their country.”7  
No mention was made of rising Afghan civilian and security force casualties, expanding 
areas of insurgent influence, the lack of government control and influence in many parts of 
the country, the continuing Taliban and Haqqani Network sanctuaries in Pakistan, or the 
overall trends in the fighting. No mention was made of the fact that US intelligence experts 
felt that the key insurgent factions had quickly recovered from any losses to their leadership, 
had reemerged as a major threat in Helmand and the south, and had expanded their 
influence and control in the eastern border areas and the north. 
As was the case in Vietnam -- and Iraq in 2011 --, the US ended its combat presence at a 
time when Transition involved a serious risk that the war would fail to achieve any form 
of security and stability. The combat situation was intensifying rather than declining, and 
the Afghan government was still partially paralyzed by the crisis growing out of the 2014 
Presidential election, and Afghanistan did finally have newly elected leaders and had 
signed a bilateral security agreement (BSA) and a status of forces agreement. 
 For all the bursts of favorable political rhetoric that followed the political compromises 
that came out of grossly corrupt election and signing a BSA, Afghanistan had virtually 
become a “forgotten war” at a time when the Taliban was making steady gains, civilian 
casualties were rising, and the Afghan forces were experiencing major problems. Afghan 
governance remained weak, corrupt, and ineffective. It was unclear that the political 
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compromises made following the corrupt election could work; the Afghan budget faced a 
massive deficit and was dependent on equally massive US and donor aid indefinitely into 
the future. The Afghan economy was in crisis, and there were no public plans or meaningful 
efforts to provide official transparency on any major aspect of post-2014 Transition.  
A Lack of Meaningful Strategy  
Afghanistan was only part of the story. Pakistan was in near-political chaos, had not eased 
its tensions with India, faced rising challenges from terrorism, had made uncertain progress 
in its latest military campaign, and had made no progress in dealing with the mix of 
economic and educational reforms that were critical to a stable future and shaping its 
broader strategy in South Asia. While US forces have effectively left Central Asia, the US 
had not announced any strategy to deal with Central Asia in the future, or to adjust to the 
impact of its growing tensions with Russia. And help try to shape the future of the region.  
The end result is that United States failed to define meaningful future strategies for 
Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Central Asia. More than that, setting a fixed deadline for 
withdrawal from Afghanistan has meant cutting its overall presence in Afghanistan so 
quickly that its Transition efforts may well fail. As for Pakistan, Central Asia, and South 
Asia, the US had decoupled transition out of Afghanistan from any visible attempt to shape 
a future posture in the region. 
In all four cases – Afghanistan, Pakistan, Central Asia, and South Asia -- the US needs to 
come to grips with the fact that strategy does not consist of concepts, good intentions, or 
public statements that will not be implemented in any meaningful form. It consists of 
making realistic assessments that shape US options, building on the policies and actions 
that are already in place, and developing practical plans that can be – and are – actually 
implemented.  
Rhetoric is the natural enemy of realism. It would be nice to see Afghanistan suddenly 
emerge in 2015 or 2016 as a unified, peaceful, developing democracy. It would be nice to 
see Pakistan put on the same path. It would be nice to resolve the tensions and risk of 
conflict between India and Pakistan. It would be nice to see Central Asia develop as a 
region, and do so in ways that are peaceful while making the same progress towards 
democracy. 
But, these are not meaningful and practical strategic objectives for the US, its European 
allies, or NATO. The current realities on the ground strongly indicate that the present US 
approach to Transition in Afghanistan will fail at the military, political, economic, and 
governance levels.  
This analysis shows that: 
 The security situation in Afghanistan is far worse than the NATO (ISAF) and the US Department 
of Defense have publically reported and creates more serious challenges to Transition, 
 Every element of the Afghan security forces faces serious issues in operating without US and other 
allied support. 
 The allocation of only some 11,000 US troops at the beginning of 2015, cutting that number in half 
by the end of 2015, and then removing all trainers and enablers by the end of 2016 – except for a 
small office of military cooperation – presents serious risks, and should – at a minimum – be cut on 
a conditions-based level rather than to a fixed schedule. 
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 The political structure of Afghanistan, and grave flaws in the structure of its governance, add another 
major threat to the success of Transition. 
 US, UN, and other reporting on the Afghan economy and development has sharply exaggerated 
progress, and understated the economic risks of Transition. More aid over a longer period, and better 
planned and executed aid, will be equally essential to success. 
As for the broader US approach to Pakistan and the region, this analysis shows that Pakistan 
is taking some steps that may reduce its status as an in sanctuary for Afghan insurgents and 
broaden its fight against terrorism, but it is still unclear that these steps will bring stability 
to Pakistan or aid transition in Afghanistan. It is equally unclear that Afghanistan’s other 
neighbors will be a major source of help to Afghanistan at the political, security, and 
economic levels. 
The analysis also indicates that the US withdrawal from Afghanistan has further reduced 
US strategic interests in Central Asia, and that US has not developed any clear strategy for 
the region. This may well leave the region even more open Russian and Chinese influence 
– a shift which does not seem to threaten US interests and may well be desirable given the 
need for strategic triage in using scarce US resources to deal with areas of greater concern.  
At the same time, both Central and South Asia will face at least another decade of uncertain 
development and stability – if not actual conflict. The US not only needs a strategy for 
Central Asia based on its overall global priorities, it needs once for South Asia as well, and 
particularly for dealing with the potential emergence of India as a counterbalance to China 
that does not link the US to the tensions between India and Pakistan, try to make India a 
formal strategic partner in ways that India will not support, or try to make India part of an 
effort to contain China rather than create a more multipolar and balanced world. 
The US must not continue to leave a near vacuum in US ability to form, resource and 
implement a strategy that offers a real hope of addressing the key challenges in Afghanistan, 
Pakistan, and Central and South Asia. A stream of White House rhetoric cannot disguise 
the fact that Obama Administration has substitute rhetoric and public relations spin for 
integrity and transparency, has an unworkable and under-resourced Transition plan for 
Afghanistan, no meaningful public strategy for Pakistan, and little more than statements of 
good intentions for Central Asia as it withdraws the forces that supported the war in 
Afghanistan. 
Repeating the Mistakes of Vietnam and Iraq 
The report also shows that the current US Transformation effort may well repeat key 
previous US failures in Vietnam and Iraq.  In fact, the current US effort attempt to rush 
military and civil Transformation in Afghanistan at rates quicker than in Vietnam, or that 
the US planned in Iraq before it failed to negotiate a workable basis for staying in country.  
There are major differences between all three conflicts. Afghan politics, security forces, 
governance, economics, and social structures have many unique qualities that will affect 
Transformation, and the role of outside power and key neighbors is different. The insurgent 
sanctuaries in Pakistan have only a tenuous similarity to the role of North Vietnamese 
forces and the post-Tet conflict or the limited role of Iran and Syria after 2003. Each 
conflict must be addressed as a separate case study where the uniqueness of its own 
problems and complexities is a constant warning about the false character of broad theories 
about counterinsurgency, stability operations, and “nation building.”  
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Yet, the way the US has fought the war in Afghanistan, approached Transition, and dealt 
with neighboring states, still has far too many parallels in the failures and lessons of the 
Vietnam and Iraq conflicts. Each conflict represented a US failure to constantly reassess 
its strategic importance in both national and regional terms, and adjust its level of efforts 
accordingly.  
Each war was initiated on the basis of limited and inadequate strategic analysis of overall 
US priorities and then allowed to escalate without adequate analysis of the cost-benefits of 
US actions The Afghan War, like Vietnam and Iraq, became a US attempt at 
transformational combat that required the US to both win a conflict and restructure the host 
nation. Each war became an exercise in armed nation building -- rather than an effort to 
defeat the enemy and help the country do things its own way. As in Vietnam and Iraq, the 
sheer scale of US goals, ambitions, and spending left a legacy of critical problems in every 
aspect of Afghan Transformation that could effective destroy the transformation effort 
unless the US is more realistic about the time and resources needed to correct its past 
mistakes. 
As in Vietnam and Iraq, the US attempted a “whole of country” approach to the civil-
military aspects of the war, and a coherent approach to Afghanistan’s problems in politics, 
governance, security and economic. In practice, however, the US had deep divisions 
between its military and civil efforts, and its military focused on tactical success and its 
civilian focus on improved governance and economic development it ways that were often 
decoupled from the fact Afghanistan was at war.  
The US military sometimes tried to address the political and ideological level of the 
insurgency, and the weaknesses in Afghan governance. As in Vietnam and Iraq, however, 
the US military generally focused on winning tactical victories rather than on defeating the 
insurgency at both the military and political levels. It measured success in terms of combat 
and largely meaningless metrics like enemy initiated attacks (EIAs), rather than success in 
creating stable secure areas under Afghani governance and reducing or eliminating 
insurgent influence.  
Each war showed that the US military could not properly assess – or act upon – a realistic 
picture of the limits and problems in dealing with the host country, neighboring states, and 
allies. Each war showed that the US military attempted to either create whole new force 
elements based on its own models or restructure host country forces to achieve the same 
goals, and that its “force generation” process failed to produce sustainable combat 
capability in host country forces.  
Each war showed that that the US military could not evolve an effective politico-military-
economic approach to counterinsurgency above the battalion level, had no workable 
approach to stability operations, and confused such operations with the need to create a 
self-sustainable state that could both win an insurgency on its own after transition and 
operate as an effective state. Moreover, in each case the US military progressively 
attempted to spin the course of the war into some form of victory and suppress negative 
data on the course of the fighting and the limits to the host country’s forces and actions. 
This progressive loss of transparency and honesty both ultimately field to “sell” the war to 
the American people and the Congress, it created unrealistic plans and expectations that 
ultimately backfired and made the situation worse. 
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At the same time, the Afghan conflict, Iraq conflict, and Vietnam showed that the civilian 
side of the US effort could neither effectively assess the overall problems in governance 
and the economy that affect the war, or develop overall plans to deal with key civil issue 
as distinguished from a “project” approach to aid. At the same time, the US underestimated 
the level of internal tension and conflict within the government of host country, and the 
seriousness of its own problems in dealing with the host country government. 
Each showed the civilian side – effectively the State Department and USAID -- had far less 
capability to plan and actually execute plans than the military, could not develop coherent 
plans or resourcing, suffered from poor fiscal and contract management, failed to perform 
effective cost control and audits, and suffered from weak or no real measures of 
effectiveness –what one senior USAID official called a war fought by “golden silos.”   
At the end of all three wars, it was unclear what the bulk of civilian aid had accomplished. 
Efforts to restructure the politics and governance of each country have proved to be deeply 
flawed. Large amounts of aid money had been wasted and contributed to high levels of 
corruption. US efforts had created serious tension with the central government and had not 
brought broad public support. Significant ethnic and sectarian challenges had become 
worse. Government in the field was often weak and corrupt, and US efforts to reform the 
justice system and rule of law had been effective or made things worse.  
The work of historians and independent US government assessments of the war in Vietnam, 
the work of GAO and the Special Inspector General for Iraqi Reconstruction (SIGIR) in 
Iraq, and work of GAO and the Special Inspector General for Afghan Reconstruction 
(SIGAR) in Iraq, all have common threads. They show a consistent lack of effective 
planning, a lack of proper audits and financial controls, and a lack of meaningful measures 
of effectiveness. They also show a focus on project aid and longer-term development rather 
than the nation’s immediate wartime needs, a failure to develop overall plans and 
assessments of national priorities,  
Like Vietnam and Iraq, the Transformation effort in Afghanistan also suffered from the 
legacy of the problems inflicted by the rapid rotation of both inexperienced military and 
civil personnel, an almost annual set of efforts to reshape key aspect of the effort with little 
real analysis of overall trends. Each of the three wars suffered from constantly changing 
priorities, erratic boom and bust funding levels in key aspects of both the military and civil 
war efforts, a lack of cost control and ability to prevent gross corruption, and the inability 
to link spending to realistic (and often any) measures of effectiveness. 
Failing to Objectively Assess the Threat: The Afghanistan “Follies” 
The Transformation effort in Afghanistan has been similar to that in Vietnam and Iraq in 
that each conflict involved a major escalation of cost and casualties that went far beyond 
the level estimated in going to war. The US failed to create serious measures of progress 
and effectiveness and never developed a sound and honest base for winning US domestic 
political support. As a result, each war led to a steady shift towards “spin” and exaggerating 
progress or success that helped lose the support of the American people, the Congress, and 
the media.  
The end result in Vietnam was a premature set of cutbacks in the US effort that helped lose 
the war in Vietnam. The end result in Iraq was a willingness to accept Iraqi political 
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resistance to keeping a workable level of US military and advisory efforts that has now 
created yet a third US war in Iraq since 1990. In the case of Afghanistan, it was setting 
fixed deadlines for withdrawal and fixed and limited levels of support for Transition that 
do not reflect real Afghan needs and are not conditions-based. 
There Three Threats in Every Major Insurgency: The Enemy, Your Host 
Country and Your Allies, and Yourself 
While this analysis focuses on the Afghan conflict, Pakistan, and the surrounding region, 
all of these factors should be kept in mind. In all three wars the US failed to honestly 
address the key issues in going to war, the limits in the host country and US effort. As a 
result, it failed to plan and manage an integrated war effort tailored to host country limits. 
It focused on threat at the military level and on US-driven transformation at the civil level 
transformation.  
The, US has failed to show in Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan that it can come to grips with 
the fact that every major counterinsurgency effort involves three major threats and not just 
one: The enemy, the host country, and the limits in the US capabilities. Out of all three 
threats, the most important one may now be the rigidities, the parochialism and other limits 
in the US effort. As this analysis makes all too clear, the US has failed to either see the full 
threat posed by its host country but its most important failure has been to look closely 
enough in the mirror. 
 In Spite of Past Mistakes, there is still a Possibility of Some Form of 
Success 
There are no quick or easy solutions to the problems the US faces in Afghanistan, Pakistan, 
and the region. There is no possibility of meeting all the over-ambitious goals of documents 
like the Afghan Compact, or the expectations some have shown regarding human rights, 
reducing corruption, and putting Afghanistan on a rapid path towards development. Even 
the most successful form of Transition in the period after 2014 will have critical limits for 
at least the next decade.  
The most anyone can realistically hope for is a relatively stable and secure country will 
emerge over the next five to ten years. What many of the more realistic military and aid 
personnel serving in Afghanistan have come to call “Afghan good enough.” In fact, limited 
engagement or actual disengagement may be the best US strategy given the limitations of 
US resources, the probability of sustained success at a credible level of effort, and 
competing strategic priorities in other regions. The analysis in this report does indicate, 
however, that the marginal additional cost of helping Afghanistan make a successful 
Transition may be relatively limited compared to the current effort, which may well end in 
failure. 
Making the size and duration of the US military efforts dependent on the actual conditions 
that emerge after 2014 does not require redeploying major land combat units, allocating 
major amounts of air power, or spending anything like the past level of expenditure. 
Providing enough aid to help Afghanistan through the economic impact of withdrawing 
US and allied troops, and the economic strains of Transition, may also be affordable. Much 
will depend on Afghan politics and governance, but much depends on the level of outside 
aid as well. There is no way to be sure, given the current lack of honesty and transparency 
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in US government reporting on the Afghan conflict, Pakistan, and the region, but some 
form of “Afghan good enough” may well be affordable, and have sufficient prospects for 
success. The tragedy, however, may well be that the US has already made so many mistakes 
that no one can now shift to a real-world, conditions-based approach.  
  
Cordesman: Strategy in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Central Asia              January  2015                
x 
Table of Contents 
I. THE STRATEGIC VACUUM IN AFGHANISTAN, CENTRAL AND SOUTH ASIA ..................... 2 
US STRATEGY WRITES OFF AFGHANISTAN PAKISTAN, AND THE REGION .................................................... 5 
A QDR That Largely Wrote Off the Region ................................................................................................. 5 
President Obama’s Statement on Afghanistan on May 27, 2014 ..................................................... 6 
President Obama’s New Strategy Speech at West Point ...................................................................... 8 
NO CLEARER LEAD FROM NATO ....................................................................................................................... 10 
A CIVIL FAILURE BY USAID, THE UN AND OTHER DONORS ......................................................................... 14 
II. UNCERTAIN PRIORITIES FOR US STRATEGY ................................................................ 18 
US “STRATEGIC TRIAGE” IS CRITICAL ............................................................................................................... 18 
THE ISSUE IS NOT RESOURCES, BUT STRATEGIC PRIORITY .......................................................................... 19 
THE COST-BENEFITS OF UPPING THE ANTE .................................................................................................... 20 
III. THE THREAT FROM AFGHAN POLITICS, LEADERSHIP, GOVERNANCE, AND 
PROSPECTS FOR STABILITY ........................................................................................................ 21 
THE SHELL OF DEMOCRACY: THE REALITY OF THE PRESIDENCY, POWER BROKERS, PARALLEL DONOR 
COUNTRY GOVERNANCE ...................................................................................................................................... 21 
The Reality of National Versus Local Governance ................................................................................ 21 
Parallel Governance by ISAF Regional Commands and National Air Donors .......................... 21 
The US Role in Weak and Failed Afghan Governance ......................................................................... 23 
A DIVIDED, POOR, AND STRUGGLING, NATION ................................................................................................ 28 
FAILED AND CORRUPT 2014 ELECTIONS THAT DID MORE TO DIVIDE THAN UNITE ............................... 29 
AN AWKWARD AND UNCERTAIN COMPROMISE ............................................................................................... 32 
A Deeply Uncertain Compromise at the Top ............................................................................................ 32 
Limited Progress in Signing a Bilateral Security Agreement .......................................................... 33 
UNCERTAIN AFGHAN LEADERSHIP AND GOVERNANCE: TWO YEARS TOO LATE? .................................... 34 
THE HERITAGE OF FAILED GOVERNANCE AND CORRUPTION ....................................................................... 35 
Corruption and Incompetence........................................................................................................................ 35 
Keeping Corruption in Perspective ............................................................................................................... 42 
THE BUDGET CRISIS IN REVENUES AND EXPENDITURES ............................................................................... 43 
The Failure to Win US and Other Outside Domestic Political Support........................................ 49 
The Combined Threat from Host Country Politics, Governance, and Budgeting .................... 53 
IV. THE ANSF AND THE THREAT FROM AN INTENSIFYING CONFLICT ............................... 54 
The President’s “Sell By Date:” Slashing Advisors and Support Regardless on Conditions in 
Afghanistan ............................................................................................................................................................. 54 
The Impact of A Late and Erratic Effort to Create Effective Afghan Forces ............................. 55 
The US as a Self-Inflicted Threat.................................................................................................................................................. 56 
A Brief and Largely Ineffective US Surge ................................................................................................................................. 57 
Host Country “Threat” ...................................................................................................................................................................... 58 
Rushing Force Development Beyond Afghan and ISAF Capacity ................................................... 60 
The Uncertain Threat ......................................................................................................................................... 56 
The Growing Security Challenges at the Time of Transition ........................................................... 61 
Mixed Data on Popular Support for the ANSF ........................................................................................ 72 
V. PROBLEMS IN DEVELOPING AN EFFECTIVE ANSF ................................................................ 76 
THE QUESTION OF SIZE AND COST ..................................................................................................................... 76 
UNCERTAIN PROGRESS IN THE ANSF ............................................................................................................... 80 
UNCERTAIN PROGRESS IN THE ANA ................................................................................................................. 81 
FOCUSING ON FORCE GENERATION RATHER THAN COMBAT CAPABILITY .................................................. 83 
THE SERIOUSNESS OF THE POLICE CHALLENGE .............................................................................................. 83 
Cordesman: Strategy in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Central Asia              January  2015                
xi 
Designing a Force with Limited Paramilitary Capability .................................................................. 84 
A Force in Transition at the Time of Transition .................................................................................... 86 
Token Paramilitary forces ............................................................................................................................... 87 
THE UNCERTAIN ROLE OF THE AFGHAN LOCAL POLICE ................................................................................ 89 
THE ISAF COMMAND VIEW IN LATE 2014 ..................................................................................................... 90 
LIMITED ADJUSTMENTS TO THE 9,800 CEILING AND THE US COMBAT ROLE .......................................... 96 
THE NEED FOR TRANSPARENCY AND TO DECIDE ON A CONDITIONS-BASED POLICY ............................... 97 
VI. THE THREAT FROM AFGHAN ECONOMIC CHALLENGES ................................................. 100 
UNDERSTANDING THE PRESSURE ON THE AFGHAN ECONOMY .................................................................. 102 
A Population at Economic Risk ................................................................................................................... 102 
Demographic Pressure on Afghan Stability .......................................................................................... 103 
Limited Progress in Human Development, and Uncertain Progress in Life Expectancy and 
Education .............................................................................................................................................................. 104 
UNCERTAIN ECONOMIC GROWTH AND OVER-DEPENDENCE AGRICULTURE ........................................... 108 
Over-Reliance on Agriculture and Favorable Rains .......................................................................... 108 
The Risks in Transition ................................................................................................................................................................. 108 
Much Depends on Agriculture and Rainfall ........................................................................................................................ 109 
ECONOMIC STRESS AND POVERTY .................................................................................................................. 112 
World Bank Assessments of Poverty ......................................................................................................... 112 
The IMF Risk Assessment Matrix ................................................................................................................ 114 
NARCOTICS .......................................................................................................................................................... 116 
A MAJOR TRADE DEFICIT AND NO MIRACLES FROM A “NEW SILK ROAD” OR MINERAL EXTRACTION
 ............................................................................................................................................................................... 120 
ECONOMIC REFORM AND THE NEED FOR AID ............................................................................................... 121 
DEVELOPING EFFECTIVE CONDITIONS-BASED AID ..................................................................................... 124 
VII. REGIONAL THREATS: THE UNCERTAIN IMPACT OF PAKISTAN.................... 126 
STRATEGIC DIFFERENCES ................................................................................................................................. 127 
A RISING TIDE OF INTERNAL VIOLENCE ........................................................................................................ 128 
AN ALLY THAT HAS ALSO BEEN A THREAT................................................................................................... 134 
A MOVEMENT TOWARDS REAL ALLIANCE? .................................................................................................. 135 
BRIBERY RATHER THAN TRUE ALLIANCE...................................................................................................... 136 
TRANSITION IN AFGHANISTAN MEANS TRANSITION IN PAKISTAN ........................................................... 142 
VIII. REGIONAL THREATS: STRATEGIC MINIMALISM IN CENTRAL ASIA ........ 145 
MAKING CENTRAL ASIA A ROUTINE US DIPLOMATIC INTEREST .............................................................. 145 
UNSTABLE AND UNPLEASANT REGIMES ........................................................................................................ 146 
INVESTMENT, TRADE AND STRATEGIC LINKAGE: THE REAL SILK ROAD DOESN’T GO THROUGH 
AFGHANISTAN OR SERVE UN INTERESTS ...................................................................................................... 149 
MINIMAL STRATEGIC AND SECURITY INTERESTS ......................................................................................... 151 
IX. REGIONAL THREATS: THE REAL US STRATEGIC INTEREST IN INDIA......... 153 
LIMITING THE US ROLE IN EASING INDIA-PAKISTANI TENSIONS AND THE ROLE IN AFGHANISTAN .. 153 
FOCUSING ON THE REAL US STRATEGIC INTEREST ..................................................................................... 154 
A GOOD STRATEGIC ALLY DOES NOT NECESSARILY MAKE A GOOD MILITARY PARTNER .................... 155 
THE NEED TO FOCUS ON OTHER ASPECTS OF US RELATIONS WITH INDIA ............................................ 158 
X. REGIONAL THREATS: IRAN, CHINA, RUSSIA, AND OTHER EXTERNAL 
POWERS ................................................................................................................................................ 152 
XI. US STRATEGY: CONDITIONS-BASED COMMITMENTS OR LIMIT THE US 
ROLE IN AFGHANISTAN AND THE REGION ....................................................................... 153 
Cordesman: Strategy in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Central Asia              January  2015                
xii 
IS STRATEGY BY DEFAULT A GOOD STRATEGY? ........................................................................................... 153 
THE AFGHAN DILEMMA .................................................................................................................................... 154 
The Case for Conditions-Based Involvement ........................................................................................ 154 
The Case Against Conditions-Based Involvement .............................................................................. 155 
Choosing Between the Options .................................................................................................................... 156 
 
 
  
Cordesman: Strategy in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Central Asia              January  2015                
xiii 
Table of Figures 
Figure 1:  Last Unclassified ISAF and UN Metrics on the Growing Problems in Afghan 
District Governance .................................................................................................. 24 
Figure 2: Problems in Afghan District Governance in July 2011 ..................................... 25 
Figure 3: Parallel Governance in ISAF Regional Commands and PRTs: Does Not Show 
NGOs ........................................................................................................................ 26 
Figure 4: Last Unclassified ISAF Assessment of the Effectiveness of Aid in Key Surveyed 
Districts: June 2010................................................................................................... 27 
Figure 5: Afghan Power Struggles: The Uncertain Results of the Election ..................... 31 
Figure 6: Afghanistan: One of the Worst Governed and Most Corrupt and Countries in the 
World – Part One ...................................................................................................... 40 
Figure 6: Afghanistan: One of the Worst Governed and Most Corrupt and Countries in the 
World – Part Two...................................................................................................... 41 
Figure 7: Afghan Perceptions of the Biggest Problems Facing Afghanistan as a Whole. 42 
Figure 8: The Crisis in the Afghan Budget – Part One ..................................................... 46 
Figure 8: The Crisis in the Afghan Budget – Part Two .................................................... 47 
Figure 8: The Crisis in the Afghan Budget – Part Three .................................................. 49 
Figure 9: US Public Opinion on the Afghan War – Part One ........................................... 51 
Figure 9: US Public Opinion on the Afghan War – Part Two .......................................... 52 
Figure 10: The Past History of Wartime Aid: Declare Victory and Leave ...................... 53 
Figure 11: The Erratic US Military Role in Afghanistan: Surging Too Late and Running 
for the Exits ............................................................................................................... 59 
Figure 12: Late and Erratic Efforts to Create Effective Afghan National Security Forces – 
Part One .................................................................................................................... 61 
Figure 12: Late and Erratic Efforts to Create Effective Afghan National Security Forces – 
Part Two .................................................................................................................... 62 
Figure 12: Late and Erratic Efforts to Create Effective Afghan National Security Forces – 
Part Three .................................................................................................................. 53 
Figure 12: Erratic Efforts to Create Effective Afghan National Security Forces After 2011 
– Part Four................................................................................................................. 54 
Figure 12: Erratic Efforts to Create Effective Afghan National Security Forces After 2011 
– Part Five ................................................................................................................. 55 
Figure 13: Guessing at Insurgent Presence and Influence – Part One .............................. 59 
Figure 13: Guessing at Insurgent Presence and Influence – Part Two ............................. 60 
Figure 14: The ISAF Data on Combat Trends in Recent 1230 Reports ........................... 63 
Figure 15: A Failed Surge in Afghanistan versus a Successful Surge in Iraq .................. 64 
Cordesman: Strategy in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Central Asia              January  2015                
xiv 
Figure 16: UN and SIGAR Estimates of Rising and Spreading Violence During 2011-2014 
– Part One ................................................................................................................. 67 
Figure 16: UN and SIGAR Estimates of Rising and Spreading Violence During 2011-2014 
– Part Two ................................................................................................................. 68 
Figure 17: State Department Estimates of Rising and Spreading Violence During 2011-
2014 – Part One ........................................................................................................ 69 
Figure 17: State Department Estimates of Rising and Spreading Violence During 2011-
2014 – Part Two ........................................................................................................ 70 
Figure 18: Asia Foundation Survey of Sympathy for Armed Opposition Groups Showed a 
Drop But still a Significant Regional Support .......................................................... 71 
Figure 19: Comparative Polls on the Popularity of the ANSF – Part One ....................... 73 
Figure 19: Comparative Polls on the Popularity of the ANSF – Part Two ....................... 74 
Figure 19: Comparative Polls on the Popularity of the ANSF – Part Three ..................... 75 
Figure 20: US Grant Aid to Afghan Security Forces Versus US Estimate of On Budget 
Costs of ANA and ANP ............................................................................................ 78 
Figure 21: Uncertain World Bank Estimates of the Budget Impact of the ANSF (Less 
Foreign Grants) ......................................................................................................... 79 
Figure 22: Key Elements of the afghan National Police and Other Non-Military Security 
Forces ........................................................................................................................ 84 
Figure 23: Afghanistan: The UN Human Development Assessment ............................. 105 
Figure 24: World Bank Comparison of Education Quality in South Asia ..................... 106 
Figure 25: Afghan Economic Growth and Its Dependence on Agriculture and Rainfall- Part 
One .......................................................................................................................... 110 
Figure 25: Afghan Economic Growth and Its Dependence on Agriculture and Rainfall- Part 
Two ......................................................................................................................... 111 
Figure 26: IMF Risk Assessment Matrix for Transition in Afghanistan ........................ 115 
Figure 27: Afghanistan as a Narco-Nation – Part One ................................................... 118 
Figure 27: Afghanistan as a Narco-Nation – Part Two ................................................... 119 
Figure 28: The Afghan Trade Deficit ............................................................................. 121 
Figure 29: World Bank Ranking of Ease of Doing Business in Afghanistan ................. 124 
Figure 30: The Broadening Patterns of Internal Violence in Pakistan – Part One ......... 132 
Figure 30: The Broadening Patterns of Internal Violence in Pakistan – Part Two ......... 133 
Figure 31: US Air and UCAV Strikes in Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia: 2002-9/2014 134 
Figure 32: Pakistan and the Human Development Challenge – Part One ...................... 139 
Figure 33: The World Bank Assessment of Pakistan: High Violence and Corruption; Poor 
Governance ............................................................................................................. 141 
Cordesman: Strategy in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Central Asia              January  2015                
xv 
Figure 34: US Aid to Pakistan: FY2002 to FY2014 ....................................................... 144 
Figure 35: U.S. Foreign Assistance to Central Asia, FY1992 to FY2015 ...................... 146 
Figure 36: The Uncertain Regimes of Central Asia........................................................ 147 
Figure 37: The Strategic Geography of Central Asia ..................................................... 150 
Figure 38: US Imports and Exports from Central Asia in 2013 ..................................... 151 
Figure 39: The India-Pakistan-China Conventional Balance ......................................... 157 
Figure 40: The India-Pakistan Nuclear Delivery System Balance ................................. 158 
 
  
Cordesman: Transition in Afghanistan                              January 2015 
2 
 
I. The Strategic Vacuum in Afghanistan, Central and 
South Asia 
For all the rhetoric the contrary, the US strategy for Afghanistan, Pakistan, Central Asia, 
and South Asia, is now driven largely by the real world impact of US decisions to cut the 
US effort in Afghanistan to predetermined levels, and to leave Afghanistan according to a 
fixed timescale, regardless of the conditions in the country and the region. For the last four 
years, US strategy in Afghanistan – and in Pakistan and Central Asia – has been driven by 
President Obama’s decision to end any major US combat presence by the end of 2014, and 
his later decision to end virtually all of the US training and assist mission by the end of 
2016. 
As Secretary Gates’ memoirs make clear, the Obama Administration’s priorities shifted 
away from Afghanistan even as the President approved a military surge in Afghanistan in 
2010.  At the very time the President announced that surge, he also set a deadline of 2014 
for a US combat role over the uncertain objections of several members of his cabinet and 
senior military advisors.8 The key portions of President Obama’s speech at West Point on 
December 1, 2009, laid out a path the President continued to pursue through the end of 
2014,9 
But while we've achieved hard-earned milestones in Iraq, the situation in Afghanistan has 
deteriorated.  After escaping across the border into Pakistan in 2001 and 2002, al Qaeda’s leadership 
established a safe haven there.  Although a legitimate government was elected by the Afghan people, 
it's been hampered by corruption, the drug trade, an under-developed economy, and insufficient 
security forces.  
Over the last several years, the Taliban has maintained common cause with al Qaeda, as they both 
seek an overthrow of the Afghan government.  Gradually, the Taliban has begun to control 
additional swaths of territory in Afghanistan, while engaging in increasingly brazen and devastating 
attacks of terrorism against the Pakistani people. 
Now, throughout this period, our troop levels in Afghanistan remained a fraction of what they were 
in Iraq.  When I took office, we had just over 32,000 Americans serving in Afghanistan, compared 
to 160,000 in Iraq at the peak of the war.  Commanders in Afghanistan repeatedly asked for support 
to deal with the reemergence of the Taliban, but these reinforcements did not arrive.  And that's 
why, shortly after taking office, I approved a longstanding request for more troops.  After 
consultations with our allies, I then announced a strategy recognizing the fundamental connection 
between our war effort in Afghanistan and the extremist safe havens in Pakistan.  I set a goal that 
was narrowly defined as disrupting, dismantling, and defeating al Qaeda and its extremist allies, and 
pledged to better coordinate our military and civilian efforts.  
Since then, we've made progress on some important objectives.  High-ranking al Qaeda and Taliban 
leaders have been killed, and we've stepped up the pressure on al Qaeda worldwide. In Pakistan, 
that nation's army has gone on its largest offensive in years.  In Afghanistan, we and our allies 
prevented the Taliban from stopping a presidential election, and -- although it was marred by fraud 
-- that election produced a government that is consistent with Afghanistan's laws and constitution. 
Yet huge challenges remain.  Afghanistan is not lost, but for several years it has moved 
backwards.  There's no imminent threat of the government being overthrown, but the Taliban has 
gained momentum.  Al Qaeda has not reemerged in Afghanistan in the same numbers as before 
9/11, but they retain their safe havens along the border.  And our forces lack the full support they 
need to effectively train and partner with Afghan security forces and better secure the 
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population.  Our new commander in Afghanistan -- General Chrystal -- has reported that the security 
situation is more serious than he anticipated.  In short:  The status quo is not sustainable. 
… And as Commander-in-Chief, I have determined that it is in our vital national interest to send an 
additional 30,000 U.S. troops to Afghanistan.  After 18 months, our troops will begin to come 
home.  These are the resources that we need to seize the initiative, while building the Afghan 
capacity that can allow for a responsible transition of our forces out of Afghanistan.  
  
I do not make this decision lightly.  I opposed the war in Iraq precisely because I believe that we 
must exercise restraint in the use of military force, and always consider the long-term consequences 
of our actions.  We have been at war now for eight years, at enormous cost in lives and 
resources.  Years of debate over Iraq and terrorism have left our unity on national security issues in 
tatters, and created a highly polarized and partisan backdrop for this effort.  And having just 
experienced the worst economic crisis since the Great Depression, the American people are 
understandably focused on rebuilding our economy and putting people to work here at home. 
…. To meet that goal, we will pursue the following objectives within Afghanistan.  We must deny 
al Qaeda a safe haven.  We must reverse the Taliban's momentum and deny it the ability to 
overthrow the government.  And we must strengthen the capacity of Afghanistan's security forces 
and government so that they can take lead responsibility for Afghanistan's future.  
We will meet these objectives in three ways.  First, we will pursue a military strategy that will break 
the Taliban's momentum and increase Afghanistan's capacity over the next 18 months. 
The 30,000 additional troops that I'm announcing tonight will deploy in the first part of 2010 -- the 
fastest possible pace -- so that they can target the insurgency and secure key population 
centers.  They'll increase our ability to train competent Afghan security forces, and to partner with 
them so that more Afghans can get into the fight.  And they will help create the conditions for the 
United States to transfer responsibility to the Afghans.  
Because this is an international effort, I've asked that our commitment be joined by contributions 
from our allies.  Some have already provided additional troops, and we're confident that there will 
be further contributions in the days and weeks ahead. Our friends have fought and bled and died 
alongside us in Afghanistan.  And now, we must come together to end this war successfully.  For 
what's at stake is not simply a test of NATO's credibility -- what's at stake is the security of our 
allies, and the common security of the world. 
But taken together, these additional American and international troops will allow us to accelerate 
handing over responsibility to Afghan forces, and allow us to begin the transfer of our forces out of 
Afghanistan in July of 2011.  Just as we have done in Iraq, we will execute this transition 
responsibly, taking into account conditions on the ground.  We'll continue to advise and assist 
Afghanistan's security forces to ensure that they can succeed over the long haul.  But it will be clear 
to the Afghan government -- and, more importantly, to the Afghan people -- that they will ultimately 
be responsible for their own country.  
Second, we will work with our partners, the United Nations, and the Afghan people to pursue a more 
effective civilian strategy, so that the government can take advantage of improved security. 
This effort must be based on performance.  The days of providing a blank check are over.  President 
Karzai's inauguration speech sent the right message about moving in a new direction.  And going 
forward, we will be clear about what we expect from those who receive our assistance.  We'll support 
Afghan ministries, governors, and local leaders that combat corruption and deliver for the 
people.  We expect those who are ineffective or corrupt to be held accountable.  And we will also 
focus our assistance in areas -- such as agriculture -- that can make an immediate impact in the lives 
of the Afghan people. 
… In the past, we too often defined our relationship with Pakistan narrowly.  Those days are 
over.  Moving forward, we are committed to a partnership with Pakistan that is built on a foundation 
of mutual interest, mutual respect, and mutual trust. We will strengthen Pakistan’s capacity to target 
those groups that threaten our countries, and have made it clear that we cannot tolerate a safe haven 
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for terrorists whose location is known and whose intentions are clear.  America is also providing 
substantial resources to support Pakistan’s democracy and development.  We are the largest 
international supporter for those Pakistanis displaced by the fighting.  And going forward, the 
Pakistan people must know America will remain a strong supporter of Pakistan’s security and 
prosperity long after the guns have fallen silent, so that the great potential of its people can be 
unleashed. 
These are the three core elements of our strategy:  a military effort to create the conditions for a 
transition; a civilian surge that reinforces positive action; and an effective partnership with Pakistan. 
I recognize there are a range of concerns about our approach.  So let me briefly address a few of the 
more prominent arguments that I've heard, and which I take very seriously. 
  
First, there are those who suggest that Afghanistan is another Vietnam.  They argue that it cannot 
be stabilized, and we're better off cutting our losses and rapidly withdrawing.  I believe this 
argument depends on a false reading of history.  Unlike Vietnam, we are joined by a broad coalition 
of 43 nations that recognizes the legitimacy of our action.  Unlike Vietnam, we are not facing a 
broad-based popular insurgency.  And most importantly, unlike Vietnam, the American people were 
viciously attacked from Afghanistan, and remain a target for those same extremists who are plotting 
along its border.  To abandon this area now -- and to rely only on efforts against al Qaeda from a 
distance -- would significantly hamper our ability to keep the pressure on al Qaeda, and create an 
unacceptable risk of additional attacks on our homeland and our allies.  
  
Second, there are those who acknowledge that we can't leave Afghanistan in its current state, but 
suggest that we go forward with the troops that we already have.  But this would simply maintain a 
status quo in which we muddle through, and permit a slow deterioration of conditions there.  It 
would ultimately prove more costly and prolong our stay in Afghanistan, because we would never 
be able to generate the conditions needed to train Afghan security forces and give them the space to 
take over. 
Finally, there are those who oppose identifying a time frame for our transition to Afghan 
responsibility.  Indeed, some call for a more dramatic and open-ended escalation of our war effort  -
- one that would commit us to a nation-building project of up to a decade.  I reject this course because 
it sets goals that are beyond what can be achieved at a reasonable cost, and what we need to achieve 
to secure our interests.  Furthermore, the absence of a time frame for transition would deny us any 
sense of urgency in working with the Afghan government.  It must be clear that Afghans will have 
to take responsibility for their security, and that America has no interest in fighting an endless war 
in Afghanistan. 
As President, I refuse to set goals that go beyond our responsibility, our means, or our interests.  And 
I must weigh all of the challenges that our nation faces.  I don't have the luxury of committing to 
just one.  Indeed, I'm mindful of the words of President Eisenhower, who -- in discussing our 
national security -- said, "Each proposal must be weighed in the light of a broader consideration:  the 
need to maintain balance in and among national programs." 
Over the past several years, we have lost that balance.  We've failed to appreciate the connection 
between our national security and our economy.  In the wake of an economic crisis, too many of our 
neighbors and friends are out of work and struggle to pay the bills.  Too many Americans are worried 
about the future facing our children.  Meanwhile, competition within the global economy has grown 
more fierce.  So we can't simply afford to ignore the price of these wars. 
All told, by the time I took office the cost of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan approached a trillion 
dollars.  Going forward, I am committed to addressing these costs openly and honestly.  Our new 
approach in Afghanistan is likely to cost us roughly $30 billion for the military this year, and I'll 
work closely with Congress to address these costs as we work to bring down our deficit. 
It was clear at the time that President Obama set these deadlines that Afghanistan lacked 
an effective government, was one of the most corrupt countries in the world, and had not 
made major progress towards development as a result of outside aid. It was clear that 
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Afghanistan faced a prolonged budget and economic crisis the moment outside aid and 
military spending was seriously cut, and that it would be unable to create and sustain 
effective security forces indefinitely without major outside financial aid, military advisors, 
and military support.  
This may explain why several senior US officials said in the days following the President’s 
speech that the process of steadily cutting US forces beginning in the summer of 2011, and 
withdrawing all combat forces by the end of 2014, would be conditions-based.  The 
President never said this, however, and in a later background briefing following speech, a 
senior US official stated that the President had rejected efforts to not include a deadline in 
his speech and to imply that withdrawal would be conditional.10 
The President also did not describe any broader strategy for Pakistan, Central Asia, or 
South Asia. By the time the President gave his December 2009 speech, however, the US 
already saw Pakistan as a key center of gravity in the war, but also as a source of aid and 
comfort to an enemy base in part on its soil. It was also clear at the time that the Pakistani 
Army was still using its Inter-Service Intelligence (ISI) branch to covertly support the 
Taliban and other Afghan insurgents, and was providing cover and sanctuary to Osama Bin 
Laden and Al Qaeda as well to the Quetta Taliban and Haqqani network. This history is 
described in detail in Carlotta Gall’s The Wrong Enemy – a book broadly endorsed by a 
number of US officers and experts who were actually working in Pakistan at the time.11 
US Strategy Writes Off Afghanistan Pakistan, and 
the Region 
This lack of conditionality and a broader regional strategy, however, has presented 
problems ever since. The rhetoric of US strategy from 2009 onwards implied continued 
support for Afghanistan without really addressing its weaknesses or its failures as a partner, 
and left the issue of Pakistan largely unaddressed because of Pakistan’s critical role as a 
route for US supplies and movements. 
The reality of US strategy moved towards a broader disengagement from Afghanistan, 
Pakistan, and Central Asia.  The new Defense Strategic Guidance that the Department of 
Defense issued in January 2012 made it clear that US intended to leave Afghanistan, and 
focus on other regions of the world. It called for the US to only fight where its strategic 
interests were directly involved and only in proportion to the importance of those interests. 
It explicitly said the US should avoid fighting wars major like the ones in Iraq and 
Afghanistan in the future, avoid large-scale land force commitments to limited wars of 
limited strategic value, and focus on strategic partnerships where the partner would play a 
major role. 
A QDR That Largely Wrote Off the Region 
The US then repeated key elements of this guidance in most Department of Defense and 
State Department budget requests from FY2013 onwards. This was not true of its FY2015 
budget submission, but it was true of the new Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR 2014) 
of long term US national security policy that the US issued in March 2014.  
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The executive summary to the 2014 QDR only provided a token reference to leaving 
Afghanistan, focused on the Middle East and Asia, and discussed virtually every other 
region than Central and South Asia – which it effectively did not mention at all: 12 
Rebalancing and sustaining our presence and posture abroad to better protect U.S. national security 
interests. In striving to achieve our three strategic objectives, the Department will also continue to 
rebalance and sustain our global posture. We will continue our contributions to the U.S. rebalance 
to the Asia-Pacific region, seeking to preserve peace and stability in a region that is increasingly 
central to U.S. political, economic, and security interests.  
Faced with North Korea’s long-range missiles and WMD programs – particularly its pursuit of 
nuclear weapons – the United States is committed to maintaining peace and security on the Korean 
Peninsula. As part of our broader efforts for stability in the Asia-Pacific region, the United States 
will maintain a robust footprint in Northeast Asia while enhancing our presence in Oceania and 
Southeast Asia.  
As we end combat operations in Afghanistan, we are prepared to transition to a limited mission 
focused on counterterrorism and training, advising, and assisting Afghan security forces. The United 
States also has enduring interests in the Middle East, and we will remain fully committed to the 
security of our partners in the region. We will continue to maintain a strong military posture in the 
Gulf region – one that can respond swiftly to crisis, deter aggression, and assure our allies and 
partners – while making sure that our military capabilities evolve to meet new threats.  
Given our deep and abiding interests in maintaining and expanding European security and prosperity, 
we will continue our work with allies and partners to promote regional stability and Euro-Atlantic 
integration, as well as to improve capacity, interoperability, and strategic access for coalition 
operations. Across the globe, we will ensure the access needed to surge forces rapidly in the event 
of a crisis. 
The QDR did not mention Central or South Asia at all in the section in the QDR on regional 
trends. 13 The two regions were only mentioned in a passing -- and as a vague priority -- in 
the final passages of the section on Building Global Security towards the end of the 
document – as much because the authors had to say something as because of any serious 
strategic focus on any state other than India: 14 
We will continue efforts to help stabilize Central and Southwest Asia and deepen our engagement 
in the Indian Ocean region to bolster our rebalance to Asia. The stability of Pakistan and peace in 
South Asia remain critical to this effort. The United States supports India’s rise as an increasingly 
capable actor in the region, and we are deepening our strategic partnership, including through the 
Defense Trade and Technology Initiative. 
President Obama’s Statement on Afghanistan on May 27, 2014 
In late May of 2014, President Obama issued a statement that made the limits to any 
continued role in Afghanistan explicitly clear. He made the US frustration with Karzai and 
the then uncertain outcome of Afghan election all too clear. His main focused, however, 
was on the fact that the future US role would set fixed limits to the US presence in 2015 
and 2016, cutting down to 9,800 men at the start of 2015, cutting this total in half by the 
end of 2015, and eliminating virtually all military personnel by the end of 2016,15  
We have now been in Afghanistan longer than many Americans expected.  But make no mistake -- 
thanks to the skill and sacrifice of our troops, diplomats, and intelligence professionals, we have 
struck significant blows against   al Qaeda’s leadership, we have eliminated Osama bin Laden, and 
we have prevented Afghanistan from being used to launch attacks against our homeland.  We have 
also supported the Afghan people as they continue the hard work of building a democracy.  We’ve 
extended more opportunities to their people, including women and girls.  And we’ve helped train 
and equip their own security forces. 
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Now we’re finishing the job we started.  Over the last several years, we’ve worked to transition 
security responsibilities to the Afghans.  One year ago, Afghan forces assumed the lead for combat 
operations.  Since then, they’ve continued to grow in size and in strength, while making huge 
sacrifices for their country.  This transition has allowed us to steadily draw down our own forces -- 
from a peak of 100,000 U.S. troops, to roughly 32,000 today. 
2014, therefore, is a pivotal year.  Together with our allies and the Afghan government, we have 
agreed that this is the year we will conclude our combat mission in Afghanistan. This is also a year 
of political transition in Afghanistan.  Earlier this spring, Afghans turned out in the millions to vote 
in the first round of their presidential election -- defying threats in order to determine their own 
destiny.  And in just over two weeks, they will vote for their next President, and Afghanistan will 
see its first democratic transfer of power in history. 
In the context of this progress, having consulted with Congress and my national security team, I’ve 
determined the nature of the commitment that America is prepared to make beyond 2014.  Our 
objectives are clear:  Disrupting threats posed by   al Qaeda; supporting Afghan security forces; and 
giving the Afghan people the opportunity to succeed as they stand on their own. 
Here’s how we will pursue those objectives.  First, America’s combat mission will be over by the 
end of this year. Starting next year, Afghans will be fully responsible for securing their 
country.  American personnel will be in an advisory role.  We will no longer patrol Afghan cities or 
towns, mountains or valleys.  That is a task for the Afghan people. 
Second, I’ve made it clear that we’re open to cooperating with Afghans on two narrow missions 
after 2014:  training Afghan forces and supporting counterterrorism operations against the remnants 
of al Qaeda.  
Today, I want to be clear about how the United States is prepared to advance those missions.  At the 
beginning of 2015, we will have approximately 98,000 U.S. -- let me start that over, just because I 
want to make sure we don’t get this written wrong.  At the beginning of 2015, we will have 
approximately 9,800 U.S. service members in different parts of the country, together with our 
NATO allies and other partners. By the end of 2015, we will have reduced that presence by roughly 
half, and we will have consolidated our troops in Kabul and on Bagram Airfield.  One year later, by 
the end of 2016, our military will draw down to a normal embassy presence in Kabul, with a security 
assistance component, just as we’ve done in Iraq. 
Now, even as our troops come home, the international community will continue to support Afghans 
as they build their country for years to come.  But our relationship will not be defined by war -- it 
will be shaped by our financial and development assistance, as well as our diplomatic support.  Our 
commitment to Afghanistan is rooted in the strategic partnership that we agreed to in 2012.  And 
this plan remains consistent with discussions we’ve had with our NATO allies.  Just as our allies 
have been with us every step of the way in Afghanistan, we expect that our allies will be with us 
going forward. 
Third, we will only sustain this military presence after 2014 if the Afghan government signs the 
Bilateral Security Agreement that our two governments have already negotiated.  This Agreement 
is essential to give our troops the authorities they need to fulfill their mission, while respecting 
Afghan sovereignty.  The two final Afghan candidates in the run-off election for President have 
each indicated that they would sign this agreement promptly after taking office.  So I’m hopeful that 
we can get this done.  
The bottom line is, it’s time to turn the page on more than a decade in which so much of our foreign 
policy was focused on the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.  When I took office, we had nearly 180,000 
troops in harm’s way.  By the end of this year, we will have less than 10,000.  In addition to bringing 
our troops home, this new chapter in American foreign policy will allow us to redirect some of the 
resources saved by ending these wars to respond more nimbly to the changing threat of terrorism, 
while addressing a broader set of priorities around the globe. 
I think Americans have learned that it’s harder to end wars than it is to begin them.  Yet this is how 
wars end in the 21st century -- not through signing ceremonies, but through decisive blows against 
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our adversaries, transitions to elected governments, security forces who take the lead and ultimately 
full responsibility.  We remain committed to a sovereign, secure, stable, and unified 
Afghanistan.  And toward that end, we will continue to support Afghan-led efforts to promote peace 
in their country through reconciliation.  We have to recognize that Afghanistan will not be a perfect 
place, and it is not America’s responsibility to make it one.  The future of Afghanistan must be 
decided by Afghans.  But what the United States can do -- what we will do -- is secure our interests 
and help give the Afghans a chance, an opportunity to seek a long, overdue and hard-earned peace.  
President Obama’s New Strategy Speech at West Point  
The real world limits to the US commitment to Afghanistan became even more apparent 
in a much broader strategy speech that President Obama gave at West Point on May 28, 
2014 – the day after his statement on Afghanistan. President Obama delivered this speech 
only one day after announcing he would maintain a significant US advisory role in 
Afghanistan only during 2015 and phase that presence out on 2016.  
He used his new strategy speech to both declare victory in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan 
and to highlight the fact the US now going to focus a different approach to war and more 
important areas. The key portions of his speech made this shift in strategic focus all too 
clear:16  
When I first spoke at West Point in 2009, we still had more than 100,000 troops in Iraq. We were 
preparing to surge in Afghanistan. Our counterterrorism efforts were focused on al-Qaida’s core 
leadership -- those who had carried out the 9/11 attacks. And our nation was just beginning a long 
climb out of the worst economic crisis since the Great Depression. 
Four and a half years later, as you graduate, the landscape has changed. We have removed our troops 
from Iraq. We are winding down our war in Afghanistan. Al-Qaida’s leadership on the border region 
between Pakistan and Afghanistan has been decimated, and Osama bin Laden is no more. (Cheers, 
applause.) And through it all, we’ve refocused our investments in what has always been a key source 
of American strength: a growing economy that can provide opportunity for everybody who’s willing 
to work hard and take responsibility here at home. 
In fact, by most measures America has rarely been stronger relative to the rest of the world. Those 
who argue otherwise -- who suggest that America is in decline or has seen its global leadership slip 
away -- are either misreading history or engaged in partisan politics. 
But the world is changing with accelerating speed. This presents opportunity, but also new dangers. 
We know all too well, after 9/11, just how technology and globalization has put power once reserved 
for states in the hands of individuals, raising the capacity of terrorists to do harm. 
Russia’s aggression towards former Soviet states unnerves capitals in Europe while China’s 
economic rise and military reach worries its neighbors. 
From Brazil to India, rising middle classes compete with us, and governments seek a greater say in 
global forums. And even as developing nations embrace democracy and market economies, 24-hour 
news and social media makes it impossible to ignore the continuation of sectarian conflicts, failing 
states and popular uprisings that might have received only passing notice a generation ago. 
It will be your generation’s task to respond to this new world. The question we face, the question 
each of you will face, is not whether America will lead but how we will lead, not just to secure our 
peace and prosperity but also extend peace and prosperity around the globe. 
As the Syrian civil war spills across borders, the capacity of battle-hardened extremist groups to 
come after us only increases. Regional aggression that goes unchecked, whether in southern Ukraine 
or the South China Sea or anywhere else in the world, will ultimately impact our allies, and could 
draw in our military. We can’t ignore what happens beyond our boundaries. 
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And beyond these narrow rationales, I believe we have a real stake -- abiding self-interest -- in 
making sure our children and our grandchildren grow up in a world where schoolgirls are not 
kidnapped; where individuals aren’t slaughtered because of tribe or faith or political belief. 
I believe that a world of greater freedom and tolerance is not only a moral imperative; it also helps 
keep us safe. 
But to say that we have an interest in pursuing peace and freedom beyond our borders is not to say 
that every problem has a military solution. Since World War II, some of our most costly mistakes 
came not from our restraint but from our willingness to rush into military adventures without 
thinking through the consequences, without building international support and legitimacy for our 
action, without leveling with the American people about the sacrifices required. Tough talk often 
draws headlines, but war rarely conforms to slogans. As General Eisenhower, someone with hard-
earned knowledge on this subject, said at this ceremony in 1947, “War is mankind’s most tragic and 
stupid folly; to seek or advise its deliberate provocation is a black crime against all men.” 
Like Eisenhower, this generation of men and women in uniform know all too well the wages of war, 
and that includes those of you here at West Point. Four of the service members who stood in the 
audience when I announced the surge of our forces in Afghanistan gave their lives in that effort. A 
lot more were wounded. 
I believe America’s security demanded those deployments. But I am haunted by those deaths. I am 
haunted by those wounds. And I would betray my duty to you, and to the country we love, if I sent 
you into harm’s way simply because I saw a problem somewhere in the world that needed to be 
fixed, or because I was worried about critics who think military intervention is the only way for 
America to avoid looking weak. 
…First, let me repeat a principle I put forward at the outset of my presidency: The United States 
will use military force, unilaterally if necessary, when our core interests demand it -- when our 
people are threatened; when our livelihoods are at stake; when the security of our allies is in danger. 
In these circumstances, we still need to ask tough questions about whether our actions are 
proportional and effective and just. International opinion matters, but America should never ask 
permission to protect our people, our homeland or our way of life. (Applause.) 
On the other hand, when issues of global concern do not pose a direct threat to the United States, 
when such issues are at stake, when crises arise that stir our conscience or push the world in a more 
dangerous direction but do not directly threaten us, then the threshold for military action must be 
higher. In such circumstances, we should not go it alone. Instead, we must mobilize allies and 
partners to take collective action. We have to broaden our tools to include diplomacy and 
development, sanctions and isolation, appeals to international law, and, if just, necessary and 
effective, multilateral military action. In such circumstances, we have to work with others because 
collective action in these circumstances is more likely to succeed, more likely to be sustained, less 
likely to lead to costly mistakes. 
This leads to my second point. For the foreseeable future, the most direct threat to America, at home 
and abroad, remains terrorism, but a strategy that involves invading every country that harbors 
terrorist networks is naive and unsustainable. I believe we must shift our counterterrorism strategy, 
drawing on the successes and shortcomings of our experience in Iraq and Afghanistan, to more 
effectively partner with countries where terrorist networks seek a foothold. 
And the need for a new strategy reflects the fact that today’s principal threat no longer comes from 
a centralized al-Qaida leadership. Instead it comes from decentralized al-Qaida affiliates and 
extremists, many with agendas focused in the countries where they operate. And this lessens the 
possibility of large-scale 9/11-style attacks against the homeland, but it heightens the danger of U.S. 
personnel overseas being attacked, as we saw in Benghazi. It heightens the danger to less defensible 
targets, as we saw in a shopping mall in Nairobi. So we have to develop a strategy that matches this 
diffuse threat, one that expands our reach without sending forces that stretch our military too thin or 
stir up local resentments. 
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We need partners to fight terrorists alongside us. And empowering partners is a large part of what 
we have done and what we are currently doing in Afghanistan. Together with our allies, America 
struck huge blows against al-Qaida core and pushed back against an insurgency that threatened to 
overrun the country. 
But sustaining this progress depends on the ability of Afghans to do the job. And that’s why we 
trained hundreds of thousands of Afghan soldiers and police. Earlier this spring, those forces -- those 
Afghan forces -- secured an election in which Afghans voted for the first democratic transfer of 
power in their history. And at the end of this year, a new Afghan president will be in office, and 
America’s combat mission will be over. 
Now -- (applause) -- that was an enormous achievement made because of America’s armed forces. 
But as we move to a train and advise mission in Afghanistan, our reduced presence there allows us 
to more effectively address emerging threats in the Middle East and North Africa. So earlier this 
year I asked my national security team to develop a plan for a network of partnerships from South 
Asia to the Sahel. 
Somewhat ironically, the President used this speech to make transparency a key aspect of 
his shift in strategy: 17 
Let me make one final point about our efforts against terrorism. The partnerships I’ve described do 
not eliminate the need to take direct action when necessary to protect ourselves. When we have 
actionable intelligence, that’s what we do, through capture operations, like the one that brought a 
terrorist involved in the plot to bomb our embassies in 1998 to face justice, or drone strikes, like 
those we’ve carried out in Yemen and Somalia. 
There are times when those actions are necessary and we cannot hesitate to protect our people. But 
as I said last year, in taking direct action, we must uphold standards that reflect our values. That 
means taking strikes only when we face a continuing, imminent threat, and only where there is no 
certainty -- there is near certainty of no civilian casualties, for our actions should meet a simple test: 
We must not create more enemies than we take off the battlefield. 
I also believe we must be more transparent about both the basis of our counterterrorism actions and 
the manner in which they are carried out. We have to be able to explain them publicly, whether it is 
drone strikes or training partners. I will increasingly turn to our military to take the lead and provide 
information to the public about our efforts. Our intelligence community has done outstanding work 
and we have to continue to protect sources and methods, but when we cannot explain our efforts 
clearly and publicly, we face terrorist propaganda and international suspicion, we erode legitimacy 
with our partners and our people, and we reduce accountability in our own government. 
And this issue of transparency is directly relevant to a third aspect of American leadership, and that 
is our effort to strengthen and enforce international order. 
After World War II, America had the wisdom to shape institutions to keep the peace and support 
human progress -- from NATO and the United Nations, to the World Bank and IMF. These 
institutions are not perfect, but they have been a force multiplier. They reducing the need for 
unilateral American action and increase restraint among other nations. 
As for the rest of the speech, the President focused on Europe and Ukraine, the Middle 
East, and Asia, and touched upon Latin America and Africa, but never mentioned Central 
of South Asia at all. 18 
No Clearer Lead from NATO 
Like Washington, NATO provided a great deal of positive rhetoric About the Afghan 
conflict during the period following the President’s speech at the end of 2009, but US allies 
had no more desire to stay in Afghanistan than the US. In fact, almost all allied public 
opinion polls showed their publics had cease to support the war before the President spoke.  
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It was clear from the start that the rest of the ISAF coalition would follow the US lead and 
almost all allied troops would also be gone by the end of 2014. . 
A corrupt and failed second round in the Afghan election in the spring of 2014 did not help 
matters. The first round on April 5, 2014, had failed to give any candidate a majority. It 
was the runoff between Ashraf Ghani and Abdullah Abdullah on June 16, 2014, however, 
which was so corrupt that it put Ashraf Ghani’s apparent victory into serious doubt and 
threatened to divide the country.  
It led to months in which the Afghan government had no effective leadership, and the 
resulting paralysis reached the point where NATO formally highlighted its lack of an 
effective security partner in its Ministerial Summit meeting in early September 2014.  
NATO issued a press release on September 4th asking the two rival Afghan Presidential 
candidates to reach some compromise in their struggle over the outcome of the election 
that had first been held on April 5, 2014 – some five months earlier:19 
NATO Leaders at the Wales Summit reaffirmed on Thursday (4 September 2014) their commitment 
to supporting Afghanistan and called on the two presidential candidates to work together and to 
conclude the necessary security agreements as soon as possible, as they have said they will. The 
ISAF Heads of State and Government also asked the two candidates to “swiftly deliver a peaceful 
outcome of this election, acceptable to the Afghan people,” the NATO Secretary General, Anders 
Fogh Rasmussen said. 
Leaders from NATO nations joined by ISAF partner countries reaffirmed their readiness to launch 
a non-combat mission in Afghanistan after 2014 to help train, advise and assist Afghan security 
forces, providing necessary legal arrangements are signed without delay. “I cannot stress too 
strongly how important this is,” Mr. Fogh Rasmussen said. “Without a signature, there can be no 
mission. Our planning is complete but time is short.” The post-2014 Resolute Support Mission is 
one of the three pillars of NATO’s long-term engagement in Afghanistan, along with a contribution 
to the long-term sustainment of the Afghan National Army and the strengthening of long-term 
political and practical cooperation with Afghanistan. “With the end of ISAF in December, we will 
change the nature and the scope of our involvement in Afghanistan,” said the Secretary General. 
“But our commitment will endure because stability in Afghanistan also means security for us.” This 
three-pronged engagement is aimed to build on the gains achieved throughout the thirteen-year long 
ISAF mission, particularly in the development of strong, professional and capable security forces, 
as well as in the fields of education, health, economic development, human rights and fundamental 
freedoms, notably for women. 
 
During the meeting, ISAF leaders underlined the importance of continued support by the 
international community, and of sustained efforts by the Afghan Government, notably in continuing 
to increase its financial accountability and contribution, improve governance and rule of law, 
promote and protect human rights for all.  The meeting also provided the opportunity to pay tribute 
to the men and women from Afghan and international forces who have served in the country and in 
other NATO operations. “This is the right time to remember what we have sacrificed and what we 
have achieved”, NATO Secretary General said. “Their courage, effort and sacrifice have made all 
our nations safer and improved global security.” 
Afghan Defence Minister Bismullah Khan Mohammadi, leaders from Japan, Central Asian states, 
as well as representatives from key international community partners from the United Nations and 
the European Union also attended the meeting. 
By the time of this NATO Ministerial Summit occurred, however, it was Russian action in 
the Ukraine and the rising war against the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria that had priority. 
A total of 31 paragraphs of the full Ministerial statement dealt with Russia and the Ukraine. 
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This discussion of Afghanistan was some four paragraphs long, and was all political 
rhetoric:20 
 We met yesterday in an expanded meeting on Afghanistan and, together with our International 
Security and Assistance Force (ISAF) partners, we issued a Wales Summit Declaration on 
Afghanistan.  
 For over a decade, NATO Allies and partner nations from across the world have stood shoulder to 
shoulder with Afghanistan in the largest operation in the history of the Alliance. This 
unprecedented effort has enhanced global security and contributed to a better future for Afghan 
men, women, and children. We honour the Afghan and international personnel who have lost their 
lives or been injured in this endeavour.  
 With the end of ISAF in December 2014, the nature and scope of our engagement with 
Afghanistan will change. We envisage three parallel, mutually reinforcing strands of activity: in 
the short term, NATO Allies and partner nations stand ready to continue to train, advise, and assist 
the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) after 2014 through the non-combat Resolute Support 
Mission; in the medium term, we reaffirm our commitment to contribute to the financial 
sustainment of the ANSF; in the long term, we remain committed to strengthening NATO's 
partnership with Afghanistan. We count on Afghanistan's commitment and cooperation.  
 We recognise the particular importance of advancing regional cooperation and good neighbourly 
relations for the security and stability of Afghanistan. We remain determined to support the Afghan 
people in their efforts to build a stable, sovereign, democratic, and united country, where rule of law 
and good governance prevail, and in which human rights for all, especially the rights of women, 
including their full participation in decision making, and those of children, are fully protected. 
Working with the Government of Afghanistan and the wider international community, our goal 
remains to never again be threatened by terrorists from within Afghanistan. Our commitment to 
Afghanistan will endure. 
NATO did, however, issue a separate statement on Afghanistan called the Wales 
Declaration on September 4, 2014. This statement did not provide any major new details 
or plans beyond those NATO had repeated since 2012. The discussions that led to the 
Wales Declaration did, however, note that the annual cost of the ANSF had risen from $4.1 
billion to $5.1 billion. As a result, NATO highlighted the growing funding challenges and 
problems in Afghanistan’s ability to carry out a Transition after 2014.21 
… ISAF will conclude at the end of 2014 as planned. For over a year, the ANSF have been in the 
lead for combat operations throughout the country. Although many challenges remain, they have 
demonstrated that they are an effective force, gaining the respect and confidence of the Afghan 
people and able to prevent insurgents from achieving their objectives. When ISAF operations end, 
the Afghan authorities will assume full responsibility for security. However, our commitment to 
Afghanistan will endure beyond ISAF along with our determination to ensure that we are never 
again threatened by terrorists from within Afghanistan. 
With the end of ISAF, the nature and scope of our engagement with Afghanistan will change. We 
envisage three parallel, mutually reinforcing, strands of activity: 
…In the short term, the Resolute Support Mission. As decided at the Chicago Summit in 2012, at 
the invitation of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, and in the context of the 
broader international effort to help Afghanistan, NATO Allies and partner nations stand ready to 
continue to train, advise and assist the ANSF after 2014. This will be done through a new, non-
combat mission with a sound legal basis. The mission’s establishment is contingent on the signing 
of the U.S.-Afghanistan Bilateral Security Agreement and NATO-Afghanistan Status of Forces 
Agreement. The Resolute Support Mission should ideally, in consultation with the Government of 
Afghanistan, be supported by a United Nations Security Council Resolution. 
…In the medium term, our contribution to the financial sustainment of the ANSF. At Chicago, 
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NATO allies and ISAF partners decided to provide support to the ANSF, as appropriate, through 
the Transformation Decade, on the understanding that the Afghan Government will make an 
increasing financial contribution to this endeavor. Today, nations renewed their financial 
commitments to support the sustainment of the ANSF, including to the end of 2017. We also urge 
the wider international community to remain engaged in the financial sustainment of the ANSF. We 
will maintain and strengthen the transparent, accountable and cost-effective funding mechanisms 
we have established since Chicago, including the Oversight and Coordination Body, which will 
ensure donors can confidently commit this support. Realizing the full promise of the pledges made 
at Chicago on the financial sustainment of the ANSF, which we have reaffirmed today, will require 
transparency, accountability, and cost-effectiveness of the relevant international funding 
mechanisms. We encourage the Afghan Government to continue and strengthen efforts to fight 
corruption. We look forward to working with the Afghan authorities to review the force structure 
and capabilities of the ANSF to achieve a sufficient and sustainable force. We restate the aim, agreed 
at Chicago, that Afghanistan should assume, no later than 2024, full financial responsibility for its 
own security forces. 
…In the long term, NATO-Afghanistan Enduring Partnership. NATO Allies remain committed to 
the NATO-Afghanistan Enduring Partnership, agreed at the Lisbon Summit in 2010. The 
strengthening of this partnership will reflect the changing nature of NATO’s relationship with 
Afghanistan whilst complementing the Resolute Support Mission and continuing beyond it. Both 
the political and practical elements of this partnership should be jointly owned and strengthened 
through regular consultation on issues of strategic concern. NATO is ready to work with 
Afghanistan to develop this partnership in line with NATO’s Partnership Policy, possibly including 
the development of an Individual Partnership Cooperation Program at an appropriate time. 
We will continue to support an Afghan-led, Afghan-owned and inclusive peace process, as stated at 
the 2011 Bonn Conference and at the Chicago Summit in 2012. We welcome efforts by all parties 
that further this process. 
Good neighbourly relations, as well as regional support and cooperation will remain essential. This 
has been strengthened notably by the Istanbul Process in the Heart of Asia region. 
A stable Afghanistan will be able to make a positive contribution to the wider region including 
through delivering progress in the fight against narcotics trafficking, illegal migration, terrorism and 
crime. 
We are resolved to support Afghanistan in making further progress towards becoming a stable, 
sovereign, democratic and united country, where rule of law and good governance prevail and in 
which human rights, and notably those of children, are fully protected. We emphasize the particular 
importance of strengthening efforts to implement the rights of women and the United Nations 
Security Council Resolutions on Women, Peace and Security, and to include women fully in 
political, peace and reconciliation processes. We further recognize the need for the protection of 
children from the damaging effects of armed conflict as required in relevant United Nations 
Resolutions. We also welcome continued work to strengthen the protection of civilians by all parties 
concerned. Thus, we are committed to continue working with Afghanistan to further strengthen 
these values and principles. 
Today we have extended significant offers of support and partnership to Afghanistan as it 
determines its own future. We remain steadfast and resolute in our commitment to the Afghan 
people. 
As for the Afghan side of the equation, Ashraf Ghani and Abdullah Abdullah reached an 
awkward compromise in late September 2014 that was brokered in part by the US. This 
compromise made Ashraf Ghani the new president, but created a new–non-constitutional 
post for Abdullah Abdullah called the Chief Executive.  This compromise, however, left 
the relative role of Ghani and Abdullah unclear. It also failed to produce a new government, 
and in spite of the fact US Secretary of State John Kerry called a triumph of “statesmanship 
and compromise.”22 Ghani dismissed the existing cabinet following his inauguration on 
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September 29, 2014, and Ghani and Abdullah had still not agreed on a new government, 
or any major appointments by the end of 2014.23 
A Civil Failure by USAID, the UN and Other Donors 
These decisions affecting US and ISAF forces, and support for the ANSF, were only half 
of the story. While the US and ISAF military effort had its limits, as the following analysis 
shows, it did have plans, structure, supporting analysis, and something approaching 
measures of effectiveness. The civil effort consisted largely over-ambitious concepts, a 
lack of meaningful economic analysis and planning, efforts to improve governance and the 
rule of law which largely failed, and cosmetic efforts at integrating civil-military panning 
which left the civil side large in the form of concepts without any meaningful plans, 
milestones, metrics, cost analysis, or measures of effectiveness. 
The lack of any serious control and management of aid money grossly increased corruption 
in Afghanistan, and led to massive waste, fraud, and abuse. It also led the World Bank and 
Transparency International to rank Afghanistan as one of the most corrupt governments in 
the world.  
The problems in the Afghan election in 2014 were only a symptom of problems that built 
up steadily after the fall of the Taliban in 2001-2002. A nation that had the image of a 
democracy was effectively governed by a series of power brokers, and far too many 
political appointments at the Ministerial, provincial, and district level were so corrupt or 
incompetent that they alienated the people from the government. UN and World Bank 
estimates discussed later in this study show that very real surge of progress that occurred 
after the Taliban were ousted in 2001-2002 largely came to a halt in 2005-2007, that 
poverty began to increase, and the near flood of civil aid only impact on a small percentage 
of the population. 
Aid donors and international organizations did little better than the Afghan government. 
The United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) proved to be a total 
failure in shaping and coordinating the international aid effort, never produced a 
meaningful development plan for Afghanistan, and never produced a useful report of any 
kind on the levels of civilian aid expenditure or its effectiveness. As is shown later in this 
analysis, the World Bank and IMF produced serious analyses of the Afghan economy in 
2012-2014, yet unrealistic development plans based on peace that was unlikely to exist and 
impossible real-world levels of progress. Seven dealt with the Islamic state and the Middle 
East.  
International conferences did make some progress in establishing conditionality for 
economic and civil aid. The Afghan government did provide a broadly structured aid plan 
and reform program at the Tokyo Conference in early July 2012. However, the Afghan 
government made little – if any – substantive progress in implementing its reform plan in 
the years that followed.  
At of the end of 2014, the Afghan government was still discussing the Tokyo Mutual 
Accountability Framework (TMAF) as a revised work in progress that would be agreed a 
Senior Officials Meeting (SOM) in 2015, based on the new priorities of the Afghan 
Government, although some unspecified TMAF hard deliverables would be implemented 
“in the interim period.” 
Cordesman: Transition in Afghanistan                              January 2015 
15 
The United Kingdom and Afghanistan did co-host a London Conference on “Afghanistan 
and International Community: Commitments to Reforms and Renewed Partnership on 
December 4, 2014.” The Conference had representatives of 59 countries and co-chaired by 
H.E. President Mohammad Ashraf Ghani, President of the Islamic Republic of 
Afghanistan, Rt Hon David Cameron MP, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom. 
Afghanistan’s Chief Executive, Dr. Abdullah Abdullah, and the United Kingdom’s Foreign 
Secretary Phillip Hammond. The meeting broadly reaffirmed each country’s partnership 
with Afghanistan after 2014. It was also attended by NGOs, representatives of Afghan civil 
society, and multilateral organizations and was preceded by meetings civil society 
engagement, private sector development and regional economic cooperation. 
The Conference declaration, however, was almost all rhetoric, and provided no new plans 
or substance. The closest it came to addressing any real issues was to state:24 
The Participants welcomed the Afghan Government’s plans to enhance productivity, increase its 
domestic revenue mobilization to attract more private sector investment, and stimulate growth and 
employment opportunities. Over time, this approach will reduce Afghanistan’s dependence on 
external support.  However, Participants recognised that this is a long-term endeavor and that the 
Afghan Government will continue to have significant economic requirements that cannot be met 
solely by domestic revenues.  
To help ensure that Afghanistan remains on a path towards a more sustainable future for all Afghans, 
the International Community reaffirmed its Tokyo commitment of providing sixteen billion US 
dollars through 2015, and sustaining support, through 2017, at or near the levels of the past decade. 
Going forward, the International Community reiterated its commitment, as set out in the Tokyo 
Declaration, to direct significant and continuing but declining financial support towards 
Afghanistan’s social and economic development Priorities through the Transformation Decade.  
Further, the International Community reaffirmed that its ability to sustain support for Afghanistan 
depends upon the principle of mutual accountability and the Afghan Government delivering on its 
commitments under the TMAF process.” 
President Ashraf Ghani did deliver a statement outlining a reform agenda and plans to bring 
economic stability, and security to the country at the conference. He presented a paper on 
the government of Afghanistan’s reform program entitled “Realizing Self Reliance: 
Commitments to Reforms and Renewed Partnership” that both recognized the challenges 
Afghanistan faced, and some of the key economic problems that were driving transition. It 
did not outline specific plans, milestones, or needs but it was far more realistic in 
addressing key problems than statement by NATO, the US, or other outside nations, and 
did highlight key reforms in many areas and stated that the Afghan program was:25 
…built around four propositions. The first proposition is that Afghanistan is facing an economic 
crisis with the transition taking a heavier than expected toll on the economy and the pace of reforms. 
Private sector confidence has slumped and a fiscal crisis is underway, with the government failing 
to mobilize adequate revenue to meet its financing priorities. Restoring confidence and improving 
revenue mobilization are the essential pre-conditions for surviving transition and successfully 
building a democratic state.  
The second proposition is that in order to realize self-reliance in the transformation decade, in the 
face of likely reductions of donor assistance, more private investments and revenue-generating 
sources will be needed to trigger growth. Building infrastructure for regional integration, trade and 
transit agreements, connectivity, cross-border investments, will be a fundamental part of our 
national strategy. Public funds will have to be channeled to sectors with maximum potential for 
growth, revenue and employment. Aid-effectiveness will have to be substantially improved.  
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The third proposition is that what look like economic and social problems have at their root failures 
of governance and a lack of serious commitment to fixing problems. Actions to fight corruption, 
end patronage, and avoid collusive practices have been undertaken half-heartedly or undermined 
from within. The fourth proposition is that the lessons of the past decade show the urgent need for 
the senior most levels of the national government to take a stronger hand in managing the overall 
implementation of policy reforms and development assistance. Government leadership is needed to 
ensure that the agenda matches national priorities, capacities, and resource envelopes within a 
multiyear strategic planning framework; to monitor performance and enforce accountability; and to 
exercise appropriate flexibility to enable changes in response to a highly uncertain environment. 
Each of these propositions is matched by a series of actions and commitments intended to give 
credibility to the claims through immediate and near-term actions, and to trigger a longer process of 
reform. Where possible, we will move quickly to implement actions. However, in many areas the 
reform process must involve consultation and coordination across a broad range of stakeholders. 
For these domains we will be signaling the government’s overall policy direction and roadmap for 
change and then using the time between the London Conference and SOM to develop more detailed 
action plans. 
… Economic growth and tangible service delivery provide the critical anchors for stability as the 
afghan economy and society begin their difficult re-adjustment to a civilian economy. Too sharp a 
cutback in the role of the state will sow the seeds for future problems. Weakened governments that 
are unable (or unwilling) to deliver basic services to their people are easy prey for dissident or radical 
groups, which spread beyond the confines of any one state. By contrast, a functioning Afghan state 
that can continue down a path of reform that promotes growth and delivers basic services will be 
the best defense against instability in the region. 
 
… While it is important to acknowledge Afghanistan’s achievements, it is equally important to 
acknowledge its failures. First and foremost has been corruption, a plague that infuriates the ordinary 
afghan as much as it does our international partners. Second, because of the way aid has been 
delivered so far, Afghanistan became addicted to help from the international community rather than 
using aid for moving towards sustainable economic growth, job creation, infrastructure development, 
investments and trade. Third, while the criminal economy has flourished in Afghanistan, the legal 
economy has been hampered by regulatory incoherence and parallel institutions. Fourth, despite 
Afghanistan’s tremendous endowment of natural resources, which could lift the afghan economy 
and improve the welfare of people, we have not yet been able to manage them well because of a 
lack of needed infrastructure and weak institutions and regulations. And last, while the urgency of 
ending the conflict and achieving a sustainable peace should be obvious, for more than a decade an 
agreeable path has not been formulated that could move disputes from the battlefield to the political 
field. 
 
… Poverty remains high, with more than 36 percent of Afghans living below the poverty line. 
Stunting and malnutrition, particularly among women and children, affect nearly half of the 
population. Another overwhelming challenge is to create sufficient number of jobs that can provide 
productive employment to the poor. While most Afghan children have access to education, many 
are still deprived, and the current low quality of education will require greater attention going 
forward. Basic health services, mainly financed by donors, will need to increase further with 
particular attention to excluded and vulnerable groups, while also addressing concerns about cost 
effectiveness and sustainability of delivery and financing models. While the status of women has 
improved, the level of female participation in the economy remains far too low, and violence against 
women is a problem that must come to an end. Finally, corruption, production and handling of 
narcotics, illicit economy and personal insecurity remain critical impediments to development 
progress across the board, but particularly to the private sector. 
 
…The infusion of ISAF expenditure drove economic growth, but the massive withdrawal that was 
planned for on the security side did not receive sufficient attention. The social and economic impacts 
of the sharp scale-down of activities were considered to be marginal, but it is now clear that this was 
a miscalculation and the economic effects of withdrawal have been and will continue to be severe, 
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creating a sizable fiscal gap in the afghan economy. Political uncertainty coupled with the 
deteriorating security situation aggravated the decline. Economic growth has fallen sharply to 1.5 
percent (estimated) in 2014 from an annual average of 9.4 percent during 2003-12. Domestic 
revenues have fallen to 8.7 percent of GDP (projected) in 2014 from the peak of 11.6 percent in 
2011. Despite austerity measures, the government faces an un-financed fiscal gap in 2014, with 
depleted cash balances and accumulating arrears. The crisis calls for urgent and immediate reforms, 
but it also provides Afghanistan with an opportunity to take bold actions. 
 
As for outside nations, the overall record was dismal and public reporting consisted largely 
of dubious successes in project aid. Donor cooperation with UNAMA was token level at 
best, UNAMA never tried to force the issue of coordinating aid activity, and the many 
donor countries never complied with the requirement to report all aid activity to the Afghan 
government. NGOs often acted arbitrarily on their own, sometimes increasing afghan 
tensions and feuding.  
 
The US State Department never produced a serious report on the civil efforts in war; 
USAID never produced a meaningful aid plan or measures of effectiveness and its 
reporting was limited to exaggerate claims on progress in pamphlets like USAID in 
Afghanistan: Partnership, Progress, and Perseverance – a report that gave USAID credit 
for favorable rainfall, projected increases in domestic revenues that never occurred, used 
questionable health statistics, and focused more on money spent than any outer measure of 
effectiveness.26 
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II. Uncertain Priorities for US Strategy 
It is a grim reflection on the Obama Administration and the US Congress, that there has 
never been a serious public debate over whether the US should play a key role in meeting 
the challenges Afghanistan will face from 2015 onwards. As President Obama’s May 2014 
strategy speech at West Point has indicated, is also unclear what the outcome of an honest 
and meaningful debate would be.  
Even if the US focuses properly on the impact of its current actions in Afghan, Pakistan, 
and the region and their consequences after 2014, and does adequately assesses its options 
and their relative risks and benefits, it might well decide that the best solution to dealing 
with the complex problems in South Asia and Central Asia should be a minimalist approach.  
US “Strategic Triage” is Critical 
The UYS has made an immense investment in the Afghan War. The US Department of 
Defense reports that the total number of US dead had reached 2,356 by the end of 
December 2014 and Operation Enduring Freedom. This total included 1,846 killed in 
action, and the total number of wounded had reached 20,066.27  
As for the dollar cost, the US government has never published an official estimate of the 
direct costs of the war at point from 2001 to 2014, but an estimate by Amy Belasco of the 
Congressional Research Service put the direct costs at $557 billion from FY2001 to 
FY2012, with $523.5 billion for the Department of Defense, $29.4 billion for the State 
Department and US Aid, and $4.2 billion for Veteran’s Administration. 28  US budget 
documents indicate that the US spent at least an additional $167 billion for the Department 
of Defense, $4 billion for the State Department and US Aid, and $3 billion for Veteran’s 
Administration.29  
This would put the total cost of the Afghan War to the US alone at a minimum of $724 
billion through the end of FY2014, but this does not include the full calendar year for 
Transition, the cost of destroyed equipment and equipment transfers to the Afghans during 
the US withdrawal, the cost of reequipping US forces for many combat losses, and the 
years of additional medical expenses for military personnel with lasting medical issues and 
disabilities.30 Some estimates that include the cost of the added federal debt, opportunity 
costs, and lifetime costs of those requiring continuing medical are in the trillions. 
A past investment, however, is no reason to keep spending lives and money unless it is 
clearly justified by strategic necessity and the probability of future success. No vital US 
national security priorities seem to be involved in the Afghan War or Pakistan that require 
a sustained major US presence or capability to intervene, and strategic triage indicates that 
other areas and problems have a higher priority for US resources. Such choices, however, 
should be made on the basis of hard analysis, and made openly and explicitly, and not 
through silence, neglect, or default. 
The US cannot solve every problem or meet every challenge, and any effort to deal with 
the US strategic vacuum in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Central Asia must be judged in a 
broader global context. The US is scarcely reducing its overall strategic and defense 
commitments.  
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The US may cutting the warfighting or Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) part of it 
military expenditures as it ends the war in Afghanistan, but it is re-engaging in Iraq and 
building up its forces in the Gulf. It is changing its force posture in the Pacific and 
strengthening its security partnerships in the region, and is giving new priority to its 
commitments in NATO as a result of the Ukraine crisis. 
The Issue is Not Resources, But Strategic Priority 
At the same time, one needs to be careful about focusing on resources -- providing that the 
chance of future success in Afghanistan is high enough to justify continued action and the 
cost of the necessary resources seems limited. Unfortunately, as this analysis makes all too 
clear, the lack of any serious transparency on the recent and probable course of the fighting, 
the size and nature of current aid plans, the role of the forces that US now plans to leave in 
Afghanistan, and virtually every other tangible aspect of a serious public policy debate 
makes this impossible.  
Most of the limited projections of the future cost of US support discussed in the following 
chapters indicated the combined cost of sustaining a US presence of around 10,000-11,000, 
and providing aid through the period Afghanistan will need civil and military aid, could be 
less than $20 billion a year. Uncertain as such estimates are, they make a striking contrast 
to past levels of spending that sometimes exceeded $100 billion a year. 
The US still has a massive pool of national security resources to draw upon in spite of past 
budget cuts and Sequestration. Neither the FY2013-FY2014 actual spending nor the 
FY2015-FY2019 baseline defense spending plans – the spending not tied to war in 
Afghanistan – project a further decline in real US spending. Moreover, the current levels 
of US national security efforts need to be kept in a global perspective. SIPRI estimates that 
the United States spent 37% of all world military expenditures in 2013 versus 11% for 
China, 5% for Russia, 3.5% for France, 3.3% for the UK, and 2.8% for Germany. In 
contrast, SIPRI estimates that Western and Central Europe cut military expenditures by 
6.5% during 2004-2013.31 
The Secretary General’s 2013 report for NATO sends the same message about the size of 
the overall US national security effort. Like the US QDR, NATO did not foresee any 
potential risk from Russia at the time of his report. In fact, the one minor mention of Russia 
largely praises Russia for its aid in Afghanistan.  
Even so, when the Secretary General’s report talks about military spending, it has a graph 
showing that the US increased its share of total NATO military spending from 68% in 
2007 to 73% in 2013. In contrast, NATO Europe dropped from 30.2% of the total to 25.5% 
during that same period. Germany kept spending constant at 4.7% of the total but made 
massive force cuts and shifted money to pay for the equivalent of an all-professional force. 
Britain dropped from 7.3% to 6.6%, France from 6.6% to 4.9%, and Italy from 2.9% to 
2.0%. 
As for allied countries, the recent NATO ministerial summit called for all NATO countries 
to raise their defense spending to 2%. US defense spending is and will remain at nearly 
twice that level. The US is spending as much on its baseline military expenditures as it did 
before it began these wars in 2001, and doing so at a time it has a serious budget deficit, a 
massive federal debt, and faces steady rises in the cost of its domestic entitlement programs.  
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The Cost-Benefits of Upping the Ante 
This mix of problems and fiscal pressures does not mean the US must -- or should -- back 
away from Afghanistan, Pakistan, or Central and South Asia. It does mean the US needs 
to exercise “strategic triage” and make hard decisions based on how valuable pursuing an 
effective role in Afghanistan will be relative to its cost and other US strategic needs. The 
US must use its resources where they meet the highest priority in terms of American 
interests and they have the most effect. The US’ resources must be used where the US has 
strategic partners that actually do their share, and US commitments and aid must be 
conditional and dependent on how well its partners actually perform. 
This, in turn, means being grimly realistic about the state of Afghan leadership and politics. 
It means analyzing Afghan capability to achieve anything approaching “Afghan good 
enough,” the real-world security situation and threat, the state of the ANSF, and the state 
of Afghan governance and the Afghan economy. 
It also means taking decisions that are both transparent and based on a detailed examination 
of the options, explicit cost benefit and risk analysis, and plans and budgets that can be 
openly debated. It is all very well to talk about “transparency.” The US and its Presidents 
have effectively abandoned transparency for two wars, and they have not benefited from 
the result. 
As a result the US urgently needs to decide just how important any form of lasting strategic 
success in Afghanistan really is. The US does have many higher foreign and domestic 
priorities, and operates in a world where Afghanistan presents only a relatively marginal 
threat of terrorism to the US and its ISAF allies relative to other extremist threats. At the 
same time, the marginal cost to the US and its allies of greatly increasing the probability 
of success may well be a tiny portion of the kinds of expenditures it made during some 
thirteen years of war. 
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III. The Threat from Afghan Politics, Leadership, 
Governance, and Prospects for Stability 
As Vietnam and Iraq have demonstrated, any effort at strategic triage must pay as much 
attention to the “threat” posed by the weaknesses and failures of the host government as 
the threat posed by the enemy. From 2002 onwards, the Afghan government has made slow 
progress in creating an effective structure of government even in the capital of Kabul. 
Provincial and District governments have often been weak, ineffective, and unable to 
operate outside limited areas of control and influence. The rule of law has been local and 
traditional in many areas. Power brokering, gross corruption, favoritism, and incompetence 
have alienated large parts of the population – empowering the insurgent threat or local 
power brokers and warlords in the process. 
The Shell of Democracy: The Reality of the 
Presidency, Power Brokers, Parallel Donor Country 
Governance 
While the Afghan central government has had all of the trappings of an elected democracy, 
the election have corrupt and done much to divide the country. In practice, the elected 
Afghan legislature has done little to move the country forward or represent its people. The 
real government has been a President with extraordinary control over all government 
revenues seeking to find the right balance of support from regional and local power brokers, 
and using his power to appoint governors, district officials, and key security and police 
officers to exert control.  The façade of democracy in “Kabulstan” has been a reality based 
on the President, the appointed, and self-elected power brokers on a national level. 
The Reality of National Versus Local Governance 
This is a reality that the US, its allies and other donors, and ISAF tried sporadically to 
address up until 2011, but with the decision to withdraw most forces by the end of 2014, 
virtually all of the public assessments of the major problems in Afghan governance stopped. 
The last unclassified summaries of the weaknesses in the governments outside Kabulstan 
are shown in Figure 1 and Figure 2. It should be stressed that these figures only show 
colors in the limited number of districts actually assessed, were “spun” to minimize the 
problems involved and show progress – whether or not it actually existed. It is striking, 
therefore, that such reporting still had to be cancelled. 
Parallel Governance by ISAF Regional Commands and National Air 
Donors 
At the same time, the US and other states that provided military and civil aid, along with 
NGOs, that bypassed the central government in many areas. At least through 2013, they 
provided direct aid funds at the provincial, district, urban, and project level. The central 
government received only a limited amount of civil aid funds – substantially under 50% -- 
and donor countries determined how money was to be spent, each pursuing different 
policies and levels of coordination with regional and local Afghan officials. Only a few 
Afghan ministries were seen as honest and effective in using civil aid.  
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Most aspects of the development of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) – and 
spending on these forces -- were shaped at every level by NATO/ISAF and US decisions, 
and by the actions and decisions of the key ISAF country leading the ISAF security effort 
in given areas. The combination of regional commands under different ISAF states and the 
creation of Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) shown in Figure 3 helped make this 
parallel governance worse. It meant that both military spending and aid, and many aspects 
of regional and local civil aid, were controlled or shaped by individual PRTs that pursued 
different policies in shaping and controlling the flow of local spending and aid, and in 
coordinating with local Afghan officials. And, as Figure 4 shows, had only a limited effect 
on Afghan development and governance in the areas actually assessed by ISAF. 
The impact of such outside efforts on the real world structure of Afghan governance was 
further complicated in the case of the US by a program called the Commander’s Emergency 
Relief Program (CERP) where US local commanders could use aid money to support short 
term tactical objectives, and often did so with minimal attention to the longer term impact 
in either benefitting the population or creating local feuds and divisions as a result of the 
way the money was spent. In many cases, NGOs also made the situation worse by running 
their own projects without meaningful efforts to assess local needs and politics, determine 
whether project was really needed or could be sustained, and examining how it fit into 
Afghan and donor country/military spending efforts. 
As the World Bank, IMF, and SIGAR data in the following chapters show, these donor 
country and military spending efforts spent far more money than the central government 
could raise and that donor countries funneled through the central government. At the same 
time, donor country teams and personnel often served in country for a year or less, kept 
changing policies and programs on an annual level, and threw money into efforts with little 
real assessment of need, fiscal controls, and measures of effectiveness. These problems 
were made worse by poor coordination of the military and civil side of many donor country 
efforts, a constant pressure to achieve instant results or support tactical military operations, 
and by the near total failure of the United Nations Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) to 
perform its function of planning, coordinating, auditing, and assessing donor country aid 
efforts. 
As a result, the steady cutback in donor country and NGO aid teams in the field that 
followed ISAF force cuts and withdrawals that began in 2013, and removed virtually all 
forces by the end of 2014, removed a key element of parallel governance. This withdrawal 
of regional and local ISAF commands and PRTs also occurred without strengthening a 
central government that was first was led by an untrusted President Karzai and then faced 
a long period of near paralysis in 2014 when another corrupt election left the Afghan 
government without effective leadership.  
The only saving grace, as US and other country facilities outside Kabul virtually imploded 
as part of the ISAF withdrawal, was that there were many Afghan officials at the national, 
provincial, and district level who had been chosen by merit, and remained in office. Many, 
however, lacked anything like their proper staffing, lacked security, and could only 
function within the limits imposed by Karzai and the non-government that followed. Even 
the best officials also had to deal with regional and local power brokers and commanders, 
and the real world nature of Afghan governance. 
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The US Role in Weak and Failed Afghan Governance 
The US must assume much of the blame for these problems and failures. It helped create 
an unworkable constitution that failed to create local and regional elected officials -- a 
constitution that gave the President power over far too much of the nation’s funds, and a 
legislature whose main function to date has been to consume state funds.  
The constitution and initial structure of the Afghan government failed to create an effective 
system for managing state funds. The US and other donor nations then compounded the 
government’s spending problems with annually massive, sharply varying amounts of 
outside military and civil aid spending that came without proper planning and controls, and 
helped increase a once acceptable level of Afghan corruption into a flood of corrupt money 
and waste from the outside, a dysfunctional government with limited control over national 
spending, and an unacceptable mess.  
The US must also take responsibility for the fact it was far too slow to accept the threat the 
resurgence of the Taliban presented, and focus on the need for politics and governance that 
could win the people’s trust.  During the period between 2002 and 2007, the US attempted 
to push too much responsibility off on to its allies and the UN. It gave priority to the 
invasion and war in Iraq, and at least some of its long series of clashes with President 
Karzai were the result of US insensitivity to Afghan values and the fact that Afghanistan’s 
de facto government was ruled by a power broker and not the elected legislature in 
“Kabulstan.” 
Since that time, the US has never publically come to grips with the problems in the structure 
of Afghan governance, the way money is spent, the real world problems in Afghan 
elections, the failures in UNAMA and donor country aid efforts, and the need to fully audit 
and manage the flow of military spending.  
As has been noted earlier, statements by the President and other senior US officials have 
praised Afghan failures, ignored the scale of these problems in Transition, and largely left 
Afghanistan to its own devices. While a number f US ambassadors, senior officials in 
country, and senior US officers tried to shift US policy under both the Bush and Obama 
Administrations, they at best has limited and temporary success. 
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Figure 1:  Last Unclassified ISAF and UN Metrics on the 
Growing Problems in Afghan District Governance 
ISAF Metrics on Quality of Government 
 
 
UN Metrics on Priority Needs by Province as of October 2010 
  
Source UNDAF, 2010, Annex B 
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Figure 2: Problems in Afghan District Governance in July 
2011 
Last Unclassified ISAF Metrics on Key Afghan Districts Where Taliban and Other Insurgents 
Dominated: July 2011  
 
Last ISAF Unclassified Metrics on Merit vs. Non-Merit Based District Governors 
 
dSource: ISAF IJC July 2011 
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Figure 3: Parallel Governance in ISAF Regional Commands 
and PRTs: Does Not Show NGOs 
 
Note: As of January 2015, No Maps or Data were Public to Show what Structure 
Remained in Afghanistan 
 
 
 
Source: DoD, “Report on Progress Towards Security and Stability in Afghanistan; US Plan for Sustaining 
the Afghan National Security Forces, Section 1203 Report, April 2011, p. 57 and October 30, 2011, p. 94, 
and http://www.isaf.nato.int/troop-numbers-and-contributions/index.php, 15 August, 2011, and 
http://www.isaf.nato.int/troop-numbers-and-contributions/index.php, August 15, 2011 
 
  
International Security Assistance Force
Provincial Reconstruction Teams
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Figure 4: Last Unclassified ISAF Assessment of the 
Effectiveness of Aid in Key Surveyed Districts: June 2010 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: COMISAF Command Brief, June 2010 
 
 
  
04-Feb-10 29-Apr-10 Governance	Assessment
6 7 Sustainable	Growth
16 19 Dependent	Growth
47 46 Minimal	Growth
40 41 Stalled	Growth
10 7 Population	at	Risk
3 2 Not	Assessed
Development 
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A Divided, Poor, and Struggling, Nation 
These problems, however, are only part of the challenges that affect post-Transition 
Afghan politics and governance. The legacy of the Soviet invasion, civil war, and the 
Taliban have left its central government weak, divided, and corrupt. Its power brokers are 
divided and usually self-seeking. It is deeply divided along geographic, ethnic sectarian, 
and tribal lines.  
Although there are no reliable population data, the CIA is certainly correct in noting there 
are deep ethnic divisions (Its estimate the population is Pashtun 42%, Tajik 27%, Hazara 
9%, Uzbek 9%, Aimak 4%, Turkmen 3%, Baloch 2%, other 4%.) There are significant 
religious divisions (The CIA estimates the population is Sunni Muslim 80%, Shia Muslim 
19%, other 1%).32  
There are deep linguistic divisions (Afghan Persian or Dari (official) 50%, Pashto (official) 
35%, Turkic languages (primarily Uzbek and Turkmen) 11%, 30 minor languages 
(primarily Balochi and Pashai) 4%,) The population is very young (42% is 14 years of age 
of younger, and has rapidly seen a shift towards urbanization (Roughly 37% in 2014 versus 
23.5% in 2001, and urbanizing at 4.4% per year.) Something like a tenth of the population 
now lives in Kabul alone.) 33 
All of these divisions are compounded by many local feuds between families and villages, 
conflicts over water and land rights, and deep divisions with – as well as between – given 
ethnic groups and tribes. As is analyzed later, poverty and drugs present additional 
problems, as does the fact some powerbrokers are the equivalent of warlords and other are 
drug kingpins. The per capita income is only around $1,100, which ranks a dismal 215th in 
the world. There are no current poverty and unemployment data but past CIA estimates 
would put each figure at 35-40%. Some 392,000 men and 370,000 women annually reach 
the age where they enter a labor force estimated at only around 7.5 million. 34 
These divisions play out in the struggle between the various insurgent groups and the 
Afghan military and government at the local level throughout the country. They also 
highlight the importance of the issues in governance that have just been discussed. To 
paraphrase Tip O’Neill, insurgency, like politics, “is local.”  
The constitution the US helped draw up after the fall of the Taliban and that was ratified in 
January 2004, still places almost all control over legislation and the allocation of money 
and force in the central government in Kabul, and gives extraordinary authority to the 
President. At the same time, all of the internal divisions in Afghanistan have been made 
worse by the fact that the Karzai government failed to create an effective structure for either 
collecting or spending state revenues, and tolerated gross levels of corruption as part of a 
system of government that was based more on juggling power brokers than seeking to 
create effective governance 
Much of the effort to shape Transition in Afghanistan remained in limbo during the long 
period from 2012 to 2014 when Karzai refused to sign a bilateral security agreement and 
status of force agreement. It stayed in limbo during the preparations for the 2014 election, 
and during the rest of 2014 -- when Afghan politics attempted to deal with the outcome of 
a disputed and corrupt Presidential election.  
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Failed and Corrupt 2014 Elections that Did More to 
Divide than Unite 
No one can at this point determine which election was more corrupt and divisive: The 
presidential election that kept Karzai in power on August 20, 2009, or the combination of 
April 5, 2014 election that left Ashraf Ghani and Abdulah Abdulah as the only two 
candidates, and the June 14, 2014 run-off election, 2014 that appeared to elect Ashraf 
Ghani but was so blatantly corrupt that his rival – Abdullah Abdullah – had to be given a 
major new role in the government.  
These formal election results are shown in Figure 5, but members of the Afghan 
Independent Election Commission are reported to have said that it disguises a far higher 
level of false ballots than is shown in Figure 5, and US and other outside experts privately 
agree. Abdullah Abdullah publically rejected this reporting once Ghani’s office made it 
public, and threatened not to attend Ghani’s inauguration. He then got into a dispute with 
Ghani over whether he should be inaugurated and sworn in and over office space with 
Ghani’s running mate as first vice president, Abdul Rashid Dostum.35 
A SIGAR Quarterly Report issued in October 2014 noted that, 
Five hours after the signing of the national-unity government agreement, the IEC announced that 
Ashraf Ghani was the winner of the election. As a condition of the national-unity government deal, 
the IEC did not immediately announce the full elections results….On September 26, however, the 
IEC presented then President-Elect Ghani with a winner’s certificate stating that Ghani won 55.27% 
of the total votes (3.93 million out of 7.12 million votes). At the same event, the IEC chairman was 
quoted saying that “the IEC was not the only institution involved in fraud. Fraud was wide ranging.” 
The Abdullah campaign issued a statement complaining that the results certificate was contrary to 
the agreement reached between the campaigns and that the certified results were not authentic. 
Assuming the results listed on the IEC certificate given to Ghani are accurate, the audit reduced 
Ghani’s share of the vote by 1.17% and increased Abdullah’s by 1.21%. 
… The European Union Election Assessment Team (EU EAT) deployed one of the largest 
international-observer missions to support the runoff audit, with up to 410 observers…. It labeled 
the audit process “unsatisfactory” and claimed the audit produced clear evidence of large-scale fraud, 
particularly ballot stuffing…. EU EAT estimated that between two and three million runoff votes 
were fraudulent. 
…A senior State Department official, in a background briefing, noted that while the runoff audit 
sought to meet best international standards, institutionalized fraud by the IEC prevented any audit 
from resolving all allegations of fraud. 
… The National Democratic Institute (NDI) issued a statement on September 24 that “while 
electoral fraud as well as certain problems in the audit process make it impossible for any official 
results to precisely reflect the votes cast, evidence was not unveiled that would cause the outcome 
to be reversed.” 
…This quarter, USAID declined to assess the conduct of the IEC and ECC during the 2014 elections 
and said it will be unable to do so until the process, including the provincial council elections, is 
concluded 
The situation was o made far worse because of the legacy of President Karzai. Largely as 
a result of the actions of President Karzai, and the mess following a corrupt Afghan election 
in the spring of 2014, plans and decisions that should have been made as early as 2012 
were kept on hold, only partially implemented, or simply forgotten under the pressure of 
other events. In spite of a constant flow of reassuring political rhetoric during a period of 
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over two critical years, Afghanistan became a nation with no clear plans for the future and 
increasingly uncertain stability. The Taliban and other insurgents made steady gains, 
civilian casualties rose, and the Afghan economy descended into crisis. 
Worse, efforts to paper over the corruption in the Afghan runoff election left the nation 
deeply uncertain as to how far the corruption went and not resolved any differences over 
its outcome. The end result was that UN Independent Election Commission avoided 
reporting the results of a UN audit.36 The official announcement of the result took the form 
of a statement by Ahmad Yousuf Nuristani, the chairman the UN Independent Election 
Commission, that there were “grave flaws” and its audit could not detect all of it, but said 
that the commission still had a duty to state that, "The Independent Election Commission 
of Afghanistan declares Dr. Ashraf Ghani Ahmad as the president of Afghanistan." 37 
This vagueness was intended to smooth over the differences between Ghani and Abdullah. 
However, Ashraf Ghani’s office then released election results that tried to show that Ghani 
was a decisive victor, but really just showed just how deeply the nation had divided during 
the two votes, and the extent to which the north polarized around Abdulllah Abdullah and 
the largely Pashtun areas coalesced around Ashraf Ghani. The end result is that both Ghani 
and Abdullah now have to live with the ongoing arguments over non-official official results 
shown in Figure 5, and an ongoing debate over Afghan political legitimacy that no one 
can now resolve. 
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Figure 5: Afghan Power Struggles: The Uncertain Results of 
the Election 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Ashraf Ghani campaign office; Tim Craig, “Ghani Named Afghan Victor,” Washington Post, 
September 21, 2014, pp. A1, A8. 
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An Awkward and Uncertain Compromise 
It took months -- and an immense amount of outside pressure-- to push the two men into 
even the shell of a political compromise.  Abdullah Abdullah and Ashraf Ghani did not 
reach a tentative agreement to share power until September 21, 2014. This compromise 
divided power by making Ashraf Ghani President and Abdullah Abdullah an extra-
constitutional Chief Executive – an arrangement where Ghani wanted all the powers of the 
President and Abdullah wanted to the role of Prime Minister.  
This uncertain agreement only came after US Secretary of State Kerry was forced to warn 
both Abdullah Abdullah and Ghani that,38 
If you don’t come to an agreement now, today, the possibilities for Afghanistan will become very 
difficult, if not dangerous,” Kerry told them, according to the partial transcript. “I really need to 
emphasize to you that if you do not have an agreement, if you do not move to a unity government, 
the United States will not be able to support Afghanistan. 
It also left a bitter legacy of months of wrangling over the level of corruption in the runoff 
election, threats by Abdullah Abdullah to form his own government regardless of the final 
vote count.  
A Deeply Uncertain Compromise at the Top 
A deeply divided Afghan leadership finally was formally inaugurated in late September 
2014 – nearly six months after a disputed election on April 5th. However, it scarcely solved 
Afghanistan’s leadership problems. Like a somewhat similar failed attempt at creating a 
national unity government in Iraq after a disputed Iraqi election in 2010, the agreement 
between Ghani and Abdullah did laid out some broad terms. But, it was critically vague as 
to the powers of each leader.  
A summary by SIGAR notes that the Technical and Political Framework issued on July 12, 
the Joint Declaration issued on August 8, and the September 2014 agreement committed 
Ghani and Abdullah to the following: 
• Convening a loya jirga (grand assembly) to amend the Afghan constitution and to consider the 
proposal to create the post of executive prime minister 
• Completing distribution of electronic/computerized identity cards to all citizens as quickly as 
possible 
• Creating, by presidential decree, the position of chief executive officer (CEO), supported by two 
deputies, with the functions of an executive prime minister 
• Proposing reforms in all government agencies and decisively combating official corruption 
• Acknowledging that the president, as the head of state and government, will lead the cabinet 
• Acknowledging that the CEO will be responsible for managing the cabinet’s implementation of 
government policies and will head a council of ministers distinct from the cabinet 
• Ensuring parity between the president and the CEO in selecting personnel at the level of head of 
key security and economic institutions and independent directorates, and  
• Establishing a special commission to reform the election system. 
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Limited Progress in Signing a Bilateral Security Agreement 
Inaugurating a deeply divided Afghan government in late September 2014 did not begin to 
solve the problem of governance. It did not show whether the new government could 
actually provide reform, effective governance, and effective security forces. It meant that 
there still was no formal structure for Transition roughly three months before the end of 
2014, and nearly two years after a structure was supposed to be in place that could make 
an effective Transition possible.  
It did, however, allow Afghan and U.S. officials did finally sign the Bilateral Security 
Agreement (BSA)—whose formal title is the Security Cooperation and Defense 
Agreement between the United States of America and the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan 
on September 30, 2014, one day after Ashraf Ghani’s inauguration as President. Afghan 
and NATO officials also signed the NATO Status of Forces Agreement the same day. 
This timing finally allowed the US to move forward well over a year after the BSA and 
status of force agreements should have already been signed. However, the new agreements 
only gave the US a basis for staying in Afghanistan. They did not provide any agreed plan 
for moving forward after Transition.  
The Special Inspector General for Afghan Reconstruction (SIGAR) summarized the impact 
of signing the two documents as follows:39 
The BSA enumerates protections that will be afforded to Department of Defense (DOD) military 
and civilian personnel. As under the 2003 status of forces agreement, under the BSA contractors are 
not immune from prosecution under the Afghan legal system, but U.S. soldiers are…Among the 
many issues covered in the BSA, the agreement also: 
• Reaffirms the United States’ obligation to develop, equip, and seek funding to support 
the ANSF 
• Establishes agreement to develop measures for analyzing Afghanistan’s use of defense 
and security resources 
• Requires semiannual assessments of actual performance of Afghanistan’s use of defense 
and security resources 
• Develops a process for making timely cooperative assessments of internal and external 
threats to Afghanistan 
• Directs that specific recommendations are made on enhancing information and 
intelligence sharing 
• Makes available facilities and areas, without fee, to U.S. forces and authorizes those 
forces to control entry into those facilities and areas 
• Authorizes U.S. forces to move freely by land, water, or air without being subject to fees 
• Provides for the United States to enter into contracts in Afghanistan and directs both 
countries to “work together to improve transparency, accountability, and effectiveness of 
contracting processes in Afghanistan, with a view to preventing misuse and bad contracting 
practices.” 
… a Status of Forces Agreement was signed by the Afghan national-security advisor and NATO’s 
senior civilian representative to…provide the legal framework for the United States, NATO, and its 
partner nations to continue their commitment to train, advise, and assist the ANSF. 
Moreover, as the previous chapters show, the US had already made key decisions about 
the size and duration of its future military presence in Afghanistan that may well lead to a 
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major military crisis or defeat in Afghanistan during 2015-2016 almost regardless of what 
the Afghan government, Pakistan, and America’s allies in ISAF now do.  As noted earlier, 
President Obama has chosen to limit the number, duration, and role of the US military 
advisory presence in Afghanistan in ways that that placed critical limits on the US role in 
Afghanistan at a time when the US is also sharply reducing its role in Pakistan and Central 
Asia.  
Uncertain Afghan Leadership and Governance: Two 
Years Too Late? 
The future status of Afghan central governance remained unclear as of mid-January 2015. 
Ghani, who is ethnically Pashtun, and Abdullah who is mixed Pashtun and Tajik, reached 
a compromise on a new cabinet and other senior appointments on January 11, 2015 -- more 
three months after the power-sharing government took office. The list excluded older 
warlords and power brokers, and was an indication that Ghani and Abdullah could work 
together. In fact, press reports indicated that their problems in agreeing on the list of 
nominees were not their own but dictated by the demands of rival power brokers on both 
sides, and that they personally had established relatively good relations. 40  
President Ghani announced a list of 25 cabinet nominees. The three critical security 
appointments included,41 
 Sher Mohammad Karimi, the Afghan army’s chief of staff, as defense minister. He was an ethnic 
Pashtun general, from the eastern province of Khost. He was the first Afghan to graduate from 
Britain's Royal Military Academy at Sandhurst. He had been exiled during the Taliban's rule and 
after their fall in 2001, and had worked his way up through senior posts in Afghan army, heading 
up its Special Forces and attending training courses in the United States. He was personally close to 
Ghani. 
 Nur ul-Haq Ulomi as interior minister. He was a former member of parliament and a former member 
of the communist party, andhad been senior military official under the President Najibullah – the 
Prime Minister that the Soviet Union had backed after leaving the country. He too was an ethnic 
Pashtun from the southern province of Kandahar, but had served as a member of parliament and 
chaired the Defence Committee After the fall of the Taliban. His political party had supported 
Abdullah and he was seen as an Abdullah choice. 
 Rahmatullah Nabil, was to continue as the head of Afghanistan’s domestic intelligence agency, will 
remain in his position if approved by lawmakers. Nabil is an ethnic Pashtun who studied engineering 
in Pakistan and worked for the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. He had been head 
of presidential palace security forces for Karzai, and began to work at work at NDS in 2010. He was 
close to Ghani. 
The full list of nominees showed that Ghani was interested in talks with the Taliban. He 
nominated Salahuddin Rabbani, the head of Afghanistan’s High Peace Council who had 
led peace talks with the Taliban in 2014, as foreign minister. He is an ethnic Tajik from 
far-northeastern Badakhshan province, and the oldest son of former Afghan president 
Burhanuddin Rabbani, who later headed the Peace Council but was assassinated by 
insurgents at his home in Kabul. He is a strong supporter of Abdullah. 
Qamarudin Shinwari was nominated as head of the ministry of tribal and border affairs. 
His brother, Jalaludin Shinwari, had been the deputy minister of justice under the Taliban. 
The list also had some progressive appointments. It nominated women to cabinet posts for 
higher education, women’s affairs, and information and culture. 42  
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At the same time, it quickly became apparent that the list presented major problems. Some 
11 nominees potentially had problems in serving because of dual citizenship. Ghani’s 
nominee for Finance Minister, Ghulam Jilani Popal, withdrew for “personal reasons,” that 
later turned out to be demands from various power brokers that he make so many 
unqualified appointments that he refused the job.43 He had to be replaced with Eklil Ahmad 
Hakimi, the Afghan ambassador to the United States. 44 
His nominee for agriculture ministry, Mohammad Yaqub Haidari was found to be on an 
Interpol wanted list for tax evasion, and had to withdraw. 45 Other appointments came 
under challenge over their age, and their identity documents. 46   
At the same time, it was far from clear how many on the list would actually be confirmed 
and serve. Some Afghan observers also felt many of the nominees had ties to power brokers 
outside Kabul, or were technocrats who lacked political influence and would leave the 
Ghani and Abdullah government just as sensitive to pressure from power brokers as the 
Karzai government had been.  
More than eight months after the first round of the Presidential election, Afghanistan still 
did not have a real government at the top, much less a stable pattern of appointments at the 
provincial and district levels. Moreover, Afghan observers made it clear that the 
appointments to date had disappointed as many power brokers as they pleased, including 
Ismail Khan, the warlord of Heart and a key Abdullah Abdullah supporter, and Hajji Zahir 
Qadir, a power broker and local warlord who had supported Ghani. 47 
The Heritage of Failed Governance and Corruption  
It is also important to stress that the political “threat,” from a divided Afghan central 
government is only part of the story. It is matched by the “threat” posed by other problems 
in Afghan governance, and the sheer scale of corruption. A separate Burke Chair study 
shows the full range of the challenges posed by Afghan governance, corruption, and 
economics: The Civil Transition in Afghanistan, 
(http://csis.org/files/publication/140630_Gov_Econ_Transition_Afghanistan_0.pdf).   
The metrics in this report supplement the analyses in the following chapters and shows a 
steady rise in poverty, failure to collect revenues and manage the budget, the lack of 
realistic goals for economic development, critical problems in governance and corruption, 
and the data that supports SIGAR and World Bank analyses that show that much of the aid 
effort has been waste and or distorted the economy.  
Corruption and Incompetence 
Figure 6 shows the World Bank estimate of the scale of the problems in Afghan 
governance. These problems go far beyond corruption, and affect every aspect of 
government operations. They not only affect the operations of the central government, but 
far too many provincial and district governments, as well as a wide range of foreign and 
native contractors and firms that are dependent on funding from the Afghan government. 
The full report on The Civil Transition in Afghanistan shows that World Bank, UN, and 
IMF estimates provide equally serious warnings about Afghan capability for economic and 
human development.  
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It is corruption, however, which may do most to limit popular loyalty to the government. 
Transparency International ranks Afghanistan as the third most corrupt country in the 
world. 48 A December 2013 poll by Democracy International that sought to determine the 
single most important issue the new President should focus upon found that 29% of 
Afghans said corruption was the issue versus only 21% for security – a measure that also 
included abuses and corruption by the police and government. Another 7% said 
reconciliation with the Taliban, 5% said roads, 4% education, and 3% medical care. Only 
5% gave defeating the Taliban top priority.49 
A November 2014 poll by the Asian Foundation had somewhat similar results, and showed 
that corruption was a steadily rising source of popular concern, but also found that security 
remained a more important issue than corruption – a finding that may partly reflect the 
deteriorating security conditions in Afghanistan during the course of 2014. These results 
are shown in Figure 7. 
The Special Inspector General for Afghan Reconstruction (SIGAR) has issued repeated 
warnings about corruption, and the problems in the government’s budget and use of aid. 
John F. Sopko, the Special Inspector General stated in a speech on September 12, 2014 
that, 
To date, the United States government has provided over $104 billion for Afghanistan 
reconstruction which has been intended: to build the Afghan government and its security forces, 
bolster Afghanistan’s economy, build its infrastructure, expand its health and education sectors, and 
improve Afghanistan’s quality of life and rule of law. …That’s an extraordinary amount of money, 
but in many ways it has gone unnoticed almost hidden in plain sight. When was the last time you 
heard mention of the massive amount of money being spent on reconstruction in Afghanistan? Or 
what have we gotten for the investment? 
Let’s put that figure in some context …Let’s just state this simple fact that’s more money than we’ve 
spent on reconstruction for any one country in our nation’s entire history. For those of you who are 
historians, at the end of this year we will have committed more funds to reconstruct Afghanistan, in 
inflation-adjusted terms, than the U.S. spent to rebuild Europe after World War II under the Marshall 
Plan… In relative terms to current foreign policy hot spots, we’re spending more money just this 
year to rebuild Afghanistan than we will spend for the next four largest countries that receive U.S. 
foreign assistance, Israel, Egypt, Pakistan, and Iraq combined. 
… As you well know, by December of this year, the President plans to leave just 9,800 U.S. troops 
in Afghanistan, and by the end of 2015 just around 5,000. As a result, many people believe 
America’s involvement in Afghanistan will therefore end. That is wrong. Despite the drawdown, 
our reconstruction mission is far from over and I would say will continue at a high tempo for some 
years to come if we want to keep the Afghan military and government afloat and protect our 
reconstruction successes. 
In that regard, right now there is nearly $16 billion in the pipeline, money that Congress has 
appropriated, but that U.S. agencies have not yet spent…That’s right $16 billion in the bank waiting 
to be pushed out the door for Afghan reconstruction projects and programs. Furthermore, it is widely 
believed the U.S. will continue to fund reconstruction at another $5 billion to $8 billion annually for 
years to come...As an example, just last week at the NATO conference in Wales, the Coalition 
agreed to fund the Afghan security forces alone at the rate of $5.1 billion a year through 2017, a $1 
billion commitment increase, with the U.S. shouldering the majority of that cost…It’s a tremendous 
amount of money. Ensuring it’s spent correctly is not only important to American taxpayers it’s 
critical to advancing our foreign policy goals. That is why it’s essential that someone is tasked with 
overseeing these efforts and ensuring that money is being spent appropriately. 
…. Reconstruction programs must take into account a recipient country’s ability to operate and 
sustain the assistance provided. If they don’t, we put the programs and tax dollars at risk. There’s 
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no real benefit in setting up projects or programs that the Afghans cannot or will not sustain once 
international forces depart and international aid declines. Unfortunately, Afghanistan is a case study 
in projects and programs set up without considering sustainability. 
The sheer size of the U.S. government’s reconstruction effort has placed both a financial and 
operational burden on the Afghan economy and its government that it simply cannot manage by 
itself. …For example, last year the Afghan government raised about $2 billion in revenues. Next 
year, it hopes to raise $2.4 billion, although recent reports we have received put this goal in serious 
doubt. With stated budget needs of approximately $7.6 billion, unfortunately the Afghan 
government will not be able to meet its budget without continued and significant donor assistance. 
Currently, the United States and other international donors fund more than 60% of the Afghan 
national budget, as well as countless reconstruction programs and projects that currently operate off-
budget. With the troop withdrawal, greater responsibility for those off-budget programs and projects 
is being given to the Afghan government.  
Looking at the Afghan National Security Forces or ANSF it’s clear why this problem is so immense. 
The latest independent assessment, by the Center for Naval Analysis, concludes that the ANSF will 
require a force of 373,000. This would cost roughly $5 billion to $6 billion per year, at a time when 
the Afghan government struggles to raise $2 billion a year.  
At these levels, if the Afghan government were to dedicate all of its domestic revenue toward 
sustaining the Afghan army and police, it still could only pay for about a third of the cost. Moreover, 
all other costs from paying civil servants to maintaining all roads, schools, hospitals and other non-
military infrastructure would also have to come from international donors.  
While paying for Afghanistan’s security forces will be challenging, the cost of ongoing non-military 
development aid is also a major contributor to the ballooning expenses the Afghan government is 
responsible for. Each new development project that the U.S. and our allies funds, increases overall 
operation and maintenance costs that the Afghan government will ultimately be responsible for.  
The bottom line: It appears we’ve created a government that the Afghans simply cannot afford. 
Corruption is another enormous inter-agency challenge facing reconstruction in Afghanistan. The 
consensus among everyone I speak with is that if corruption is allowed to continue unabated it will 
likely jeopardize every gain we’ve made so far in Afghanistan…Corruption destroys the populace’s 
confidence in their elected officials, siphons off funds that would be used to combat insurgents or 
build infrastructure, and ultimately leads to a government that is ineffectual and distrusted.  
The threat from unabated corruption is especially exemplified right now in light of the ongoing 
election crisis. A crisis spawned from corruption, which many fear is putting Afghanistan’s entire 
future in jeopardy. …However, the problem of corruption isn’t new. Experts and SIGAR have been 
highlighting concerns about corruption for a long time.  
Top U.S. officials are very much aware of Afghan corruption. A report commissioned by General 
Dunford last year noted that “Corruption directly threatens the viability and legitimacy of the 
Afghan state.” USAID’s own assistant administrator for Afghanistan and Pakistan, Larry Sampler, 
told Congress that Afghanistan is “the most corrupt place I’ve ever been to.” And Retired Marine 
Gen. John Allen identified corruption as the biggest threat to Afghanistan’s future an even bigger 
threat than the Taliban. 
The Afghans are also concerned with corruption. In June, Integrity Watch Afghanistan (an Afghan 
NGO) issued their latest national corruption survey. It found that corruption tied for second as the 
greatest challenge facing Afghanistan, after security. While 18% of respondents in the 2012 survey 
said they faced corruption within the last 12 months, 21% of respondents said they faced corruption 
in the 2014 survey.  
The survey also noted that Afghans believe corruption in most public sectors undermined their 
access to services. The same services the U.S. invested billions in establishing….For example, 28% 
of respondents believed that their households were deprived of access to electricity because of 
corruption and 18% said corruption blocked their access to higher education. The exact same areas 
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where U.S. agencies commonly claim great success. In fact, the corruption percentages for 
electricity and education are not only up from 2012 but they are also higher than for justice by the 
courts and security by the police.  
In June, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace singled out Afghanistan as an example of 
a state where governing systems have been bent to benefit one or a very few networks. According 
to the report, President Karzai regularly calls his attorney general to influence cases or personally 
orders the release of suspects from pre-trial detention, quashing the cases against them. 
This is the same Attorney General that recently threw a respected New York Times reporter out of 
the country because he didn’t like his reporting. The DOD and the State Department have repeatedly 
noted that the Afghan AG has deliberately avoided prosecuting either senior officials or individuals 
with ties to senior officials and stymied the work of the investigatory arm of his own internal-control 
and monitoring unit….SIGAR has also had problems with the Attorney General. In one case, 
SIGAR worked to freeze and seize nearly $70 million in funds, stolen from the U.S. government, 
that was sitting in Afghan banks. For months we pressed the Attorney General's Office to freeze the 
money and begin the legal process to seize the cash. At first, we were told the bank account was 
frozen and the money protected. Unfortunately, as is too often the case, we later learned that the 
money was mysteriously unfrozen by some powerful bureaucrat in Kabul.  
SIGAR has issued a number of reports on U.S. efforts to combat corruption. These reports have 
continually pointed out that the United States lacks a unified anti-corruption strategy in Afghanistan. 
This is astonishing, given that Afghanistan is one of the most corrupt countries in the world, and a 
country that the United States is spending billions of dollars in….Yet there has been no progress 
made toward developing a unified anti-corruption strategy. In fact, things could get worse with the 
drawdown. 
We cannot shy away from the challenge of corruption. We need a strategy, and we need to hold the 
Afghans feet to the fire on this issue. SIGAR will continue to point out how well or poorly not only 
U.S. officials but also Afghan officials perform in their promises to reduce corruption. 
…Directly tied to corruption is the final inter-agency challenge I wanted to talk about today 
countering the growth of the drug trade. This challenge is no secret to anyone; the U.S. has already 
spent nearly $7.6 billion to combat the opium industry. Yet, by every conceivable metric, we’ve 
failed…Production and cultivation are up, interdiction and eradication are down, financial support 
to the insurgency is up, and addiction and abuse are at unprecedented levels in Afghanistan.  
During my trips to Afghanistan I’ve met with U.S., Afghan and international officials involved in 
implementing and evaluating counternarcotics programs. In the opinion of almost everyone I’ve 
met, the counternarcotics situation in Afghanistan is dire, with little prospect for improvement. 
As with sustainability and corruption, the expanding cultivation and trafficking of drugs puts the 
entire Afghan reconstruction effort at risk. The narcotics trade poisons the Afghan financial sector 
and fuels a growing illicit economy This, in turn, undermines the Afghan state’s legitimacy by 
stoking corruption, nourishing criminal networks and providing significant financial support to the 
Taliban and other insurgent groups…There are already signs that elements within the Afghan 
security forces are reaching arrangements with rural communities to allow opium poppy cultivation 
even encouraging production to build local patronage networks and generate illicit income. 
Given the importance of this problem, I was astonished to find that the counternarcotics effort isn’t 
a top priority during this critical transition period and beyond. For example, the latest U.S. Civil-
Military Strategic Framework for Afghanistan, which articulates the “vision for pursing U.S. 
national goals in Afghanistan,” barely mentions counternarcotics. It notes that the U.S. 
counternarcotics strategy for 2010 “informs” the framework, but for the first time since the U.S. 
government began outlining its reconstruction goals, it didn’t include counternarcotics as a major 
focus area. 
When I’ve met with Department of Justice, State Department and DOD officials, no one’s been able 
to convincingly explain to me how the U.S. counternarcotics efforts are making a meaningful impact 
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on the narcotics trade or how they’ll have a significant impact after the 2014 transition. That’s 
troubling… 
Virtually every observer agrees that the levels of corruption common to virtually all 
developing states were driven to massive levels by the wave of foreign military and aid 
spending in each country between 2002 and 2014, by the lack of meaningful management 
and control over the funds involved as well as an emphasis on spending rate rather than 
any meaningful measures of performance and effectiveness. Corruption has been by the 
insecurity of Afghan officials and security officers who often saw little alternative than 
taking the money while they could, and by government favoritism to power brokers and 
their influence.  
 
Corruption has been driven by the willingness of both Afghan and foreign contractors to 
misuse funds and make false claims about levels of effort and performance, and by 
Ministers and ministries that have been all willing to do the same. It has been driven by a 
financial system where the abuses of the Kabul Bank have only been the most egregious 
example of internal fraud and threat. And, corruption developed at every level of the justice 
system from the Attorney General’s office down.50 
 
There is no way to know how much of the military and aid funds actually spent in 
Afghanistan were wasted in this manner, or how much of the corruption money left the 
country and was deposited in Gulf and other foreign banks, but shipments of money worth 
millions of dollars have been intercepted at Kabul Airport. The work of then Brigadier 
General H.R. McMaster in commanding ISAF’s Task Force Shafafiyat, or Task Force 
Transparency, as well as the work of the Special Inspector General for Afghan 
Construction has shown the pivotal impact of the lack of US military and USAID control 
of funds spent in Afghanistan in encouraging corruption.51 
One of many tragedies in the way the US managed its role in the war was that if focused 
on formal top down anti-corruption task forces, and efforts to force the Afghan government 
to confront the key power brokers and people it depended upon for power, rather than 
assessing the impact of its own spending, controlling and auditing the flow of money and 
making serious efforts to control its flow and measuring its effectiveness. The end result 
was that virtually no senior official or well-connected Afghan was successful prosecuted 
and imprisoned, and every major anti-corruption effort trigger a major political battle 
which the anti-corruption official lost – often at great personal cost.  
By the time that General Petraeus tasked General McMasters with actually addressing the 
real and controllable causes of the worst corruption by controlling the flow of money in 
2012, the US was already committed to withdrawal, at odds with Karzai, and it was too 
late to really implement the reforms proposed by the Task Force Shafafiyat (Transparency) 
that McMaster’s led. At the time of Transition at the end of 2014, anti-corruption measures 
remained as ineffective as ever, and many observers the growing fear of the impact of ISAF 
withdrawal and Afghanistan’s economic future was making corruption and capital flight 
even worse.  
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Figure 6: Afghanistan: One of the Worst Governed and Most 
Corrupt and Countries in the World – Part One 
 
World Bank Estimate of Trends in Governance 
 
Source: World Bank, http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/worldwide-governance-indicators.  
  
Cordesman: Transition in Afghanistan                              January 2015 
41 
Figure 6: Afghanistan: One of the Worst Governed and Most 
Corrupt and Countries in the World – Part Two 
 
IMF Estimate of Trends in Governance 
 
  
 
Note: IMF Sources are World Bank Doing Business Report (2014); World Bank Worldwide Governance 
Indicators; World Bank Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey; and IMF staff 
calculations. 
 
Source for graphs: ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN. 2014 ARTICLE IV CONSULTATION—
STAFF REPORT; PRESS RELEASE; AND STATE STATEMENT BY THE EXECUTIVE 
DIRECTORFOR THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN, 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2014/cr14128.pdf, p. 14.   
1/ Low income countries; 
2/ Middle East, North Africa, 
and Pakistan; 
3/ Emerging market 
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Figure 7: Afghan Perceptions of the Biggest Problems Facing 
Afghanistan as a Whole 
 
Source: Asia Foundation, Afghanistan in 2014, A Survey of the Afghan People, November 2014, pp. 24-25.  
Keeping Corruption in Perspective 
The past, however, is not always a predicative prologue to the future. Some Afghan leaders 
like Ashraf Ghani deserve credit for trying to reform the Afghan government, create a more 
effective national approach to development, and reduce corruption back to the levels where 
the government can operate a more effective and popular level.  
Both Ghani and Abdullah have called for reform, and – as has been noted earlier -- Ghani 
proposed detailed steps in the plan for Realizing Self Reliance: Commitments to Reforms 
and Renewed Partnership that he issued at the London Conference in early December 
2014. 52  This report highlighted the critical steps that  
Afghanistan needed to take at the level of civil governance, and which now present major 
challenges to Afghan security and stability: 53 
 Tackling the Underlying Drivers of Corruption 
o Actions to root out corruption from critical institutions  
o Diagnosis of sources of corruption  
o Establishing credibility through a series of high profile actions 
o Intense efforts to control narcotic production and sale  
 Building Better Governance 
o Reforming the electoral system 
Respondents from all regions rank insecurity, corruption, and unemployment interchangeably as the 
three biggest problems facing Afghanistan. Insecurity is cited most often in the West (42.0%) and least 
often in the North East (24.5%). The presence of the Taliban is cited most frequently in the West (13.8%) 
and least frequently in the South West (4.9%). People in the East region are most likely to say corruption 
is the biggest problem facing Afghanistan (34.1%) and people in the Central/Hazarajat region are the least 
likely (22.4%). Meanwhile, unemployment is cited most often in the Central/Kabul (35.9%) region and 
least often in the South East (19.7%) region. 
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o Justice sector reform 
o Professionalizing public administration 
o Improving government efficiency and effectiveness  
o Civil service reforms  
o Strengthening public financial management (PFM)  
o Improving sub-national governance 
o Making cities the economic drivers for development  
 Restoring Fiscal Sustainability  
o Strengthening enforcement and fighting corruption in customs  
o Creating an Independent Revenue Authority 
o Increasing tax income and strengthening tax enforcement  
o Using budget to manage policy 
o Strengthening fiscal discipline  
 Reforming Development Planning and Management  
o Improving strategic management  
o Consolidating and streamlining priorities  
o Reducing Development costs 
 Bolstering Private Sector Confidence, Promoting Growth, and Creating Jobs  
o Improving the investment climate  
o Strengthening the financial sector  
o Strengthening regulatory and supervisory capacity of the central bank  
o Promoting growth in key economic sectors 
 Ensuring Citizen’s Development Rights  
o Developing services but through new delivery models  
o Empowering women  
o Preparing a National Economic Empowerment Plan for Women  
o Supporting Human Rights 
o Improving the well-being of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) 
Carrying out these reforms, however, takes political unity, requires honest and competent 
government personnel at every level from the district to Kabul, and must overcome a 
massive set of existing problems in the face of an ongoing conflict that will at best take 
years to accomplish. It is clear from even the summary reporting of outside international 
organizations and NGOs that permeating corruption and the broad level of incompetence 
at every level of Afghan governance are now as much of a host country threat as the 
problems in Afghan politics.  
The Budget Crisis in Revenues and Expenditures 
The Afghan government must also cope with a massive gap between its revenues and 
expenditures for at least the next half decade even if the ANSF proves to be full effective 
in dealing with the Taliban and other insurgents without more aid and outside assistance 
than is currently planned. This gap has grown out of the fact that outside military spending 
and aid have financed the bulk of Afghan government spending ever since the fall of the 
Taliban, and the gap between projected Afghan government expenditures and revenues in 
the period from 2015 onwards has become steadily more serious than was originally 
estimated in 2012.  
Once again, these numbers and trends are complex and are laid out in more detail in The 
Civil Transition in Afghanistan 
(http://csis.org/files/publication/140630_Gov_Econ_Transition_Afghanistan_0.pdf).  
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The summary estimates of SIGAR and the World Bank in late 2014 do, however, make the 
challenges the Afghan government faces all too clear, as do the summary estimates shown 
in Figure 8. The situation was so bad towards the end of 2014 that the Afghan government 
could not pay its civil servants without additional outside aid. As SIGAR notes,54 
The World Bank reported this quarter that Afghanistan is headed for a fiscal crisis. Government 
cash balances are low and it is behind in operations and maintenance as well as discretionary 
development spending…The Ministry of Finance (MOF) reported that Afghanistan is suffering 
from acute budgetary 
Shortfalls… and the World Bank estimates a shortfall of $500 million in FY 1393 (December 21, 
2013–December 20, 2014), threatening to affect payments of civil servant salaries, pensions, and 
operating and development spending. However, the Bank warns that the fiscal gap will be even 
larger if revised government-revenue targets are not reached and donor grants are not paid. 
…In May, the Afghan Minister of Finance was quoted saying that donors have not released on-
budget development funding to the Afghan government, creating “a major hole in [the Afghan 
government’s] development budget.” In August, a MOF spokesman warned that a host of 
development projects to build and maintain roads, schools, and clinics had been suspended for lack 
of funds.473 The MOF instituted control measures to reduce discretionary spending and operations 
and maintenance expenses. 
… Afghanistan has one of the lowest rates of domestic-revenue collection in the world, averaging 
9% of GDP from 2006–2013, according to the IMF. Revenue collection continues to decline against 
budget projections. In the first seven months of FY 1393, total domestic revenues—tax and non-tax 
revenues, and customs duties—missed MOF targets by $274 million (-22%) so far, and decreased 
by approximately $39.46 million from the same period in FY 1392 (-3.8%). 
The World Bank estimated a budgetary shortfall of around $500 million in FY 1393 (December 21, 
2013–December 20, 2014), and reported that Afghanistan is headed for a fiscal crisis. Government 
cash balances are low and it is behind in operations and maintenance as well as discretionary 
development spending.673 Afghanistan is suffering from acute budgetary shortfalls in FY 1393, 
threatening to affect payments of civil servant salaries, pensions, and operating and development 
spending. However, should revised government revenue targets not be reached and donor grants not 
paid, the World Bank warns that the fiscal gap will grow. 
Afghan officials have largely attributed this gap to donor failure to release on-budget development 
aid, and the protracted presidential election that depressed consumer spending and led to an overall 
decline in imports—major sources of government tax and customs revenue. State said continuing 
drawdown of international forces, whose presence traditionally helped bolster imports, is 
compounding Afghanistan’s revenue shortfalls. 
… State attributed Afghanistan’s fiscal crisis to economic inertia, stemming from the drawn-out 
political transition, and Afghanistan’s unrealistic budget. While expressing a willingness to work 
with the new government to improve revenue collection measures and budget formulation, State 
said the new government bears ultimate responsibility for fixing these problems. Officials said 
Afghanistan has been warned that the United States will not respond favorably to repeated requests 
for emergency funds. 
SIGAR asked State for a U.S. government point of contact with access to the Afghanistan Financial 
Management Information System (AFMIS), the country’s government-wide accounting system, as 
well as a description of any efforts undertaken by the United States or the international community 
to validate AFMIS data. State responded it does not currently have access to AFMIS. DOD relies 
upon AFMIS for tracking Ministry of Interior and Ministry of Defense spending and has access to 
certain AFMIS data, but acknowledges that the data is entered by Afghan ministry staff, making its 
reliability dependent on those same individuals. DOD is not aware of any periodic data-validity 
checks... 
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SIGAR believes U.S. government agencies should press the MOF for complete access to AFMIS 
and help the Afghan government ensure the data is accurate and verifiable. While the AFMIS data 
is far from perfect, without it, SIGAR believes the United States lacks a holistic view of what the 
Afghan government reports to be spending its money on and at what rate, cannot confirm whether 
and to what degree budgetary shortfalls exist, and has insufficient basis to inform the U.S. response.  
SIGAR questions the Afghan government’s management of billions of dollars in U.S. and 
international donor assistance. Afghanistan’s budgetary shortfalls, excluding donor grants, have 
been documented by SIGAR, the World Bank, IMF, and Afghanistan’s Ministry of Finance, among 
others, long before the protracted presidential elections and its associated economic impacts. 
Afghanistan has suffered from a lack of political will to address corruption, which permeates many 
Afghan government institutions, and from weak enforcement of revenue measures. SIGAR agrees 
with State that a new Afghan administration brings fresh opportunities to tackle these issues… 
It is the World Bank and IMF estimates of the longer-term trends in the budget deficit in 
Part Two of Figure 8, however, that should be the subject of the greatest concern. They 
show massive deficits indefinitely into the future –extending to 2025 and 2030. Much 
depends on the security situation –which can be either better or worse than the estimates in 
Figure 8. Even the civil side of demand, however, can present major problems.  
Any such projections for the future have massive uncertainties, and Afghanistan should be 
able to close some of the projected gap by increasing its revenue collection. The only 
practical ways that Afghanistan can deal the full level of such deficits, however, are to have 
massive foreign aid long beyond the timeframes currently discussed in US policy 
documents and international conferences, to have a form of victory or peace settlement that 
allows truly massive cuts in security spending, and/or to further impoverish one of the 
poorest countries in the world. 
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Figure 8: The Crisis in the Afghan Budget – Part One 
 
 
Special Inspector General for Afghan Reconstruction, (SIGAR), Quarterly Report, October 30, 
2014, pp. 85-86. 
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Figure 8: The Crisis in the Afghan Budget – Part Two 
World Bank Estimates of Future Gap Between Afghan Budget Revenues and 
Expenditures 
Projected Expenditure & Domestic Revenue 
 
Financing Gaps, incl. & excl. Security 
 
. Note: Much of civilian and military aid has been delivered outside of the budget through external, budget contributions. 
Of the US$15.7 billion in aid to Afghanistan in 2010/11, only a small portion, roughly 11 percent, was delivered on-
budget. Nevertheless, on-budget aid is an important financing source. While domestic revenues significantly increased 
between from 3 percent in 2002 to 11.4 percent in 2012, they have been insufficient to sustain the government’s operation 
and investment. In 2012, domestic revenues only financed 40 percent of total expenditures; the remainder was financed 
by foreign grants. The fiscal sustainability ratio, which measures domestic revenue over operating expenditures, was only 
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60 percent in 2012, which means that Afghanistan can currently not even fully meet the recurrent costs of its public 
service provision. This renders the operations of the government unsustainable without additional external financing. 
The analysis projects revenues to reach more than 17 percent of GDP by 2025 (from current levels of 11 percent), 
assuming good performance in revenue collection and continued development of extractive Industries. However, on-
budget expenditures are expected to grow much faster, largely as a result of rising security spending for both operations 
and maintenance (O&M) and wages for the army and police, which were historically funded by donors outside of the 
budget…. But it will also be driven by non-security spending, which will increase due to additional O&M liabilities 
associated with the handover of donor-built assets and with a rising government payroll as civil service reforms unfold. 
Security spending is projected to be more than 15.2 percent of GDP in 2021 (about as much as total projected domestic 
revenue in that year), the civilian wage bill 4.8 percent, and the civilian nonwage O&M bill 7.2 percent. Depending on 
how many of the O&M liabilities the government takes on, total government spending could assume between 38 percent 
and 54 percent of GDP by 2025. This would result in a total financing gap of 20 percent of GDP in 2025, and even higher 
levels in the intermediate years 
Source: Nassif, Claudia; Joya, Omar; Lofgren, Hans; Gable, Susanna; Redaelli, Silvia; Jordan, Luke; Jaffrin, Guillemette 
Sidonie. 2014. Full report. Vol. 2 of Afghanistan - Pathways to inclusive growth. Washington, DC : World Bank Group, 
Report No: ACS8228, Islamic State of Afghanistan, Pathways to Inclusive Growth, Full Report, March 2014, SASEP, 
SOUTH ASIA 53-54 
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Figure 8: The Crisis in the Afghan Budget – Part Three 
IMF Estimates of Future Gap Between Afghan Budget Revenues and Expenditures 
 
Domestic revenues have stagnated due to the economic slowdown, faltering efforts, and leakages, and are expected to 
rise only slowly, while operating budget expenditures, which were at 15 percent of GDP in 2010 are projected to increase 
to over 29 percent of GDP by 2018 as part of the security transition. The combination of these factors generates large 
fiscal vulnerabilities. Afghanistan has one of the lowest domestic revenue collections in the world, with an average of 
about 9 percent of GDP in 2006–13 compared to about 21 percent in low-income countries. Factors behind this poor 
performance include a very low starting point, low compliance, opposition to new taxes, and a limited set of taxes.  
Source: ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN. 2014 ARTICLE IV CONSULTATION—STAFF REPORT; 
PRESS RELEASE; AND STATEMENT BY THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTORFOR THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF 
AFGHANISTAN, http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2014/cr14128.pdf, p. 14. 
The Failure to Win US and Other Outside Domestic Political Support 
The trends in Figure 8 are also important because they highlight an issue that is important 
both to sustaining anything like the level of aid Afghanistan may need, and any increase in 
US and allied military support if the security situation should demand this.  It is unclear 
that there is anywhere near the level of US domestic political support necessary to sustain 
a serious US military and civil aid effort that might well have to last to at least 2018-2020 
– and possibly far longer.  
The Administration, the Congress, and the American people may want to “win” in 
Afghanistan to the degree this means some form of relatively stable Afghanistan, and one 
free of Taliban and extremist control.  
As Figure 9 shows, however US public opinion polls have long provided a clear warning 
about the limits to popular support for continued US intervention in Afghanistan. More 
recent polling has been even more negative. The AFP reported on December 26, 2014 that, 
“A large majority of Americans now say the war was not worth it, and only 23 percent of 
US soldiers believe the mission has been a success, according to recent polls.55  
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A BBC poll in October 2014 found that, “Fewer than half of respondents said the conflict 
was worthwhile for the US...Two-thirds of participants were skeptical that US involvement 
left the Afghan government able to defend its own people without assistance, (and) only 
28% of respondents say America is safer as a result.”56  
As was the case in Vietnam, it also seems likely that if the US government is found to have 
understated the risks in the need for aid or for US military support, the resulting backlash 
may make things worse. It is also worth noting that public support for the Afghan conflict 
in most other ISAF countries became negative far earlier than in the US, and has dropped 
even more sharply over time. 
As Figure 10 shows, the history of past wars should be a warning to anyone in the US 
government that feels that the promises made at the end of conflicts really mean sustained 
aid and support. 
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Figure 9: US Public Opinion on the Afghan War – Part One 
Gallup Poll: February 2014 
 
 
Source: Gallup, Afghanistan, http://www.gallup.com/poll/116233/Afghanistan.aspx 
 
Pew Poll: January 2014 
 
Source: Pew Research Center, January 30, 2014, http://www.people-press.org/2014/01/30/more-now-see-failure-than-success-in-
iraq-afghanistan/1-30-2014_05/. 
 
  
Cordesman: Transition in Afghanistan                              January 2015 
52 
Figure 9: US Public Opinion on the Afghan War – Part Two 
Quinnipiac University. June 24-30, 2014. N=1,446 registered voters nationwide. Margin of error ± 2.6. 
              
"From what you've read and heard, do you think Barack Obama is removing U.S. troops from 
 Afghanistan too quickly, not quickly enough, or is he handling this about right?" 
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The Combined Threat from Host Country Politics, Governance, and 
Budgeting 
If the civil side of Transition comes to consist of a failed election, unstable Afghan politics, 
and an incompetent and corrupt Afghan government, the end result may well pose as much 
of a threat over time as the Taliban and other insurgents. It is not clear that an Afghan 
government that cannot honestly and effectively administrate aid, carry out economic 
reform, or use aid to stabilize the economy can either maintain the domestic popular 
support it needs to win or the outside support it needs to provide the necessary levels of 
aid. 
Figure 10: The Past History of Wartime Aid: Declare Victory 
and Leave  
 
 
Source: USAID, USAID Afghanistan: Towards an Enduring Partnership, January 28, 2011. 
 
 
  
Development Assistance Levels Before and After Troop Reductions 
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IV. The ANSF and the Threat from an Intensifying 
Conflict  
Important as Afghanistan’s political and governance challenges are, its security challenges 
are just as great.  The Afghan security forces have been rushed into being and expanded at 
rates that leave major gaps and flaws. Its key ministries -- the Ministry of Defense (MoD) 
and the Ministry of the Interior (MoI) – are still very much works in progress.  
As the next chapter describes in detail, every branch of the ANSF faces major challenges 
now that outside combat forces have departed: 
 The Afghan National Army (ANA) is the most competent service, but many of its units lack 
experience leadership, it suffers from serious attrition problems, its combat support and service 
support units are only beginning to have to do the job on their own, and the Army as whole lacks 
experience in functioning effectively as a self-sustaining force. 
 The Afghan National Police have some effective units, but far too many are weak and corrupt, and 
it lacks the support of the other elements of an effective justice system. Many elements are more 
loyal to their commander or local political leaders than the central government, and deeply involved 
in district or provincial politics. Only a few elements are trained and equipped for the paramilitary 
missions they must now perform. The police are taking high casualties, and are unable to operate 
outside their base areas or in significant portions of the area they are supposed to cover in areas with 
any significant insurgent presence. 
 The Afghan Local Police (ALP) have provided important local security in some areas, and been a 
source of power brokering and abuse in others. It is unclear that the ALP can be effectively 
controlled by the central government over time, or how well it will interface with the ANP and MoI. 
Future plans for the ALP were being reevaluated at the end of 2014, and it is unclear what role they 
will really play in the future.  
 The capability and future role of the forces that must provide convoy and facility security is highly 
uncertain. Some elements of the Afghan Public Protection Forces (APPF) still exists, but former 
President Karzai decided to abolish it in the spring of 2014.  The ANP now provides convoy 
protection, and the APPF’s present facility security function is uncertain at a time when US and 
other ISAF withdrawals have made the protection of facilities and transport even more critical. It is 
unclear that the ANSF can adequately replace the role played by private security contractors. 
The President’s “Sell By Date:” Slashing Advisors and Support 
Regardless on Conditions in Afghanistan 
All of these factors highlight the risks inherent in President Obama’s decisions to set a 
fixed deadline for ending almost all outside combat support for Afghan forces, and to 
rapidly phase out almost all other US forces during 2015-2016. They create major risks 
that substantial parts of the country will come under insurgent control that the role of the 
central government will weaken as other regions develop their own security forces, and 
that the struggle with the Taliban will go on indefinitely into the future.  
As has been noted earlier, the President made a statement at the White House on May 27, 
2014, that he would end any major US role in the war by the time he left office at the end 
of 2016. This statement also indicated that US withdrawal was not conditions-based and 
would occur regardless of the conditions that emerged during Transition. The key portions 
of President Obama’s statement that affected Afghan security forces were:57  
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…2014…is a pivotal year.  Together with our allies and the Afghan government, we have agreed 
that this is the year we will conclude our combat mission in Afghanistan. This is also a year of 
political transition in Afghanistan.  Earlier this spring, Afghans turned out in the millions to vote in 
the first round of their presidential election -- defying threats in order to determine their own 
destiny.  And in just over two weeks, they will vote for their next President, and Afghanistan will 
see its first democratic transfer of power in history. 
…Our objectives are clear:  Disrupting threats posed by   al Qaeda; supporting Afghan security 
forces; and giving the Afghan people the opportunity to succeed as they stand on their own. 
Here’s how we will pursue those objectives.  First, America’s combat mission will be over by the 
end of this year. Starting next year, Afghans will be fully responsible for securing their 
country.  American personnel will be in an advisory role.  We will no longer patrol Afghan cities or 
towns, mountains or valleys.  That is a task for the Afghan people. 
Second, I’ve made it clear that we’re open to cooperating with Afghans on two narrow missions 
after 2014:  training Afghan forces and supporting counterterrorism operations against the remnants 
of al Qaeda.  
… At the beginning of 2015, we will have approximately 9,800 U.S. service members in different 
parts of the country, together with our NATO allies and other partners. By the end of 2015, we will 
have reduced that presence by roughly half, and we will have consolidated our troops in Kabul and 
on Bagram Airfield.  One year later, by the end of 2016, our military will draw down to a normal 
embassy presence in Kabul, with a security assistance component, just as we’ve done in Iraq. 
...our relationship will not be defined by war -- it will be shaped by our financial and development 
assistance, as well as our diplomatic support.  Our commitment to Afghanistan is rooted in the 
strategic partnership that we agreed to in 2012.  And this plan remains consistent with discussions 
we’ve had with our NATO allies.  Just as our allies have been with us every step of the way in 
Afghanistan, we expect that our allies will be with us going forward. 
This speech made it clear that the US would slash virtually every aspect of the US military 
role in helping Afghan forces in 2015, and then end it in 2016, and do so regardless of the 
conditions emerging on the ground.  In practice, it also put the President’s desire to end the 
war politics before creating workable military plans and maintaining a capacity to provide 
a conditions-based response if Afghanistan encountered major military challenges. 
The Impact of A Late and Erratic Effort to Create Effective Afghan 
Forces 
Deadlines, however, were scarcely the only problem. To put the impact of President 
Obama’s decisions in perspective, it is important to note that the problems the US created 
for Afghanistan in creating an effective ANSF went well beyond those created by imposing 
a fixed and somewhat arbitrary deadline for US withdrawal. They were also shaped by 
decisions under the Bush Administration that gave priority to Iraq, and ignored warnings 
by various US ambassadors and senior commanders.  
They are the product of the erratic the entire history of the US military presence in 
Afghanistan, and by the erratic patterns in US efforts to build up Afghan forces from 2001 
to the present. The problems in every element of Afghan forces have been shaped by the 
fact the US took so long to decide to create effective Afghan forces in the first place, 
suddenly rushed their expansion forward without adequate numbers of qualified advisors 
after 2010, and then was equally quick in depriving the new created Afghan forces of the 
outside support they need.  
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The US as a Self-Inflicted Threat  
Figure 11 shows that the Bush Administration kept US troop levels low during 2002-2009. 
This decision was taken largely because of the war in Iraq. The Bush Administration could 
deal with the political, military, and fiscal strains of fighting two intense regional land 
conflicts at the same time. It choose to give priority to Iraq, in part because of its greater 
strategic importance and in part because the seriousness of the threat in Iraq became clear 
in 2004-2005, while the US was in denial about the rising risks in Afghanistan. 
The Bush Administration failed to assess how quickly the Taliban and other insurgent 
forces were able to establish sanctuaries in Pakistan, re-infiltrate into Afghanistan, and 
build up and effective mix of political and military forces. Both the US and NATO also 
confused the ability to win limited tactical engagements with the defeat of Taliban efforts 
to win control of given areas of territory and parts of the population – ignoring both the 
extent to which the corruption and failures of the Afghan government enabled the Taliban 
and the importance of the political dimensions of the war.  
Looking back at US and ISAF reporting, both focused on the fact ISAF did not lose tactical 
encounters and effectively ignored the true character of the insurgent build up for nearly 
half a decade. They also failed to treat the insurgency in net assessment terms, making 
direct comparisons of the strengths and weaknesses of Afghan government and insurgent 
forces, and focusing as much on governance and civil factors as the outcome of direct 
military clashes. While given units often did make such comparisons at the local level, the 
ISAF command saw the fighting in largely military terms and focused on the threat rather 
than the host country government and forces. 
The problems in both US troop levels and efforts to generate Afghan security forces 
through 2009 were further compounded by annual US tours of duty, and a focus on 
defeating the enemy in the field rather than creating secure civil-military areas that made 
Afghan loyal to the government. Annual tours of duty, rotations from one part of the 
country to another in following tours of duty, and a failure to assign clear strategic priorities 
to the US and ISAF effort – rather than react to the insurgents -- further compounded the 
problem. So did the fact that the creation of a police force initially focused on local policing 
at a time when police need paramilitary capabilities to function, and the police were never 
properly funded and trained for the rising level of combat that occurred after the mid-2000s. 
As a result, the Taliban and other insurgents had something approaching a free ride in 
recovering their capabilities in Afghanistan in the period from 2003 to 2008. They kept 
taking losses when they directly encountered ISAF forces, in part because of nearly total 
ISAF superiority in the air and modern IS&R technology. But, these tactical losses did not 
prevent the insurgents from expanding their presence, control, and influence in many areas. 
They did not prevent the insurgent from exploiting popular anger at the failures of the 
Afghan government and its corruption, pressuring and intimidating the local population, 
providing popular justice, and exploiting the fact that much of the fighting was done by Us 
and allied forces rather than Afghans.  
The insurgents could also take full advantage of their de facto sanctuaries in Pakistan. The 
fact that the Taliban, Haqqani Network, Hekmatyer faction, and other insurgent groups 
could take sanctuary in Pakistan also meant that most tactical victories had little lasting 
effect. 
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The problems created by the US and ISAF focus on tactical victories were further 
compounded by problems in the way US and allied military forces dealt with the civil 
dimensions of the war. The aid that US forces could provide through the Commander's 
Emergency Response Program (CERP), and local USAID personnel could provide through 
the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) efforts, did help offset Afghan power brokering 
and corruption. So did the civil efforts of some allied forces, although some countries 
virtually decoupled their military efforts from their civil ones.  
At the same time, both military aid efforts, and many of the civil aid efforts that directly 
supported them,  suffered from the fact that well-intentioned personnel lacked the 
background and experience to plan and administrate such efforts, and focused on the 
immediate tactical priority at the expense of lasting security and stability. They often 
wasted money, fed the local process of corruption, or funded one local faction at the 
expense of another. These problems were made worse in many areas by contract programs 
that sharply overpaid Afghans for security duties and at least through 2011, they were so 
poorly audited that they to local and regional corruption.  
No serious effort was made to develop effective ways of assessing such aid needs and 
efforts on national and continuing basis. There were no meaningful measures of 
effectiveness for most projects, and minimal real world accounting and auditing efforts. 
Only sporadic efforts were made to determine how such civil efforts were perceived by 
Afghans and how many Afghans actually benefited. 
A Brief and Largely Ineffective US Surge 
The Obama Administration did address the immediate shortfalls in US forces and plans for 
developing Afghan forces. At the same time, it severely and publically limited the duration 
of the “surge” in US forces. It also set rigid deadlines that ensured that the insurgents knew 
that US and ISAF forces would be sharply cut after 2012 and end their combat role in 2014. 
This also meant that the insurgents knew they could ride out both the “surge” shown in 
Figure 11, and the period in which the ANSF had serious outside support.  
Furthermore, the impact of the “surge” was undermined by the firing of General Stanley 
A. McChrystal, and by concentrating much of the “surge” in a Marine Corp command in 
Helmand at the expense of a meaningful national campaign plan and priorities. The end 
result was that much of the surge was wasted in winning temporary tactical advantages in 
Helmand, and that ISAF came under growing pressure to focus on tactical encounters as 
US and allied forces were steadily cut between 2012 and the end of 2014 – a “boom and 
bust” cycle that did little to effectively prepare for Transition. 
The surge was accompanied by the creation of an AFPAK Hands program intended to 
provide military and civilians with the area expertise and language skills necessary to 
function effectively in the field, and who would serve for several years to provide 
continuity and true local area expertise. Like the surge, however, this program came late 
and was not effective. The Afghan hands program did not did not deploy its first class to 
Afghanistan until mid-2010 – some eight years into the war.58 The program did have some 
successes, and led to plans to create similar capabilities for the Pacific theater.59  
By the time Afghan hands began to deploy, however, the surge was ending, the US was 
beginning to move towards cutbacks and withdrawal, and there was so much turbulence in 
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the military and civil efforts in Kabul and the field that most of the people trained in the 
program were never assigned to effective positions that could use their expertise, and the 
program turned into a failure where many of those trained not only were never given a 
proper assignment but suffered career penalties for having volunteered and trained for 
hardship tours. 
Host Country “Threat”  
Throughout this period, the host country “threat” presented major problems.. The fact 
President Karzai controlled virtually all provincial and district administrative and police 
positions and put loyalty and power brokering ahead of honesty and effectiveness created 
a serious host country threat, compounded by Karzai’s focus on power-brokering and lack 
of interest in the effectiveness of the overall campaign. The US and ISAF did make 
attempts to push for the replacement of corrupt and ineffective officials, but had only 
limited success and even “successes” often meant that a corrupt or ineffective official was 
simply moved to a position elsewhere.  
The ISAF emphasis on winning tactical victories in the field, particularly against enemy-
initiated attacks (EIAs), meant there was far too little emphasis on depriving the Taliban 
and other insurgent movements of the ability to establish political influence in given areas, 
become involved in extortion and drugs, and take over the local justice system at a time 
when most aid efforts focused on reforming the rule of law by Western standards from the 
top down.  
Tribal and local feuds made prompt justice an essential part of security at the local level in 
many areas, but the afghan government could not provide effective policing and justice 
systems in much of the country. As a result, it was the insurgents that came to provide local 
justice in a number of areas. This gave the insurgents a significant edge in such areas in 
spite of the harshness of the way they enforced their judgments. This was particularly true 
in the many areas where corrupt or ineffective local officials and a lack of all the elements 
of the formal justice system made turning to the Afghan government a nightmare of delay 
and corruption.  
As has been described in the previous chapter, these problems have not yet been affected 
by President Karzai’s departure from office, and it is unclear whether Ashraf Ghani and 
Abdullah Abdullah can agree on – and implement -- an effective program for reform – 
particularly given each leader’s need to protect his own power base and the fact they much 
also compromise on appointments that meet Afghanistan’s power brokering needs at least 
as much as its needs for effective provincial and local governance. 
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Figure 11: The Erratic US Military Role in Afghanistan: 
Surging Too Late and Running for the Exits 
 
 US surge came several years after insurgent surge reflected in following 
graphs, and US troops will actually drop in a downward curve in 2015-2016, 
not steps.  
 Original US plans called for substantial conditions-based US advisory 
presence through 2016, and US commanders recommended higher levels than 
President decided upon. 
 
 
 
 US forces will only be based in Kabul and Bagram air base after end 2015. 
They will be further reduced in size by end 2017 to an advisory component at 
the U.S. Embassy in Kabul, “most likely numbering several hundred.” 
Source: US Department of Defense, and Washington Post, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/us-troops-in-
afghanistan/2014/09/30/45477364-490d-11e4-b72e-d60a9229cc10_graphic.html, accessed October 1, 2014. 
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Rushing Force Development Beyond Afghan and ISAF Capacity 
The US and ISAF effort to create Afghan forces did not become serious until 2009, and 
then took several years to properly staff, equip, and facilitate.  The legacy of past problems 
was then compounded by change in the plans and goals for Afghan forces once the US and 
ISAF did begin to take Afghan force development seriously as a result of the President 
Obama’s deadlines for withdrawal.  At the same time, the fixed deadlines for withdrawal, 
a growing insurgent threat, and the sharp and sudden increase in Afghan force goals after 
2009, put more and more pressure on the ANSF to rush its expansion.  
They also were compounded by erratic aid funding that made effective development 
impossible because of the need to adjust the force development effort to a boom and bust 
cycle in aid money and in advisors. ISAF was suddenly required to create a far stronger 
advisory and training effort without being given the money and experienced advisors it 
needed. These problems in the US force generation efforts for the ANSF were also affected 
by high rates of US military rotation. Many personnel were assigned to training duties with 
no prior experience and on a one-year tour.  More broadly, the US national security 
community failed to learn the cost of constant changes in the details of critical plans and 
strategy was largely been forgotten or ignored.   
Figure 12 provides some summary data and just shows how late and erratic the effort to 
build effective Afghan combat forces was in terms of money, force, goals, and training 
resources. It helps explain many of the problems in Afghan forces that are now unfairly 
blamed on the Afghan government and ISAF/NTM-A training effort, but were actually 
driven by US policy and funding decisions.  It should be noted that these charts are only a 
few of the metrics that show how rushed and erratic the ANSF build-up and force 
development effort was, and that a wider range of metrics is available in other reports cited 
later in this study.  
It is tribute to all concerned at NTM-A and ISAF that most of sudden expansion of Afghan 
forces could actually be manned between 2009 and 2014, and that it was possible to 
bringing in a larger and better qualified advisory force, improve partnering, provide the 
required equipment and facilities, and transition many units to a high degree of self-reliance 
during 2012-2014.   
As Figure 12 also shows, however, this process had to be rushed, presented major 
problems in terms of the attrition of experience personnel, and did not mean that the most 
elements of the ANSF were truly ready to lose all US and other allied advisory personnel, 
could stand alone without foreign advisors, and could come close to matching the ISAF 
force in offensive operations or maintaining security in the areas where they were deployed. 
Afghan forces began to take unacceptable levels of casualties as ISAF withdrawals 
proceeded during 2013-2014, and the reassuring statistics that ISAF issued about the 
growth of ANSF capabilities to take the lead in combat said nothing about the scale and 
impact of the operations involved or the ability to sustain the same level of security without 
ISAF support. 
 
  
Cordesman: Transition in Afghanistan                              January 2015 
61 
Figure 12: Late and Erratic Efforts to Create Effective 
Afghan National Security Forces – Part One  
The Rush to Build Effective Forces After 2009 
 
Source: ISAF, May 2001 
 
Critical Shortages in Advisors Through 2011 – Note that these numbers count advisors allocated to the 
mission but not present as present and that many – if not most advisors actually present had no prior 
area or training experience of the kind required. 
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Figure 12: Late and Erratic Efforts to Create Effective 
Afghan National Security Forces – Part Two  
Critical Shortfalls in ANSF Trainers Existed Continued Through 2012 
 
 
 
Only 32% of Trainers Actually in Place on 
September 1, 2010 
  
Following the September 23, 2010 NATO Force Generation 
Conference, in-place trainers and pledges increased by 18 
percent and 34 percent, respectively, which decreased the 
remaining shortage of trainers by 35 percent. The total 
requirement in CJSOR v10 is 2,796, a net growth of 471 
personnel.  
To address the NATO CJSOR v10 shortfall temporarily, the 
United States is providing an additional 868 personnel with 
skills not found in the deployed units. For the fielded ANSF 
Force, the current shortfall is 16 Operational Mentor and 
Liaison Teams (OMLTs) and 139 Police Operational Mentor 
and Liaison Teams (POMLTs). . In 2011, the shortfalls will 
increase with the departure of the Canadian brigade in 
Kandahar and the additional growth of the ANSF. By 2011, 
the shortfall is projected to be 41 OMLTs and 243 POMLTs 
 
Source: NTM-A, Year In Review, November 2009 to November 2010, p. 25: Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in 
Afghanistan, Report to Congress In accordance with section 1230 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 
(Public Law 110-181), as amended, November 2010, p.  20-21 
 
Efforts to Partner with Afghan Units Did Not Really Pay Off Until 2011, and Also 
were Not Properly Staffed with Experienced Personnel 
  
Afghan Government and the donor nation advise NTM-A/CSTC-A early in the process, NTM-
A/CSTC-A is able to track these cases and provide assistance, as necessary.   
 
Specific donation information (e.g., quantities and types of equipment) is tracked in a database 
maintained by the DCOM-ISC.  Since 2002, 45 nations (NATO and non-NATO), NATO, and 
six international funding agencies have contributed more than 2.36 billion USD in assistance to 
the Afghan Government.
12
  Future solicitations will focus on equipment, infrastructure, and 
monetary donations for both the ANA and ANP.  Monetary donations are especially critical due 
to the need for contracted institutional training centers, medical facilities, and standardized 
equipment.  
2.5:  Institutional Trainer and Mentor Status 
The manning resources required to accomplish the mission of growing the ANSF are identified 
in part two of the CJSOR.
13
  NATO released CJSOR v10 on September 1, 2010, which 
incorporates requirements not filled in CJSOR v9.5, as well as additional requirements 
identified.
14
  Deputy Supreme Allied commander Europe (DSACEUR) increased efforts to fill 
the shortage in NATO ISAF institutional trainers.  Following the September 23, 2010 NATO 
Force Generation Conference, in-place trainers and pledges increased by 18 percent and 34 
percent, respectively, which decreased the remaining shortage of trainers by 35 percent.  The 
total requirement in CJSOR v10 is 2,796, a net growth of 471 personnel.  The current shortfall in 
CJSOR v10 for institutional trainers is 920, with 896 trainers in-place and 980 confirmed pledges 
for trainers (see Table 1 below for the current CJSOR trainer status).  The United States currently 
sources 1,711 non-CJSOR trainer positions to mitigate the shortfall from CJSOR v9.5.  To 
address the NATO CJSOR v10 shortfall temporarily, the United States is also providing an 
additional 868 personnel with skills not found in the deployed units.  This U.S. bridging solution 
provides NATO with additional time to source CJSOR requirements.   
 
Table 1.  CJSOR Trainer Status (Version 10.0) 
Authorized In Place  Pledged Shortage
2,796 896 980 920
 
 
Because not all of the trainers are needed at once, NTM-A prioritized its most critical trainer 
skills.  Filling the top 15 most critical capabilities, depicted below in Table 2, will enable NTM-
A to continue on schedule until early summer 2011, averting delays in institutional transition and 
ANSF professionalization.   
 
For the fielded ANSF Force, the current shortfall is 16 Operational Mentor and Liaison Teams 
(OMLTs) and 139 Police Operational Mentor and Liaison Teams (POMLTs).  This shortfall is 
                                              
12 For example, the following recent donations are indicative of major donations received by Afghanistan: in June 2010, a Turkish donation of 
144 U.S.-produced .50 caliber machine guns, 950 81mm mortars, and more than 14,000 pair of field boots arrived in Afghanistan in support of 
the ANA; on July 23, 2010, Bosnia and Herzegovina made the most recent formal equipment offer to the ANSF.  The staff completed the 
required work to accept 60 D-30 Howitzers in support of the ANA; on June 28, 2010, Australia contributed 50 million Australian dollars into the 
NATO Trust Fund with no caveats.  Thi  is the first of five yearly installments tha  c mprise a total donation of 250 million Australian dollars. 
13 The CJSOR is a capabilities-based document used by NATO to identify the forces required to execute the campaign. 
14 TCNs have never completely filled the institutional trainer requirements in v9.5.  Institutional trainer shortfall for the CJSOR v9.5 was 776 
institutional trainers, taking into account the 646 confirmed pledges by TCNs. 
20 
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Figure 12: Late and Erratic Efforts to Create Effective 
Afghan National Security Forces – Part Three  
Erratic US Aid Funding of Afghan Security Forces Cripples Development 
Delays between appropriation by Congress and ability to spend effectively in 
Afghanistan mean that major US funding only had an impact from 2010 onwards and 
then dropped sharply after 2011. 
 
Source: SIGAR, Quarterly Report to Congress, July 30, 2014, p. 76. 
 
Suitable ANSF Force Growth and Adequate Training Capacity Do Not Occur Until 
2011 
ANSF: Training Capacity: 9/2009-11/2010 
 
Source: NTM-A, Year In Review, November 2009 to November 2010, p. 8. 
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Figure 12: Erratic Efforts to Create Effective Afghan 
National Security Forces After 2011 – Part Four  
Forces Totals Are High in 2014, But Count Many Missing Personnel and Some 
11,000 Civilians are Counted as Military 
 
Source: SIGAR, Quarterly Report, October 30, 2014, p. 92 
 
High ANA Attrition Rates Symbolize a Force Still in Development with Serious 
Retention and Attrition Problems 
 
Source: Department of Defense, p. 42, Progress Towards security and Stability in Afghanistan, October 2014, p. 42. 
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Figure 12: Erratic Efforts to Create Effective Afghan 
National Security Forces After 2011 – Part Five  
High ANAF Attrition ands turnover Rates are Also a Problem 
 
Source: Department of Defense, p. 42, Progress Towards security and Stability in Afghanistan, October 2014, p. 48. 
 
The Same is True of the Police, Which Have Extremely High Turnover 
 
 
Source: Department of Defense, p. 42, Progress Towards security and Stability in Afghanistan, October 2014, p. 53. 
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The Uncertain Threat  
It is difficult to assess how the strength and capability of the various insurgent groups 
changed over time, and experts differ over numbers, relative capability, trends, leadership 
and insurgent goals. The problem in assessing the threat has been further compound by the 
fact that ISAF and the US have made little effort to publically characterize the various 
elements of the insurgent threat since 2011.  
There are good reasons to avoid providing the kind of details that might compromise 
operations against the insurgents, and to be careful about the extent to which such 
disclosures embarrass the Pakistani and Afghan governments. There are also very real 
limits to the data US, ISAF, allied, and Afghan intelligence can develop.  
At the same time, a failure to provide meaningful broad assessments of risk, and to provide 
the level of public transparency necessary to assess the overall course of the fighting, and 
the prospects of a successful Transition, makes it impossible for a democratic society to 
understand the course of the fighting and the merits of continuing to support the Afghan 
government and forces. “Spinning” the threat is just as dishonest as “spinning” the success 
of the Afghan government and forces. 
The US ISAF never provided meaningful public estimates of the strength and influence of 
given insurgent groups at any point during the war. They ceased to provide details on 
insurgent goals and plans during late 2010 to early 2011, as well as on its leadership and 
unity. None of the US policy statements or reports from the time that President Obama 
announced his final set of deadlines to the actual date of Transition at the end of 2014 
provided any meaningful threat assessment. There not only was no meaningful 
transparency, there was no meaningful effort. 
As a result, there is no summary body of declassified data to draw upon in understanding 
the various Afghan insurgent groups.  
 There are no maps or data on the expansion or contraction of the influence of various insurgent 
groups and rise or contraction of areas of Afghan government and ANSF influence and control. All 
that are available are limited maps of violent tactical incidents – data that have limited value in 
assessing an insurgency based on political control and influence.  
 The sample maps from Wikipedia and the last public estimate provided by the Department of 
Defense shown in Figure 13 illustrate the problems involved in getting even minimal understanding. 
The Wikipedia map shows vast areas of influence where the Taliban has only weak or minimal 
insurgent elements, while the Department of Defense map shows small areas of violent EIAs without 
any breakout as to the movement involved or its presence and influence. There has never been any 
official map or estimate of the relative level of Afghan government presence and security versus 
insurgent presence and influence.) 
 The ties between given insurgent movements and Al Qaida “central,” remain unclear, as do Al 
Qaida’s links to Pakistani Inter-service Intelligence (ISI), and the degree of tacit tolerance that 
Pakistan shows to Al Qaida “centrals” continuing operations in Pakistan. 
 No meaningful unclassified data are provided on the role of foreign volunteers or the source of 
financing. 
 The public data on the growth of narcotics cultivation and output strongly indicate that the Taliban 
was able to reassert substantial influence over narcotics output in Helmand after 2012, but the 
subject is not mention in ISAF, Department of Defense, and UN reporting. 
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 The relations between the Afghan and Pakistani Taliban seem to have gotten closer from 2009 
onwards, but these relations are far from clear and experts differ.  
 It is clear that former members of insurgent networks have served in various Afghan governments, 
and that insurgent groups do penetrate both the government and some elements of the ANSF, but 
no public reporting has been made on the extent of insurgent influence or ability to obtain 
information from the Afghan government and various elements of the ANSF. 
 There is no debate over the continuing importance of Pakistani sanctuaries, at least through the start 
of the Pakistani offensive in Waziristan in 2014, but there is little reliable data on the size and nature 
of the forces and facilities involved.  
 There is no public assessment of the fighting strength of the Taliban, the main insurgent threat, how 
this strength has varied over time, and the number of core, seasonal, and local fighters. Experts also 
differ over the extent of the control and influence that Mullah Omar and the Quetta Shura Taliban 
have exerted over various elements of the Taliban and affiliated insurgent groups exerted over time, 
and whether and how much this influence diminished. General Stanley McChrystal did, however, 
publically state on February 8, 2009 that Mullah Omar and the central structure of the Taliban 
operate out of Quetta in Pakistan. The current links between the Afghan Taliban and the Tehrik-i-
Taliban Pakistan (TTP or Pakistani Taliban) and Malakand Taliban in Pakistan also remain unclear. 
Since that time, other reports have indicated that Mullah Omar has been silent or even dead, that the 
division between elements of the Taliban have deepened, and that some Taliban elements have allied 
themselves with the Islamic State while the others have remain aligned with Al Qaida. None of these 
reports have been reliable enough to substitute for the Transparency that the US and ISAF failed to 
provide.60 
 No one doubts the extreme character of the Haqqani Network, which is able to operate in the 
Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) in Northern Pakistan, near the southeastern border of 
Afghanistan, and conduct attacks in urban areas like Kabul, or that it has continuing ties to both Al 
Qaeda and Pakistani Inter-service Intelligence (ISI). However, there are no reliable public 
assessments of its size and the level of tension or cooperation between it and the other major 
insurgent networks.  Past claims that it had in excess of 20,000 fighters have never been verified, 
and the full nature of its forces in Pakistan and funding are unclear. 
 The same is true of the Hekmatyer Hezbi-e Islami Gulbidden or HIG (led by led by Gulbuddin 
Hekmatyar), its splinter groups like the Hekmatyer Hezbi-e Islami Khalis (HIK) (led by Mulavi 
Younas Khalis), the Hezbi Islami (a registered political party in Afghanistan), and the Pakistan 
Hezbi Islami (PHI) in Pakistan, as well as the ties of these groups to various members of the Afghan 
central government. It is clear that there have been some clashed with the Haqqani Network, but 
there is little reliable reporting on the seriousness of the tensions between various insurgent factions. 
Reports that the Hekmatyer Hezbi-e Islami has lost fighting strength may be accurate, but it is not 
clear it has lost political influence to the same degree and it still seems to be able to conduct attacks 
even Kabul. 
 There is little concrete data on the role and size that Uzbek insurgents like the Islamic Movement of 
Uzbekistan (IMU) play in either Afghanistan or Pakistan. It is clear, however, that the IMU has 
increased its role in the northern border area of Afghanistan and has attack Turkman border guards 
from within Afghanistan, and have been detected in northwestern Afghanistan as well. The size of 
the movement is unclear, but it included Tajiks as well as Uzbeks, and may have some ties to 
Turkman Jihadists. 
 Experts also differ over the extent to which meaningful numbers of insurgent fighters have 
abandoned the struggle and returned to civil life on a lasting basis. The October 2014 Department 
of Defense report on Progress toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan indicated that over 9,000 
fighters had been reintegrated into Afghan society since 2010, but made not attempt to report how 
many had gone back to become insurgents. It also noted that funding was not available to keep 
supporting the program, serious problems existed in the Afghan government effort and reporting, 
and that the ISAF’s Force Reintegration Cell ceased to operate in October 2014.61 
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Figure 13: Guessing at Insurgent Presence and Influence – 
Part One 
The Wikipedia Estimate: Dated Guestimate of Maximum Presence 
 
Source: Wikipedia, 
http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/7/71/Insurgent_Regions_in_Afghanistan_and_Pakistan.jpg.  
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Figure 13: Guessing at Insurgent Presence and Influence – 
Part Two 
The Last Department of Defense Public Estimate Before Transition (April 2014): 
Show only 10 Most Violent Districts in Terms of Enemy Initiated Tactical clashes, 
covering Less than a Third of Even Tactical Activity 
 
Source: Department of Defense, Progress toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan. (1230 semi-annual 
report to Congress), October 2014, http://www.defense.gov/pubs/Oct2014_Report_Final.pdf, p. 11. 
Cordesman: Transition in Afghanistan                              January 2015 
61 
The Growing Security Challenges at the Time of Transition 
The limited data that ISAF and the US have provided on broad nation-wide the trends in 
the fighting since 2012 have major credibility problems. They do not address the strength 
or trends in any major insurgent movement. They also seem to deliberately downplay 
national trends. 
 It became increasingly clear from other sources during the 2013 and 2014, however, that 
the security challenges posed by the Taliban, the Haqqani Network, and the Hekmatyer 
Hezbi Islami continued to increase, and that the Afghan forces were having growing 
problems in dealing with these threats.  Media reports, UN reporting, and reports from 
other sources made this clear – as did reports on the rising level of ANSF casualties -- 
although the US and ISAF engaged in a public relations effort to “spin” the war by avoiding 
bad news.  A slow but steady decline took place in in the public transparency of US and 
ISAF assessments of the military situation after 2011.  
This decline accelerated when ISAF had to admit in 2013 that the favorable data it had 
published in 2001-2013 on the downward trends in enemy initiated attacks or EIAs were 
incorrect in claiming success and had to withdraw the data.62 By this time, however, the 
US and ISAF had already begun to provide little or no details and metrics on the course of 
the fighting. The only meaningful unclassified summaries they provided focused on 
unexplained and undefined percentages of change in the tactical situation without any 
analysis of the growth of the insurgent threat by area, why the casualty data rose so sharply, 
and why casualties increased in some many areas.  
These ISAF data are provided in Figure 14, and the last Department of Defense semi-
annual report issued before the end of 2014 explained the trends as follows:63 
Security incidents are insurgent-initiated incidents, which include direct fire (DF) attacks, indirect 
fire (IDF) attacks, surface-to-air fires (SAFIRE), improvised explosive device and mine explosions, 
IEDs and mines that were found and cleared, as well as IEDs that prematurely detonated or were 
turned in to coalition or Afghan forces by the Afghan populace. Comparing April to August 2014 
to the same period last year, nationwide security incidents fell by approximately 30 percent. By 
comparison, nationwide security incidents fell by 10 percent for the April to August 2013 period 
compared to the same time frame in 2012. These numbers also reflect a growing reliance on Afghan-
provided data.  
Enemy-initiated attacks (EIAs) are insurgent-initiated incidents against coalition and Afghan forces. 
Like security incidents, EIAs include DF, IDF, SAFIRE, and IED and mine explosions.  EIAs 
exclude IEDs and mines that were found and cleared (including premature IED detonations and IED 
turn-ins).  EIAs decreased by 27 percent from April 1 through August 31, 2014, as compared to the 
same period last year. This is an improvement from the decrease of four percent that occurred from 
2012 to the same period in 2013, but may also reflect data reporting changes as noted previously 
The majority of attacks comprised direct fire attacks and IED attacks. Insurgents continue to conduct 
high-profile and complex attacks against individuals, population centers, and remote outposts. The 
insurgency conducted more than ten high-profile attacks in Kabul District during this reporting 
period. Although the resulting media coverage has promoted local and international perceptions of 
insecurity, such attacks have not generated strategic momentum for the insurgency.  
From April 1 through August 31, 2014, violence remained highly concentrated with 80 percent of 
nationwide EIAs occurring in regions where only 46 percent of the population lives (including 
Kabul District with approximately 13 percent of the population) 
…Fifty percent of nationwide EIAs occurred where approximately 13 percent of the population 
lives. The ten most violent districts in Afghanistan account for approximately just over three percent 
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of the population and 21 percent of the violence nationwide.  Attacks against ISAF and ISAF-
partnered units declined by approximately 60 percent year-over-year from April to August 2014, 
compared to the same period in 2013. The number of EIAs involving only the ANSF (and ALP) 
decreased 15 percent in 2014 from 2013. As displayed in Figure 4 the percentage of EIAs involving 
only ANSF units continued to rise, while those involving ISAF units fell.  
The problems with these ISAF data and comments is that they ignore the fact that the 
insurgents could concentrate on taking territory and increasing their influence at the 
regional and local levels once they saw ISAF forces depart, did not have to challenge ANSF 
forces directly when they began to largely stay in their bases or the immediate area, and 
could simply wait out the withdrawal of US and allied forces.  
The surge in Afghanistan did produce at least temporary gains in the more populated areas 
of Helmand and more important gains in securing Kandahar, but Figure 14 shows that it 
had no meaningful overall impact on Afghan security.  
Moreover, the data on overall combat trends and casualties in Figure 15 present a very 
different story and one that tracks with independent media reporting. They show how 
ineffective the US “surge” in Afghanistan was on a national level and in comparison with 
a similar effort in Iraq.  
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Figure 14: The ISAF Data on Combat Trends in Recent 1230 
Reports 
 
 
 Source: Department of Defense, Report on Progress in Afghan Security and Stability,  
October 2013, p. 17, April 2014, p. 11, October 2014, p. 15.  
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Figure 15: A Failed Surge in Afghanistan versus a Successful 
Surge in Iraq 
The Surge in Iraq vs. the Surge in Afghanistan 
Iraq 
 
Afghanistan 
 
Source: MNSTC-I and Department of Defense, Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan, p. A-2.  
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The data from the UN and SIGAR shown in Figure 16 make it clear that casualties 
continued to rise, and violence spread steadily more widely in Afghanistan during 2010-
2014.  
The UN casualty data in the Part One of Figure 16 also highlight the risks in relying on 
counts of tactical incidents without assessing their overall impact. Civilian deaths show a 
steady rise over time, and provide a clear measure of the intensity of a conflict. It is also 
obvious from the different trends in casualties by area that national totals can be highly 
misleading in showing the impact of an insurgency in given regions and the support 
insurgents receive. A drop in casualties does not necessarily mean the government is 
winning, it may well mean that insurgent influence has increased to the point where conflict 
has dropped accordingly.   
Other UN data call the ISAF data in Figure 14 into further question.  SIGAR reports that 
the UN data show a steadily intensifying level of conflict, serious ANSF casualties, and 
different attack patterns:64 
Attrition continues to be a major challenge for the ANSF. Between September 2013 and August 
2014, more than 36,000 ANA personnel were dropped from ANA rolls. Moreover, the ANA 
continues to suffer serious combat losses. Between March 2012 and August 2014, more than 2,850 
ANA personnel were killed in action (KIA) and 14,600 were wounded in action (WIA)…For the 
ANP, attrition fell from 2.35% for the month of July to 1.68% in the month of August, the latest 
period for which SIGAR was provided data. Unlike the ANA, the ANP does not report on personnel 
present for duty, absent without leave, or killed or wounded in action. The ANP remains short of its 
goal to maintain less than 1.4% monthly attrition. 
According to the UN Secretary-General, the conflict in Afghanistan continues to intensify. In his 
September 9 report to the UN Security Council, the Secretary-General said insurgent groups, 
international terrorists, and associated networks took advantage of the protracted electoral crisis and 
political uncertainty to mount major assaults around the country…the number of security incidents 
continued to increase, with this period reflecting the second-highest level of violence, after 2011, 
since the fall of the Taliban. 
The majority of the security incidents once again occurred in the south, south-east, and east. The 
UN recorded 211 assassinations and 30 failed assassination attempts, an increase of 7.1% for both 
over the same period in 2013… Armed clashes (47.3%) and improvised explosive device (IED) 
events (29.1%) accounted for 76.4% of all security incidents….  
The UN reported that some insurgents attempted not only to capture but also to hold territory 
through the use of “swarm attacks” consisting of several hundred attackers attempting to overwhelm 
district administrative centers and security checkpoints. 
…Afghan and American commanders say the ANSF is holding well near main cities, but are being 
tested as more remote districts come under heavy attacks…Afghan interior minister Mohammad 
Omar Daudzai testified to the Afghan parliament that the past six months had been the deadliest of 
the 13-year-long conflict, with 1,368 ANP personnel killed and 2,370 wounded since the beginning 
of the current Afghan year. Police casualties have generally run at twice the level of Afghan Army 
casualties through much of the war 
It is worth noting in this regard, that it was the US command in Iraq that had to correct its 
casualty data during the Iraq conflict from 2003-2011, and not the UN. As Part Two of 
Figure 16 shows, UNAMA issued an assessment of civilian deaths and casualties at the 
end of 2014 that did not break down the cause by whether it was insurgents, the government, 
ISAF, or unknown, but showed even sharper growth in casualties than the previous data.  
There is no clear way to assess the uncertainty in such data, but it seems likely that they 
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understate the true level of casualties, many of which are not formally reported– 
particularly for wounded, and that it became harder to track the data in 2013 and 2014, as 
ISAF and ANSF forces came to play a less active role in the field. 
 
It is also worth noting that while the UN did not have full data on the civilian casualties in 
Afghanistan in 2014 at the time of Transition, its estimate for the period between January 
2014 and the end of November 2014 was 3,188 civilian deaths and 6,429 injuries, which 
was 19% higher than during the same period in 2013.65 It is also important to note that 
these data almost certainly undercount the real totals, since the ability to collect data in the 
border areas and rural areas where the insurgent did much of the fighting had always been 
limited and had declined significantly during 2014. 
 
Similarly, the State Department data in Figure 17 show a massive rise in the level of 
terrorist incidents during the period from 2010-2013, in spite of the surge and claims that 
the security situation was improving. They also show a growing focus on Afghan police 
and government targets, and that focusing on enemy initiated attacks on ISAF and Afghan 
forces ignored the key shifts taking place in both insurgent targeting and the cause of the 
casualties being produced. 
 
Finally, Figure 18 shows the result of an Asian Foundation poll in 2014 of popular support 
for the Taliban. It is still reassuring in that many areas have only limited support for the 
insurgents, but scarcely indicates that they lack influence and popular support in many parts 
of the country. Other surveys show that positive support for insurgents sometimes is based 
on the assumption by those polled that the insurgent would join a peaceful political process, 
but this was not part of the Asian Foundation poll.  
 
Moreover, other earlier polls by ABC and the Washington Post showed a slow decline in 
popular support for the Afghan government, and polls of popular support for insurgents 
ignore the fact that it is their ability to intimidate and control given areas that often 
determines their strength, not their popularity.  
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Figure 16: UN and SIGAR Estimates of Rising and Spreading 
Violence During 2011-2014 – Part One 
Steady Rise in UN Estimate of Civilian Casualties in Inflicted by Taliban, Haqqani 
Network, and Other Insurgents 
 
Steady Expansion in UN Estimate of Key Areas of Violence 
 
Source: UNAMA/UNHCR, Afghanistan Midyear Report on Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict: 
2014http://unama.unmissions.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=m_XyrUQDKZg%3d&tabid=12254&mid=15756&language=en,  
US, July 20 
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Figure 16: UN and SIGAR Estimates of Rising and Spreading 
Violence During 2011-2014 – Part Two 
 
SIGAR Estimate on Pattern of Casualties in 2014 
 
 
 
UNAMA Revised Estimate of Civilian Casualties at the End of 2014 
 
Year                     2009      2010       2011      2012        2013        2014       2009-2014 
 
Civilian 
Injuries  3,586 4,343 4,507 4,805 5,656 6,429 - 
 
  % Change - 21% 4% 7% 18% 14% 79% 
 
Civilian  
Deaths 2,412 2,777 3,021 2,754 2,959 3,188 - 
 
  % Change - 15% 9% -8% 7% 8% 32% 
 
Total 
Civilian  
Casualties 5,998 7,120 7,528 7,559 8,615 9,617 - 
 
  % Change - 19% 6% .4% 14% 12% 60%  
 
Source: UNAMA as shown in Washington Post, January 1, 2015, p. A9 
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Figure 17: State Department Estimates of Rising and 
Spreading Violence During 2011-2014 – Part One 
Rise in State Department Data Base Estimate of Total Terrorist Incidents: Global Terrorism 
Database: Afghanistan – Incidents Over Time, 1970 – 2013 
 
Source: US State Department, Country Reports on Terrorism, 2013, Statistical Annex, April 2014, 
http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?search=afghanistan&sa.x=0&sa.y=0 
Rise in State Department Data Base Estimate of Taliban and other Insurgent Terrorist Incidents: 
Global Terrorism Database: Afghanistan – Incidents Over Time, 1970 – 2013 
  
Source: US State Department, Country Reports on Terrorism, 2013, Statistical Annex, April 2014, 
http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?search=afghanistan&sa.x=0&sa.y=0 
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Figure 17: State Department Estimates of Rising and 
Spreading Violence During 2011-2014 – Part Two 
Shift in State Department Data Base Estimate of Taliban and other Insurgent Terrorist Incidents: To 
Focus on Police and afghan government Targets: Afghanistan – Incidents Over Time, 1970 – 2013 
  
Source: US State Department, Country Reports on Terrorism, 2013, Statistical Annex, April 2014, 
http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?search=afghanistan&sa.x=0&sa.y=0 
Shift in State Department Data Base Estimate of Taliban and other Insurgent Terrorist Casualties: 
Afghanistan – Incidents Over Time, 1970 – 2013 
 
 
Source: US State Department, Country Reports on Terrorism, 2013, Statistical Annex, April 2014, 
http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?search=afghanistan&sa.x=0&sa.y=0 
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Figure 18: Asia Foundation Survey of Sympathy for Armed 
Opposition Groups Showed a Drop But still a Significant 
Regional Support 
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Mixed Data on Popular Support for the ANSF 
It is also worth noting that the US data on the popularity of the ANSF differ from polls 
from other sources. Figure 19 shows polling data that are generally reassuring in terms of 
popular support for the ANA. ANP, and central government relative to the Taliban – 
although ABC and other polls have shown a more negative trend over time. 
The following data showing the results of an Asian Foundation poll asking who brings the 
most security to your area seems to reflect the fact that most of the Afghans polled have 
not been exposed to conflict that involved ANA forces Most people do not see regular 
forces fight or operate near them and do see the police.  
It is also interesting to note the contrast between these results and the data in the Asian 
Foundation poll in response to questions on which service is honest and fair and which 
does most to preserve security. The ANP gets better ratings than the ANA for honest and 
fair in spite of other polling data reflecting a high level of corruption, and the ANA gets a 
better rating for overall help security in spite of the much higher rating the ANP got for 
maintaining local security.  
It is also interesting to note that the polling data on fear by activity show that Afghans are 
much less happy with both the ANA and ANP when they actually come into contact with 
them – although Afghans had a much greater fear of contact with ISAF. This is a warning 
that the future conduct and capability of Afghan forces will be a critical factor in shaping 
popular perceptions of the government and security forces, and in both Vietnam and Iraq, 
tension with the national security forces increased significantly after US advisors left and 
the level of local conflict increased. 
It is the final set of polling data in Figure 19, however, that may deserve the most attention. 
The results vary sharply by area – another warning about focusing on nationwide results 
when conflict and insurgent activity varies sharply by area. At the same time, the results 
reflect a consistent focus on material wellbeing and security, with little focus on the ANA 
and ANP per se -- as well as on governance outside the greater Kabul area. These attitudes 
again seem to be shaped by the fact most Afghans did not see a serious risk of the renewal 
of conflict in their areas. These results – along with support for the government –could 
become far more negative if the ANSF is not able to keep the fighting and other insurgent 
activity from spreading into populated areas in 2015, 2016, and beyond. This is a serious 
risk. 
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Figure 19: Comparative Polls on the Popularity of the ANSF 
– Part One 
DoD Report Estimate of Percentage of Afghan Survey Respondents that have a Very Favorable or 
Somewhat Favorable View of the Afghan Government, Afghan Security Forces, and the Taliban 
 
 
 
 
DoD Report Estimate of Percentage of Afghan Survey Respondent Answers to Question of “Who 
Most Brings Security to Your Area?” 
 
Source: Department of Defense, Report on Progress in Afghan Security and Stability,  
October 2013, p. 17, April 2014, p. 11, October 2014, p. 26. 
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Figure 19: Comparative Polls on the Popularity of the ANSF 
– Part Two 
Asian Foundation Survey of Popularity of the ANA and ANP 
 
 
Asia Foundation, Afghanistan in 2014, A Survey of the Afghan People, November 2014, pp. 34 & 42 
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Figure 19: Comparative Polls on the Popularity of the ANSF 
– Part Three 
Asia Foundation Estimate of relative Popularity by Region 
 
Asia Foundation, Afghanistan in 2014, A Survey of the Afghan People, November 2014, p. 19 
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V. Problems in Developing An Effective ANSF 
The unclassified data on the trends in the fighting in the previous chapter raise serious 
questions about the President Obama’s May 2014 decisions. Getting the US effort down to 
9,800 by the end of 2014, cut them in half by the end of 2015, and virtually eliminate a US 
presence by the end of 2016 assumed something close to victory within two years.  
Even at the start of 2015, it meant the advisory and support effort had to be largely 
eliminated at the Kandak and small combat unit level during the course of US force 
withdrawal from the field. Keeping so low a level of US troops at the start of 2015 meant 
there would not be enough US forces to provide effective advisory efforts for every Afghan 
corps at the start of the year and that coverage of any given corps would have to drop 
steadily during 2015 and be minimal or eliminated during the course of 2016. 
The President’s May 2014 decisions also limited the number of enablers and the size of 
intelligence support to levels significantly below what senior military commanders had 
initially advised. They meant that the US would have to concentrate many of the remaining 
4,800 to 5,500 personnel at Baghram by the end of 2015, and there would only be a few 
hundred advisors in an Office of Military Cooperation in the US Embassy in Kabul after 
the end of 2016.66 They also meant the US and ISAF would only token air assets and no 
real land combat capability to deal with the 2015 campaign season, and that the cuts to 
come during 2015 and would have virtually no capability in 2016. 
The 9,800 personnel decision did not include a small US counterterrorism force that the 
US said would be deployed, but did not quantify or describe for security reasons. 
Administration sources did, however, indicate that the US would make major cuts in its 
intelligence effort. Press sources also reported that similar cuts were also taking place in 
the US military counterterrorism force and CIA and civilian intelligence.  
The CIA was to go from the largest CIA station in the world, with a staff approaching 1,000 
to one below 200, and virtually eliminate its drone strike capability – which had already 
dropped from a peak of around 122 in 2010 to 72 in 2011, 48 in 2012, 28 in 2013, and only 
seven through mid-September 2014. It was far from clear that the US would either have a 
meaningful counterterrorism capability to operate in either Afghanistan or Pakistan after 
mid-2015, or the ability to support Afghan army and police forces with the technical 
intelligence they would desperately need at the Corps level and in the field. 67 
It is also important to note that the timing of these decisions through 2016 effectively 
deprived the next President of any real options to change to situation. They made it 
extremely difficult for the new President to reverse course once almost US forces had gone 
and impossible if the ANSF had already suffered major defeats. 
The Question of Size and Cost 
All of the factors affecting the development of ANSF, and its ability to meet threat have to 
be put in the perspective of what Afghanistan can afford and can sustain over time. The 
subject of Afghan funding capability and what future levels of aid are credible has been 
debated since the first efforts to create Afghan forces, and “affordability” was one of the 
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reasons the US and ISAF were slow to push the development of the ANSF during 2002-
2006. 
None of these issues have diminished with time. Earlier plans to reorganize and cut the 
ANSF at some point after Transition seem to have been abandoned or delayed, or simply 
left in limbo. There is no public future development plan for any element of the ANSF, and 
has been shown earlier, many aspects of force development are awaiting decisions by a 
new government that did not yet exist at the end of 2014.  
Somewhat arbitrary total cost figures of $4.1 billion to $5.1 billion a year have been quoted 
in various reports, but there are far too few details about how such totals have been 
developed, or how the funds involved will be allocated, to given any such totals much 
credibility. Asserting the same total repeatedly without explanation does not make it more 
credible.  
 Figure 20 shows the patterns in US security assistance to Afghanistan through 2014. The total US 
funding reached $65.56 billion or % of a total of $104.08 billion in US aid. The security aid had five 
elements: Afghan Security forces Fund (ASSF), Commander’s Emergency Relief Fund (CERP), 
Afghan Infrastructure Fund (AIF), Task Force for Business and Stability Operations (TFBSO) and 
DoD Counter-Narcotics (DoD CN). The ASSF and AIF were the key elements actually building and 
supporting afghan forces and totaled $58.37 through 2014.68 
 Figure 20 shows that the security aid for FY2014 totaled $5.34 billion and the request from FY2015 
was $4.277 billion. Security aid had dropped sharply during FY2011 to FY2013, but had become 
more level in FY2014 and FY2015. 
 Figure 20 also shows US estimate of the Afghan budget cost of the ANA and ANP. It is far from 
clear how these costs are derived, since they are only a tiny fraction of the total Afghan security 
budget, total past US aid, and the much larger $4.1 to $5.1 billion total often being estimated for the 
total Afghan budget and grant aid costs of the ANSF 
 Figure 21 provides a World Bank estimate that highlights the problem in terms of Afghan budget 
expenditures on security. It should be stressed, however, that the costs included do not equal the 
estimates of US and ISAF experts, and that the rises shown in these costs illustrate the fact that 
much will depend on the future intensity of combat. It is equally clear that no one can predict the 
level of outside imports and support that will be required until the ANSF stand fully on their own – 
a process that is not currently scheduled to be complete until the end of 2016. 
The end result is a fiscal mess with no clear plan for the future, uncertain sustainability, 
and massive dependence on outside US aid. 
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Figure 20: US Grant Aid to Afghan Security Forces Versus 
US Estimate of On Budget Costs of ANA and ANP  
US Annual Aid Expenditures on Afghan Security Forces 
 
  
SIGAR, Quarterly Report to Congress, October 30, 2014, http://www.sigar.mil/pdf/quarterlyreports/2014-10-
30qr.pdf,  p. 71 
US Department of Defense estimate of ANA and ANP Afghan Budget Funding 
Profile 
 
 
Source: Department of Defense, Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan, October 
30, 2014, pp. 61-62. 
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Figure 21: Uncertain World Bank Estimates of the Budget 
Impact of the ANSF (Less Foreign Grants) 
 
 
World Bank, Afghanistan: Transition Economics Update. The World Bank November 27, 2014, pp. 7, 12 
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Uncertain Progress in the ANSF 
It is hard to assess just how serious the complex mix of limitations in the ANSF at the point 
of Transition really are. Unclassified ISAF and Department of Defense reporting has only 
hinted at how the US and its allies intend to carry out the detailed aspects of the “train and 
assist” mission in Afghanistan after the end of 2014, what their assessment is of the 
probable combat situation, how the steadily declining advisory effort will work, how 
Afghan forces will be reshaped and funded, and how the ISAF command will change.  
ISAF and the US have cut back sharply on public reporting on the weaknesses in Afghan 
forces that have been addressed in past US Department of Defense semiannual “1230” 
reports since 2012. The last such report before the end of 2014 – the October 2014 edition 
of the DOD Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan – classified 
all of the past detail on progress in the readiness of Afghan army units, and ceases to 
provide metrics on the Ministry of Defense, and Ministry of Interior – although it did reveal 
continuing critical problems with attrition in the Afghan Army and ANP – a cutback in 
reporting criticized by the Special Inspector General for Afghan Reconstruction (SIGAR) 
in its quarterly report for the same period. 69 
There is too little transparency -- and too much public relations spin -- to make a full 
assessment of the ANSF from the unclassified data now available, however, is that 
Afghanistan faces major security challenges even with outside aid.  Many of the limited 
unclassified data that are available also involve series of charts and metrics that are too 
complex for to do more than touch upon in this report. They can, however, be found in a 
series of separate reports comparing different sources and periods reporting on both the 
trends in combat situation and the problems in the Afghan National Security Forces 
(ANSF): 
 Afghan Forces on the Edge of Transition– I: Introduction, US Policy, and Cuts in US Forces 
and Spending, available on the CSIS web site at 
http://csis.org/files/publication/141118_I_Security_Transition_in_Afghanistan_17_NOV_2014_0.
pdf 
 Afghan Forces on the Edge of Transition – II: Sharply Contradictory Data on Levels of Violence, 
which is available on the CSIS web site at 
http://csis.org/files/publication/141216Security_Transition_in_Afghanistan_II_2.pdf. 
 Afghan Forces on the Edge of Transition– III: Measuring the Transition from ISAF to ANSF, 
available on the CSIS web site at 
http://csis.org/files/publication/141118_III_Security_Transition_in_Afghanistan_17_NOV_2014_
0.pdf 
 Afghan Forces on the Edge of Transition– IV: Progress in Afghan Force Development, available 
on the CSIS web site at 
http://csis.org/files/publication/141118_IV_Security_Transition_in_Afghanistan_17_NOV_2014_
0.pdf 
What is clear from these data, however, is that Transition has been rushed, there has been 
little or no recent progress towards security and stability, setting fixed deadlines for 
withdrawal has made the challenges to the ANSF more serious. The scale of these 
challenges also help explain why some key US commanders recommended before the 
President’s May 2014 speech that the US leave some 16,000 troops after 2014, be ready to 
provide air support, and stay at conditions-based levels until Afghanistan was secure.  
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Uncertain Progress in the ANA 
Even a brief review of the limited data available does provide some insights. All sources 
agree that the ANA is clearly making the most progress of any element within the ANSF, 
although media reporting on the ANA’s effectiveness has often been less favorable than 
official reporting. There are also many signs that it may need a stronger and longer advisory 
and enabling effort than is now planned.  
The DoD report for October 2014 focused on the areas of progress within the ANA, but it 
also raised a number of issues that warn about the risks in fixed deadlines and rapid cuts in 
trainers and advisors:70 
Coalition advisory efforts continued to focus on addressing shortfalls in MoD human capital; 
contracting and procurement; and transparency, accountability and oversight. President Ghani has 
signaled that improvements in these areas across the government will be a focus of his 
administration. 
MoD hiring practices sometimes rely on patronage networks rather than qualifications when filling 
positions of authority. The MoD has a dearth of competent officers in positions of authority; 
however, a number of senior officers constrain advisors’ ability to develop the capacity of the 
individual offices and to design and implement needed reforms. The budgetary system is overly 
bureaucratic, which inhibits the MoD’s ability to resource the force properly, and overly restrictive 
laws increase the workload associated with contracting and procurement. Continued assignment of 
junior officers with the requisite training and skills, coupled with the recruitment of appropriately 
trained and experienced civilians, will help mitigate these shortfalls 
A weakness in bottom-up requirement identification and demand-based forecasting continues. From 
the ministerial to the corps level, there are opportunities for training and education in this area to 
further the ANA’s ability to sustain its force and manage limited budget resources. 
The MoD continues to struggle in developing transparency, accountability, and oversight 
procedures. During this reporting period, the MoD established eight additional Transparency and 
Accountability Committees to counter-corruption. However, the committees are still developing 
administrative capabilities to properly oversee and report on transparency and accountability issues. 
ANA training and education organizations have matured, but have not established a centralized 
systems approach to support coherent professional development. The ANA needs to identify career 
policies and streams supported by integrated professional development. Limited instructor selection, 
development, and rotation reduce effective career management and experience captured. There are 
limited long-term training plans and career streams to support professional development for both 
male and female personnel. 
The ANA’s overall strength during the reporting period remained above 80 percent of the Tashkil 
strength. The ANA is adjusting soldier, non-commissioned officer (NCO/bridmal), and officer 
strengths to meet the target strengths for each component rather than for the ANA as a whole. 
Attrition continues to challenge the force with monthly attrition rates averaging above the acceptable 
rate of 1.4 percent. Much staff effort has been focused on identifying and addressing the causes of 
attrition. Retention and reducing attrition are key factors to professionalize the force. There is an 
increasing trend in the number of experienced soldiers opting out of re-enlistment, accounting for 
about a third of all attrition. Leadership must refocus their efforts on increasing re-enlisting and 
reducing attrition. Enforcing a rotation policy could mitigate re-enlistment issues by allowing 
recontracted soldiers to transfer away from the front line or nearer to their home. 
MoD leadership states that institutional barriers to the recruitment of women stems from traditional 
and cultural biases. Additionally, they claim that many families do not want their daughters to join 
the ANA because of concerns for their security. There are four main challenges with integration. 
The first challenge is achieving the goal of recruited and trained women in accordance with the 
Annual Accession Plan approved by the Minister of Defense, which states that the ANA will recruit 
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and train 485 women per year. The second challenge is identifying permanent positions for women 
within the force. The third challenge is ensuring that all military establishments have adequate 
female facilities. Finally, the fourth challenge is delivering a safe environment for women at those 
establishments. The development of ground medical evacuation (MEDEVAC) capabilities 
continues to be a high priority for ANSF leadership. 
The ANA has conceptualized a centralized training and education headquarters; however, without 
adjustments to structure and rank organization, it will be unable to implement this concept. 
The attrition rate in the ANA continues to pose challenges to ANSF development. The ANA 
averaged approximately 2.2 percent attrition for the past 12 months with a low of 1.8 percent in 
March 2014 and a peak of 3.3 percent in December 2013 and April 2014. In the first quarter of 2014, 
ANA average monthly attrition rate was 2.6 percent. Until December 2013, the ANA was authorized 
to staff to 115 percent of the Tashkil authorizations for enlisted soldiers. Directives in December 
2013 and January 2014 rescinded this and authorized payment only up to 100 percent manning 
levels. 
 
The main causes of attrition include high operational tempo, sustained risk, soldier care and quality 
of life, and leave issues. Afghan casualties increased since the ANSF took the lead for security in 
June 2013. Although combat losses comprise a relatively small percentage of total ANSF attrition 
numbers, reducing ANSF casualties remains both a top morale and operational priority for ISAF 
and ANSF leaders. In addition to enemy action, casualties in the 2014 fighting season could be 
contributed to several other factors, such as lack of medical training and medical kits, casualty 
evacuation delays, and the overall condition of Afghan medical capabilities. 
 
Although the overall attrition rate is higher than optimal, it is not directly affecting operations in the 
short-term, as the ANSF remains sustainable numerically due to robust recruitment. However, 
attrition is always a concern, especially NCO attrition, given the loss of key military experience this 
represents. Urgent action is therefore being taken to address the root causes of attrition beyond 
combat casualties and to develop a culture of leadership accountability in the ANSF. Attrition 
management is focused on balancing the force at Tashkil authorization levels for the targeted mix 
of officers, NCOs, and soldiers in authorized military occupational specialties. 
 
Many of the improvements needed for long-term sustainability and independence must be made at 
the national and ministerial level. National improvement focus areas are planning, forecasting, 
inventory management, and scheduled logistics. 
 
Sustainment issues at the brigade level continue to revolve around the lack of effective command 
maintenance programs, improper use of trained personnel, a shortage of trained mechanics, and the 
lack of requirement forecasting. The ANA struggles to identify and direct the lateral transfer of 
equipment between units. Despite having a doctrinal process to cross-level equipment across units, 
ANA and MoD leadership have thus far proven unable or unwilling to direct the transfer of 
equipment from units possessing excess quantities to units with shortages. 
 
During this reporting period, the General Command of Police Special Units and ANA Special Forces 
and Commando units conducted over 900 unilateral operations. In comparison, ISAF SOF 
conducted fewer than 25 unilateral operations. ISAF continued to advise ASSF by leading some 
partnered operations and advising when ANSF were in the lead. ISAF advised over 300 ANSF-led 
operations during the reporting period. Areas of continued focus by ISAF advisors include 
enhancing interoperability with other defense and police forces, including planning joint operations. 
ISAF advisors continued to advise partnered units during planning for major operations and 
facilitated development of professional relationships among Afghan commanders to mitigate 
instances of ANA commanders using ANASOF for missions more suited to conventional infantry. 
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Focusing on Force Generation rather than Combat 
Capability 
The problem with such insights about the ANA is that they focus on force generation and 
not combat capability. Limiting size and duration of the US effort in Afghanistan has 
ignored the critical difference between apparent success in providing new forces with the 
formal training and resources they need, and helping them achieve actual success in 
creating combat capability. The US should have learned in Vietnam and Iraq that the ability 
to rapidly train and equip new combat units has never meant that newly generated units 
will be effective in combat, and providing mentors and trainers to these forces when they 
do go into combat is a critical stage in giving new forces real capability.  
No matter how good the trainers and advisors who generate new forces are – and the US 
and other advisors in NTM-A have been pushed into creating key elements of Afghan 
forces nearly two years ahead of the original schedule-- it takes time to create combat 
leaders, make new units functional in combat, and provide combat support, service support, 
and logistics support on a sustained basis. 
The US experience in Vietnam and Iraq is also warning as to just how dangerous it can be 
to take an optimistic view of force development, and focus on the ratings given by trainers 
and “force generators,” and combat experience before a force actually has to stand on its 
own over an extended period of time. Moreover, the history of far too many recent major 
US military advisory efforts has been history of imposing a US approach to generating 
military forces on countries which lack the experience and resources to do things the US 
way once US forces and advisors leave. 
In both Vietnam and Iraq, a rapid US departure showed each host country force needed 
several more years of outside support for entire “transformed” allied military structure to 
become an effective warfighting machine, in addition to a host of problems in coordinating, 
as well as the problems in sustaining combat operations. The problems in generating new 
forces have also been compounded by the problems in staffing new units with officers and 
NCOs that can make their way through the formal training process, but cannot make the 
transition to combat leader – particularly in a country where promotion is often political 
and affected by high levels of corruption and divided and uncertain civil government.  
Developing forces need combat advisors to be deployed with their forward elements for at 
least several years to help them acquire the leadership skills, ability to operate complex 
systems and tactics in combat, coordinate effectively, and advise when combat leaders need 
to be replace or retrained. The fact Afghans often are excellent fighters does not make them 
excellent warfighters. 
The Seriousness of the Police Challenge 
 been further complicated by the failure to both define the role of the police in terms of 
both paramilitary capability and define its role as part of the overall o  Afghan justice 
system.  
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Designing a Force with Limited Paramilitary Capability 
The Department of Defense’s October 2014 report did not provide any clear plan for future 
budgets and aid for the police, or attempt to provide any clear link between plans for the 
security forces and plans for the civil sector.71  It did, however, provide some important 
insights into just how serious the police challenge may be. 
As Figure 12 has shown, the various branches of the ANP make up some 157,000 
personnel out of a total force goal of 352,000, or some 45%. In August 2014, they made 
up 152,000 personnel out of the 340,000 uniform personnel reported to actually be serving. 
This is a very high percentage of the total force for a nation at war, and only a small number 
are actually trained and equipped for paramilitary roles. As is the case with many elements 
of the ANSF, current unclassified reporting does not provide enough detailed to provide 
an accurate picture of how the ANP was manned at the end of December 2014, but the 
breakout of the ANP in Figure 22 provides a rough picture of its structure, as well as how 
it relates to police and local forces. 
Figure 22: Key Elements of the afghan National Police and 
Other Non-Military Security Forces 
 
Branch      
 
 
 
MOI 
Authorized 
Manning 
 
 
NA 
% of 
Total 
Force 
 
NA 
Description 
 
A reasonable level of leadership integrity by Afghan standards, but 
far more subject to political influence, problems with favoritism, and 
corruption in promotions and contracting than the MoD. Being rushed 
into premature readiness. End-2014 is too early if the MOI does not 
have continuing outside support. Future effectiveness will, again 
depend far more on post-2014 election leadership than training and 
readiness to assume effective management of various elements of 
ANP, and the MoI will remain far more subject to outside political 
pressure than MoD.  
ANCOP 14,451 4% The Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP) are a relatively 
effective paramilitary force with 14,383 men assigned in Q4 2012. 
The ANCOP is the only element of ANP consistently capable of 
counterinsurgency operations. Currently loyal to central government, 
but has a high attrition rate and much depends on the next president. 
AUP 110,279 31% The Afghan Uniform Police (AUP) had 106,235 personnel assigned 
in Q4 2012. The AUP are a deeply divided force with some good 
elements and many corrupt and ineffective elements tied to 
powerbrokers. There are some elements with probable links to 
insurgents and criminal networks. Operations are often very limited 
in Districts with significant insurgent elements. Lacks support of 
effective local government and other elements of justice system in 
many areas. There are major advisor shortages and many elements are 
unrated by advisors. There is an uncertain overall ability to sustain 
readiness and training levels, pay, and selection and promotion by 
merit if advisors phase down. Many elements likely to devolve to 
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force elements tied to local power brokers, make deals with 
insurgents, or collapse after 2014. 
ABP 22,000 7% 
The Afghan Border Police, under the current CY 1393 Tashkil, is 
authorized a target end strength of approximately 22,000 personnel. 
The ABP are responsible for the security of the Afghan border, which 
includes a 50 km area of operation from the border inside 
Afghanistan, as well as the control of all entry control points (e.g., 
border crossings, railroad entry points, and airports) in and out of 
Afghanistan. The ABP headquarters is in Kabul, and the unit operates 
with brigade level units assigned to 6 zones throughout the country. 
The ABP are manned, trained, and equipped to provide security and 
interdiction along the border with rifles, light and heavy machine 
guns, rocket-propelled grenades, and 82mm mortars The force had 
some good elements, and others that were corrupt, but actively fought 
or resisted insurgents. However, there are many corrupt and 
ineffective elements operating as local power brokers or tied to 
powerbrokers. Often guilty of extortion in AOR or at checkpoints, and 
sometimes seizure of boys. Some elements with links to criminal 
networks and working arrangements with insurgents. Serious problem 
in terms of lost government revenues because of corruption.  
ANP 
Subtotal 
157,000 45%  
CNPA 2,986? 0.8% The Counter-Narcotics Police of Afghanistan are a small force that 
had 2,581 men assigned in Q4 2012. They are a small force charged 
with helping to implement a large program that has cost some $6.1 
billion since 2002. Their effectiveness is unclear, and as is the broader 
role of the ANSF – which often does not operate in key narcotic 
growing areas, or has tailored eradication to support given power 
brokers and respond to bribes. The overall effort has had little impact 
since 2010, although disease and drought have affected total 
production. UNDOC estimates that the area under cultivation 
increased from 131,000 hectares in 2011 to 154,000 in 2012, and 
major increases took place in southern areas under Taliban influence. 
Total 
ANSF 
352,000 100%  
ALP 30,000 NA 
By Q3 2014, the number of ALP Guardians deployed in transitioned 
ALP districts had nearly reached 30,000 authorized by the Tashkil. 
ALP Guardians hade deployed to 150 transitioned districts (up from 
145 in March 2014) across 29 provinces, where they operated under 
MoI direction. GIRoA now managed more than two-thirds of the 
ALP units. Recruiting and manning had largely tribal elements, 
many with ties to local power brokers and some with past ties to 
insurgent elements. Can potentially be a critical element in limiting 
insurgent presence or control, but can easily break up or change 
sides as outside advisors withdraw or if the central government lacks 
unity and leadership. 
APPF 16,981 NA 
 
During Q3 2014, the Ministry of Interior continued implementing 
President Karzai’s February 2014 cabinet meeting decision to 
dissolve the Afghan Public Protection Force and transition some of its 
personnel and functions into the MoI. The APPF is no longer a term 
of reference for a security force that provides contracted site or 
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convoy security in Afghanistan. As of July 2014, former APPF 
personnel were providing site security, but the MoI referred to them 
as police and soldiers instead of APPF guards. Although the Afghan 
presidential decree for the dissolution of the state-owned enterprise 
APPF was issued in February 2014, it still existed under the APPF 
name within GIRoA. Convoy security was now operational under the 
MoI as the Convey Transportation Guard Brigade (CTGB), within the 
Deputy Minister Security Pillar. The ANP’s convoy escort brigade 
now provided convoy security. As of July 2014, former APPF 
personnel were providing site security, but the MoI referred to them 
as police and soldiers instead of APPF guards. Approximately 3,400 
APPF guards were dismissed when the convoy security unit within 
APPF was shut down. Some guards have been hired by the CTGB; 
however, no data have been provided by MoI. Most civilian personnel 
working at the APPF headquarters were dismissed and replaced by 
uniformed MoI personnel. APPF headquarters and site security 
current strength is reported as 16,015 personnel against an 
organizational plan of 16,981. The APPF continues to provide site 
security services to government, commercial, and international 
customers. The authorized manning level of the CTGB was 3,500 
personnel. Reliable statistics on the actual size of the CTGB are not 
currently available. 
The APPF’s ability to train new site security guards has been severely 
degraded by the closing of its regional training center. The entire 
training staff was dismissed. APPF has moved to a model that requires 
the customer to pay for the training of its guard force. Private local 
companies then provide the manning. 
. 
Militias NA NA There is no meaningful unclassified data on their number and strength, 
but they range from small local elements to significant forces and 
often play a key role in local security, or in supporting power brokers.  
Little or no real loyalty to government; and often exploit and abuse 
power, are corrupt, tied to criminal networks, or make deals with 
insurgents. As much of a threat to unity and effective governance as a 
check on insurgents. 
A Force in Transition at the Time of Transition 
The Department of Defense quarterly report to Congress on Progress Toward Security and 
Stability in Afghanistan -- issued in October 2014 – provided the last major source of 
unclassified reporting on the ANSF before Transition. It noted that many aspects of the 
structure of the police were under review, but it was clear that any clear decisions as to 
future changes were then awaiting the choice of a new government, 72 
The MoI continues to progress toward autonomous operations. Of 31 departments, 27 require little 
to no coalition oversight; 3 operate independently without coalition oversight and 24 operate with 
minimal coalition assistance or oversight. MoI leaders have shown that they are willing to embrace 
greater challenges and improve all aspects of their operations to achieve autonomous capabilities. 
ISAF currently projects that the MoI will be rated as capable of autonomous operations with reduced 
coalition oversight by the end of 2015. 
MoI leadership demonstrates an understanding of both security and sustainability challenges for the 
ministry and Afghanistan. The Deputy Minister for Strategy and Policy has developed and published 
some baseline strategic documents. During this reporting period, the MoI revised three key strategic 
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documents: the Strategic Planning Directive, National Police Strategy, and National Police Plan. 
This guidance will foster the continued development of the ANP and facilitate the expansion of 
operational capabilities to meet current and future challenges to Afghanistan’s stabilization and 
security. 
The Deputy Minister’s General Directorate of Strategy produced a revised Strategic Planning 
Directive. The directive links strategic guidance to operational planning and explains the 
responsibilities and duties of MoI deputy ministries and general independent directorates relative to 
the nesting of strategic, operational, and tactical planning. The revised Strategic Planning Directive 
is an exclusively Afghan product and represents a considerable improvement over the previous 
edition. 
The General Directorate of Strategy also completed a revision of the National Police Strategy during 
this reporting period, which provides the strategic guidance necessary to ensure the continued 
development of the MoI and ANP. Additionally, the National Police Strategy provides the strategic-
level guidance necessary to prioritize the Minister of Interior’s 10-year vision imperatives. Like the 
Strategic Planning Directive, the National Police Strategy is an exclusively Afghan-produced 
document. It articulates clearly the 13 strategic goals that the ANP is oriented towards achieving 
during the five-year period of 2014 to 2018. 
The General Directorate of Strategy also developed and published a completely revised version of 
the National Police Plan. The plan introduces two key products: the operational plan (OPLAN), and 
quarterly report templates. The former is a tool that deputy ministers and inspector general 
directorates will use to develop their action plans relative to their respective tasks in the National 
Police Plan. The OPLAN template provides a guideline to document key information necessary to 
develop implementable plans and, most importantly, requires a projection of estimated costs 
associated with each action. Cost estimates are a crucial input to the requirements-based 
programming process that the Deputy Minister for Strategy and Policy is implementing. This 
innovation should help ensure that future budgets are linked to strategic goals.  
The OPLAN template also adds a requirement to develop performance, evaluation, and results 
indicators for each task as a means of tracking progress, validating successes, and identifying 
shortfalls. The quarterly report is another equally significant component of the Deputy Minister for 
Strategy and Policy’s vision to revise the MoI’s strategic planning process. Ostensibly a way to 
ensure that deputy ministers and inspector general directorates understand strategic guidance, 
discern equities, and implement respective plans, the quarterly report is a tool to monitor progress, 
validate evidence of performance, and track expenditure of programmed resources… 
… The MoI is working to adjust its forces to include the convoy security and site security 
responsibilities of the Afghan Public Protection Force (APPF), which a presidential directive 
dissolved in February 2014…The ANP will provide convoy security through the establishment of 
convoy escort brigades that are designed to provide security similar to the convoy security kandaks 
of the APPF. The APPF Operations Section, which provided site security, has migrated into the 
ANP and continues to provide this function. The transition of the APPF into the ANP created legal 
and fiscal challenges related to the payment of ANP soldiers for a contracted service. President 
Ghani has expressed his desire to reevaluate the decision on APPF. That coordination is ongoing at 
the time of this report. 
Token Paramilitary forces 
What was clear from Department of Defense and other reporting was that the bulk of the 
police were trained and equipped to act as regular police and not as combat forces. Only 
two elements of the police – both small – were elite forces that were relatively free of the 
influence of power brokers and endemic corruption, and only one – the ANCOP forces -- 
had clear paramilitary functions, 73 
Afghanistan National Civil Order Police units are assessed as the most confident forces in the ANP 
due to their specialized training and unique recruitment. ANCOP units maintain a paramilitary 
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structure and more closely resemble the ANA than a civil order organization. ANCOP units are 
confident in their training, equipment, and leadership to combat the insurgency and hold cleared 
terrain. 
Approximately 14,755 ANCOP personnel are currently assigned with the primary mission of 
conducting high intensity policing operations after ANA clearing operations and before the security 
situation stabilizes to the point that AUP forces can perform in a normal policing role. The ANCOP 
are capable of rapid deployment in support of its own mission or the missions of other ANSF units. 
The ANCOP are a regionally based, nationally deployable force whose primary role is to maintain 
the rule of law and order utilizing armed capability and special tactics. Because its units are 
nationally deployable, the ANCOP should be less susceptible to local power brokering than other 
branches of the ANP, which should contribute to its overall effectiveness. 
The most significant area of concern for the ANCOP is the incorrect employment of its force. The 
ANCOP are frequently deployed piecemealed as a reserve force. Undue political influences have 
resulted in the ANCOP performing missions that should be conducted by other branches of the 
ANSF. The units are frequently deployed to locations where their capability is wasted on 
checkpoints or to assist with AUP workload. This misuse causes challenges in coordination and 
joint operations with the ANA and NDS. A consolidation and re-employment of the ANCOP in a 
true gendarmerie role, in conjunction with ANA clearing operations, is necessary to effectively 
establishing continuous GIRoA control over contested districts. 
Police Special Forces: The General Command of Police Special Units fielded most of its 
subordinate units. The only GCPSU units still not fully fielded and at initial operating capability are 
the new Provincial Response Companies (PRCs). Dependent on the outcomes of Tashkil 
considerations, the planned future expansion in PRCs to a desired end state of one per province is 
likely to be a process extending into 2015 and 2016. 
As of September 17, GCPSU fielded 74 percent of the police special unit (PSU) Tashkil and 79 
percent of overall target strength. Monthly attrition thus far in the 2014 fighting season is low at 1.6 
percent of the formation. Unit manning shortages demonstrate the observation of high standards in 
recruitment, training, and requirements. GCPSU are some of the best-equipped units in the ANP. 
PSU members come from different regions of the country, which mitigates collaboration with local 
insurgent networks. Regarding specialty skill manning and fielding, special police are trained 
according to specific requirements for their positions. Shortfalls exist with qualified personnel and 
training on the targeting and intelligence cycle, but these are improving through mentorship and 
integrated training.  
GCPSU recruits attend the foundation course at the Special Police Training Center for introductory 
skills required for service. The top 20 percent are selected to attend a National Unit Operator Course 
at the Special Policy Training Wing. 
Members of the AUP, in general, view the GCPSU as a more capable unit and often aspire to be 
GCPSU special policemen or policewomen. This generates positive recruitment from within the 
AUP and assists the GCPSU as it receives personnel who have already been trained in basic policing 
and understand evidence-based operations and the Afghan rule of law. 
The GCPSU has shortfalls in equipment maintenance and resupply. Personnel lack the required 
training and equipment for basic maintenance and have no organic logistics capability. The resupply 
process is slow, but improving. Although high operational tempo continues, the wear on GCPSU 
equipment appears minimal and current consumption rates are sustainable. 
The fact that only 9% of the total police force -- and 4% of the total ANSF – was a dedicated 
paramilitary force meant that some 142.245 police personnel – 40% of the ANSF – were 
not trained and equipped for the combat mission that they faced as US and other ISAF 
forces withdrew. It also explains why the fact the police took such high casualties, and why 
their losses were no more a measure of effectiveness than the fact that isolated police units 
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had been forced into independent operations” which meant they were little more than 
targets.  
This lack of paramilitary capability present challenges that go far beyond the problems 
faced by the ANA and ANAF – which have a clear role and mission for a nation at war. It 
also means that the ANSF needs to be evaluated by branch and not as a coherent force, it 
shows that the potential strain on the ANA is far greater that talking about a 352,000 man 
Afghan security force indicates, and it raises serious questions about how the elements of 
the ANP should be sized, equipped, and trained in the future for which no unclassified 
source provided any meaningful answers at the time of Transition. 
At the same time, the police face equally great challenges in performing their normal role 
in law enforcement. One of the many critical failures to integrate the planning for civil-
military and operations is reflected in the fact that ISAF dealt with the police and civilian 
aid workers dealt with the rest of the justice system. In fact, none of the official unclassified 
reporting on any element of the police tied its effectiveness to its function in supporting 
civil justice, or attempted to assess whether any of the other elements of the justice system 
– courts, lawyers, prisons – were effective in supporting the police.  
It was clear from a wide range of media reporting that the rest of the justice system was 
often grossly corrupt, that law enforcement officials had good reason not to challenge 
senior government officials and power brokers, that key elements of the justice system 
were not present or would not act in some areas, and that traditional law and insurgent 
courts played a major role in real world justice. In short, the police were often as incapable 
of playing a role in civil justice, as they were in fighting insurgents – with the difference 
that even if they were properly trained and honest the other elements of the justice system 
meant they could not function effectively. 
What was not clear was what aid – if any – the new government would get in dealing with 
any of these issues. Unclassified reporting focused almost exclusively on the ANA, and 
not paramilitary forces over the overall operation of the justice system, and future plans for 
training and aid were vague to non-existent. 
The Uncertain Role of the Afghan Local Police 
These problems in assessing the ANSF are further complicated by the fact that the Afghan 
Local Police are not part of the ANSF, although they were seen as a key potential layer of 
defense against the Taliban and other insurgents at the time of Transition. The October 
2014 Department of Defense report noted that the new government would reevaluated their 
role but summarized their status at the point of Transition as follows:74 
 The Afghan Local Police have become an integral part of the ANSF’s layered security plan. By the 
end of this reporting period, the number of ALP Guardians deployed in transitioned ALP districts 
had nearly reached 30,000 authorized by the Tashkil. ALP Guardians have deployed to 150 
transitioned districts (up from 145 in March 2014) across 29 provinces, where they operate under 
MoI direction. GIRoA now manages more than two-thirds of the ALP units. The ALP continued to 
be the focus of insurgent attacks. In most cases, ALP Guardians stood their ground, protected their 
villages, and prevailed in firefights with insurgents. The ALP showed resiliency in the face of high-
casualty attacks, with spikes in recruitment following such events. 
The newly MoI-certified ALP program of instruction is integrated into the curriculum at the regional 
and provincial training centers. The four-week training program ensures a national standard, 
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addresses some of the ethical concerns about the ALP cited by international organizations, and 
enhances the credibility of the ALP with both the MoI and the international community. The 
program is 140 hours long and now includes modules on human rights and ethics, logistics, and 
administrative processes. Thus far, nearly 4,000 Guardians have completed the program. The ANP 
Training General Command is working to allocate ALP training slots in order to ensure the training 
centers have a yearly ALP throughput capacity of over 5,000 Guardians. 
The logistics capabilities of ALP headquarters continue to improve. The greatest sustainment 
limitation is insufficient communication with the districts. In order to identify logistical shortfalls, 
the ALP headquarters relies to a large extent on coalition advisors’ abilities to connect to the ALP 
districts. 
… The Afghan Local Police program requires greater district-level oversight from Kabul and the 
MoI to ensure ALP sustainment and to curtail the impact of predatory patronage networks that 
degrade popular support for the ALP. Major initiatives, such as Tashkil redistribution, saw little 
progress during this reporting period. The physical separation and lack of communication pose 
challenges in managing this program from Kabul. Additionally, the ALP headquarters has little input 
into district and provincial security plans and decisions because of the lack of ownership by 
provincial and district chiefs of police. 
… Without proximate ANP or ANA forces as reinforcements, defensive ALP units are susceptible 
to coordinated attacks and overwhelmed by insurgents equipped with more powerful weapon 
systems, such as mortars and rocket-propelled grenades. ALP effectiveness this fighting season has 
been degraded by a chronic inability to provide ALP units with timely support for resupply, 
reinforcements, or maintenance. 
… At the ALP headquarters level, most officers are effective at their jobs and show initiative to 
address issues affecting the ALP headquarters and ALP Guardians. However, provincial and district 
chiefs of police are responsible for pay, employment, and sustainment of the ALP. Failures by some 
of these leaders resulted in critical sustainment issues over the reporting period that went unresolved 
until ALP headquarters staff assistance visits. 
The ALP is supposed to provide an additional 30,000 men capable of local defense 
missions. At the time of transition, however, it was unclear how they were top be structure 
and located, how they could function without outside ANA and ANP support, and who 
would keep them from becoming the tools of local power brokers, becoming the equivalent 
of petty warlords, or joining the insurgents if they were the most power force in the area. 
Media reporting on the ALP was severely limited by a lack of access, but it was clear from 
talking to reporters who were able to visit some elements of the ALP that all three of these 
problems already existed at the end of 2014. 
The ISAF Command View in Late 2014 
Senior US officers the and ISAF command did not publically challenge the President’s 
deadline and plans to cut and eliminate most of the remaining US and allied troop presence 
during 2015-2016 -- although some key officers and former commanders did privately 
make it clear that their views were different.  
Several top commanders did, however, make statements at the end of 2014 that provide 
additional insight as to the challenges the ANSF face even when these statements accept 
the coming deadlines and lack of conditions-based caveats to executing them according to 
schedule. General Joseph Dunford transferred command of ISAF to General John 
Campbell on August 26, 2014, and General Campbell gave a broad endorsement to the 
Presidents plans in a press conference on October 2nd.  
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It was an endorsement that said little about future plans for the Afghan forces, future 
funding, the limits to the US and allied advisory presence, and how the coming drawdown 
in the advisory effort would work. Nevertheless, General Campbell’s comments provided 
the first really substantive public statement about the Transition and drawdown plans that 
either the US or ISAF had issued in months:75 
If I had one word to tell you what I've seen so far in the six weeks, it's transition, transition, transition. 
And that is transition from ISAF to the mission of resolute support. It's the political transition with 
a new president, the BSA signing the SOFA signing, and this really complete political transition. 
We're currently with about 40,000 troops on the ground, just less than 40,000. We're moving to 12.5 
by the end of this year. That's NATO forces and the United States. The number for the United States, 
you know, was 9,800. We continue to go there. 
We're on a very good glide path to make that by the end of December, and I think that the BSA and 
the SOFA really has boosted the confidence of the Afghan people and -- also our coalition partners 
provide the necessary forces for the Resolute Support Mission. I've seen huge difference just in the 
attitude since the last week since the BSA and the SOFA and the inauguration came this week. 
I had the opportunity to be there at the inauguration with Ambassador Cunningham. And really, the 
two things that struck me immediately from President Ghani that I did not see prior to that date was: 
one, the appreciation for the coalition forces; and number two: the appreciation for the ANSF. And 
President Ghani has embraced the Afghan security forces, the police and the army, that made an 
immediate impact on them and their morale. And again, I think that's going to be a great window of 
opportunity for Afghanistan as we move forward. 
I do look forward to continuing to work with the NATO forces as we move toward this resolution 
support set. It's a fundamentally different mission, as we really work at train, advise, and assist at 
the corps level, and we'll be on four of the six corps, and then really at the ministerial level. And 
that's different from when I was here last time, when we were all the way down to kandak level. 
…But I've been focusing on the security institutions, the ministry of interior, the ministry of defense, 
the national security adviser, NDS, and then working with both President Ghani and the CEO, Mr. 
Abdullah, so that's been my focus here the first six weeks. 
I do think there's going to be some challenges as we move forward, working through the national 
unity government. I look forward to working with both President Ghani and Mr. Abdullah on that. 
And, again, I will take any questions on that as we go forward. 
…We continue to have great success on the ground in many areas, and I think a lot of that has been 
taken away from the news through the last several weeks with Iraq and Syria, and I really do want 
to emphasize that you have men and women out there that continue to be in harm's way, that do 
great things for all of our countries, working with the Afghan security forces, and I'm proud to be 
part of that. 
… we're absolutely on glide path right now. We've been on a glide path to get to the resolute support 
set, probably by the 1st of November, and we're on that glide path and we're actually -- in some 
places, we're ahead of schedule, so I really have no concerns on the retrograde piece. There's been 
a lot of very hard work done by all the units here….We've gone from -- when I was here last time, 
about 300 COPs [combat outpost] and FOBs [forward operating base]. We're just a little under 30 
at this point in time. And so, I feel very confident that we have a good glide slope and we'll make 
the resolute support set by the end of December. 
When General Campbell was asked, “do you believe that 9,800 is enough troops for 
Afghanistan? And can you tell us what their new mission will be?” he focused on recent 
reports of problems in the Afghan forces, rather than the adequacy of the planned advisory 
effort during 2015 and 2016: 76 
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Afghanistan is fundamentally different than Iraq, in almost -- you can't compare those two. We now 
have a great window of opportunity after signing the BSA and the SOFA where the entire country 
of Afghanistan wants the coalition, not just the United States, but over probably 38, 39 countries, 
once we hit resolute support. You got to remember, we've had over 50 countries tied into this ISAF 
mission in the last 13 years. I don't think -- that's unprecedented. I don't think we've ever had that 
many -- that many countries stick together in a time of conflict. 
So this is fundamentally different where we're at. And, again, President Ghani, by signing the BSA, 
by signing the SOFA, has said they are a sovereign country but they do continue to want the 
assistance that the coalition provides. And I think we're in a different place than we were with 
Iraq….The military here, the Afghan security forces, completely different than when I left Iraq, and 
they're completely different than when I was here just a couple of years ago. They've taken on the 
security mission from last June of '13. They had it mostly entirely by themselves for the summer of 
'14. I think they've done very well, supporting both the elections and through some of the major 
events. 
The last couple of weeks, there has been an uptick with the Taliban trying to make a statement as 
they close out the fighting season…What you may be getting in the -- in the media, probably in the 
Western part of Ghazni in a place called Ajristan, where you heard about potential beheadings, 250 
houses burning, 150 people killed, that's absolutely false….And we've worked very hard with the 
Afghans to make sure they get that message out to show that the -- the Afghan security forces can 
hold the terrain. There's nowhere that we have Afghan security forces that the Taliban can get the 
terrain and hold the terrain. 
The Taliban may take over a district center or something, but only temporarily. Once the ANSF 
understand that piece of it, they go after that, they get the terrain back. So I'm very confident in their 
abilities. 
They do have some shortfalls that we'll continue to work on, and that's what part of resolute support 
is. We'll work very hard on their aviation, on their intelligence, on their sustainment, those things 
that are very, very hard for any army, especially hard here in Afghanistan. We'll continue to work 
with them on that…We have at least two years here to continue to build on the security for the 
Afghan people, to continue to work with the ministries, the MOI and MOD. 
You mentioned 9,800. That's just the U.S. contribution. We'll be at about 12.5, 12.7 with the NATO 
contribution. And we will have forces in the north, in the west, in the east, and in the south, and then 
in Kabul center. 
So we're going to really a spoke and hub, and come 1 January, in the east, we'll have forces in 
Jalalabad, in Gamberi, in Bagram. In the north, they'll be in Mazar-e-Sharif, in the west, they'll be 
in Herat, and in the south, they'll be in Kandahar...We'll be covered down on four of the six corps, 
and two of the corps will continue to advise, but just less frequently than we can the other four corps. 
…we're not out on patrol with the Afghans; they've taken over the fight. We're focused on the systems 
and processes that they have at the corps level. We're no longer with the brigades. We're no longer 
with the Kandaks. 
Again, I said earlier in the opening statement in a place called Ajristan, which is western part of 
Ghazni, very remote area, that was part of our RC-East, continues to be part of our RC-East. I had 
issues when I was here -- a very remote location. For about the past week, there's been an uptick in 
activity out there, but nothing near like what the local media has provided here. 
The district governor, the provincial governor, the district police, the provincial police made some 
phone calls back into the capital. They made phone calls to the press. They were exaggerated. We've 
had both our special operating forces that are partnered with the Afghan special operating forces, 
which are probably the very best in this part of the world, have been down in the Ajristan area for 
about the last four days. All of the reports that I get back show probably six Afghan military killed, 
maybe 12 civilians. That was as of yesterday was the last update. I was out of the net most of today 
down in RC-South. 
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But again, there's no terrain down there in Ajristan that the Afghans do not control. And there are 
some very exaggerated reports. I very -- feel very confident that Ajristan, western part of Ghazni is 
not an issue. 
And Helmand, for the last several week, there's been an uptick in the last four or five days. There's 
been a pretty substantial fight. And again, both the commandos, the 215th Corps and the police, I 
think you'll see in the next day or two with the Afghans coming out and reporting the success that 
they've had there. 
The problem we've had in the past is we've encouraged the Afghans to go ahead and report this to 
show the success that they have. And quite candidly, they've been afraid to do that. And they've 
been inhibited in some places to -- to tell some of the good news stories. But I think, again, under 
President Ghani and Mr. Abdullah, you will see the police, the army, senior leadership, come out 
and speak with the media more and show you the great success that they're having. 
There are casualties on both sides, but I think here in the next 24 to 48 hours, what you'll see in 
Helmand is that the Taliban do not own any of the ground that they've tried to get, and that they'll 
end the fighting season '14 here very discouraged, and that their leadership continues not even to be 
in Afghanistan and that their morale of the Taliban continues to be low. 
They have, quite frankly, won the information war because I think – all of you back there -- Taliban 
have made success, and they haven't. And so, we have not done a good job in telling that story. But 
I'm here to tell you in the six weeks I've been on the ground, I've been very, very confident of what 
the Afghan security forces can do. We'll continue to provide ISR close air support. Some of those 
things that we will build up their capabilities, but we're not there yet. And that's why we'll continue 
to do the train, advise, assist as part of resolute support in both '15 and into '16. 
When General Campbell did provide a limited set of remarks that did address the problems 
in the ANSF, he did little describe the scale of current challenges or how they would be 
met: 77 
The gaps and seams that were identified early on, aviation, close air support, intelligence, logistics, 
how to sustain their force are the processes that we continue to work on. 
We've developed eight essential functions as we move into resolute support that will continue to 
work with the Afghan forces. Those include the joint fires piece. It includes working with their force 
generation….And again, I'm very confident that the Afghan forces have the capability to withstand 
the fight internally inside here in Afghanistan. They're very confident as well. 
But quite candidly, the last couple years, there's been some impediments to them, based on maybe 
some political decisions within their own country that prevented them from even going 
further…And now, with a new administration in, with President Ghani, who has embraced the 
military here, that will probably change some of the directives that were out there that may have 
inhibited the military. I believe that they'll continue to grow…The Afghan military is the most 
respected institution in Afghanistan. Every poll taken in the last two years, they're at the very, very 
top. 
And again, I feel confident that there're some areas and challenges that we'll have to continue to 
work on, but there is no place that once the Taliban or any other insurgents take over, that the Afghan 
military can't take that back from them. 
And the places that the Taliban and the insurgents are going after are going after are very remote 
locations where we don't have a lot of police, we don't have a lot of army, and they're trying to make 
these very high-profile attacks, spectacular attacks. And once we have the security forces in those 
areas, then the Taliban are quickly defeated. 
Will we be in a position to provide air support, medevac to the Afghans in '15? The number of 
platforms that we have, the amount of ISR, the amount of CAS, the amount of medevac we'll have 
will be greatly diminished from what we have today, in proportion to where we're going with the 
12.5. 
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We continue to work through the Afghans what we will be able to provide and what we won't be 
able to provide to the Afghans starting on 1 January. And I have to have that discussion both with 
President Ghani, Mr. Abdullah. And I have to have that discussion with General Austin out of 
CENTCOM and General Breedlove, SACEUR. 
General Campbell did note how uncertain the structure of the new government was and 
some of the issues in creating effective Ministries of Defense and the Interior, 
… And we are working very hard with both the ministry of interior, the ministry of defense to 
strengthen the controls as we move into 2015 on how we leverage the funding….I just brought in 
Minister Atmar. He's the new national security adviser. I had Major Kevin Wendell in probably two 
days ago brief him on a change in business and how we will tighten those controls to give us better 
accountability and oversight of how we use the money. 
I'll just -- in fact, I wrote down a couple of bullets here on the reporting requirements, new 
procedures to really minimize expenditure of the budget codes. There's a mandatory use of the 
electronic payroll system and the monthly reconciliation of the payroll submissions. There's a 
greater emphasis now on linking the payments to contracts. There's a simple thing like we're going 
to pay them in Afghanis as opposed to dollars. 
There is a new piece on contract transition and how we work that. We brought, again, the national 
security adviser in to give him a little bit of oversight on that. We're working now probably starting 
next week as we work through these commitment letters that I sign, and personally talk to the MOI 
and the MOD to make sure they understand how we will tighten up those controls. 
And quite frankly, from Mr. Atmar, he was very appreciative of the increased scrutiny that we'll put 
on any oversight that we'll have both over the MOI and MOD. President Ghani has stressed many, 
many times about the issues of corruption. And we want to make sure that we continue to fall in line 
with that, learn from what we've done in the past, work with the SIGAR, work with both the MOI 
and MOD, and have a little bit better ability to see that. 
Now, we're not going to be out in numbers that we were in the past, so we won't have the touch 
points out in the brigades, kandaks. We'll continue to have that at the corps, and we're actually 
increasing the numbers that we've ever had in the ministries. And because of that, I think that will 
really help us in really the central function number one which is plan, program, budget and execution 
-- really, the PPBE system which is, you know, really hard for U.S. to understand as well. But I 
think we've been working that very well with the Afghans. 
We are trying to do something else that will help us, and that's really build up the civilian positions 
inside both ministries. The MOI is a little bit better than the MOD at this point, but to bring in young 
people that really understand the programming, the budgeting, and that execution, and to bring in 
that young talent as civilians so they continue to grow and have continuity. 
 
The MOI has embraced that. I've had discussions with the MOD. I believe they will embrace it as 
well. And I think that also will help us with our transparency and the accountability oversight. 
… And, again, I'm very comfortable at this point in time with the plan and the ramp of the drawdown 
and, quite frankly, the organization that's set up to leverage the folks that we'll have here, getting 
the right people with the right skill sets at the right level in the ministries. And, again, I feel 
comfortable that we're on the right -- the right path to do that. 
I have to measure it in risk to the force and risk to the mission. And, again, some of that will change 
based on the new administration. Some of the policies that the new president puts out will -- will 
come into my mind as I take a holistic look on how to evaluate some of the gaps and seams that we 
identified and the goals and objectives that we wanted to get at in resolute support. 
I think it's really, really early right now for me to be able to do that, because, again, we're just starting 
this political transition and we haven't even started resolute support yet. I think I have the ability to 
make those recommendations to the chain on command at the appropriate time, but right now, it's 
really way too early. 
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We're going to still try to figure out who the new governors are, who the new MOI or MOD, if they 
switched out, who within those ministries. So we've got to try to work toward that continuity and 
continue to work that base. 
But, really, the advisers that we have, that's our new weapon system. And those are the folks that 
will be out there, engaged at the right levels to really work on the gaps and seams that we identified 
probably a year and a half ago with our Afghan partners here. 
And I feel very confident that we have a good plan, but as any commander on the ground, you know, 
I reserve the right to be able to take a look at the risk to the force, risk to the mission, and then 
provide my assessments to my chain of command as we move forward. 
He addressed the issue of rising Afghan casualties as follows 
…there has been an uptick in the number of casualties that the Afghan security forces have taken. 
But that was expected because they're in the lead…There's much greater percentage rate on the 
police because that's really the first line of defense. The police are not trained. They're not equipped 
the same level that the Afghan army and the special operating forces are equipped. So they've 
probably taken the brunt of those casualties. 
Helmand, again, for the last six weeks has been a pretty good fight, but I think, again in the next 48 
hours you'll see reports from the Afghans that show that they've done very, very well there. 
But the number of casualties for the Afghan security forces for the summer of '14 is just slightly 
higher, actually, than '13. But the last month or xso that percentage has gone up to kind of get it to 
where it was in '13. But that's because they've been in the lead almost completely this summer, more 
so than they were last year. 
…I think the overall average of casualties, and this is probably both wounded and killed, is slightly 
higher, not very much higher, than the summer of '13. The last month or so it's spiked to reach that 
level, otherwise it would have probably been lower than '13...The number that's been floating around 
out there, and, again, sometimes hard to measure based on working through our Afghan systems, 
for overall casualties, this includes both wounded and killed, is in the neighborhood of 7,000 to 
9,000 for '14. And, from '13, I think it's about the same number...So again, not -- not much higher 
than '13, in fact, the big spike here in the last couple weeks, because of the fighting done in Helmand 
and a little bit down in Ajristan. 
When it came to the Afghan Air Force, a force that was originally only supposed to reach 
something approach full operational status in 2016, General Campbell limited his 
comments to the Mi-17, 
… There's about 84 or so Mi-17s here in Afghanistan. The requirement's about 87, so we have three 
to go...We continue to work both with the Afghan air force and the special mission wing, which 
supports the special operating forces. 
I had an opportunity to go on a flight line here a couple weeks ago and sit down both with the air 
force and then with the special operating -- or the special mission wing. 
The capability that the special mission wing -- just think the comparison between -- that's their Task 
Force 160 -- and the ability they have to take Afghan soldiers, to fly very low and put them on an 
LZ to provide resupply is pretty incredible…And I think that they've been a force multiplier for the 
special operating forces. And for the conventional forces, the army and the police, they've been 
mostly moving forces and then providing resupply. 
And I think that capability continues to build confidence in the Afghan security forces, in the Afghan 
people, but I've been really, really impressed…And they also have an ISR capability with an aircraft 
that provides them full motion video that they work with the special operating forces, and they've 
used that quite extensively in the last couple of days in Helmand. 
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…So the Mi-17s are a -- General Dunford used the word many, many months, a "game changer," 
and I absolutely believe that as well, that they provide them a capability that gives them confidence, 
boots their confidence to continue to -- continue to fight. 
Limited Adjustments to the 9,800 Ceiling and the US 
Combat Role 
There has been some progress towards more realistic US force levels since the President 
made these statements, but the resulting increase is very limited and seems to be temporary 
at best. General Campbell did announce a new effort to determine whether Afghan forces 
would be ready for the last US forces to leave Afghanistan in 2016 in November 2013. He 
was quoted as saying in a phone interview that he was:78 
"beginning now to take a hard look" at what effect delays in concluding a bilateral security 
agreement between the United States and Afghanistan and the months of uncertainty over the 
country's presidential elections have had on the preparedness of the Afghan military. Afghan forces 
have been taking heavy casualties in recent months while they battle the resurgent Taliban… Do I 
come back and do I alert my leadership and say we are coming down to this number, we need to 
hold a little bit longer to take advantage of some of the things that President [Ashraf] Ghani has put 
in place and we need more NATO forces in certain locations for longer?"…I've got to do that 
analysis and we're just starting that now." 
Reliable press reports also indicated in late November 2014 that the US military had 
persuaded the White House to allow US forces to play a limited, but more active combat 
role when ANSF forces got into serious trouble and put some advisors forward into combat 
units. This same decision allowed the limited us of US fighters, bombers, UAVs, and 
UCAVs to provide combat support in “hunting the remnants of Al Qaeda.” A senior US 
military officer said on background that US combat systems could include fighter like the 
F-16, bombers like the B-1, and UCAVs like the Predator and Reaper.79 
The decision was taken in part because of the collapse of Iraqi forces in a somewhat similar 
set of military challenges from the Islamic State, but the role of US forces was still to be 
kept very limited. A background briefing by a senior US official stated that, 80  
Safety of our personnel is the president's first priority and our armed forces will continue to engage 
in operations in self-defense and in support of Afghan Security Forces …the United States may 
provide combat enabler support to the [Afghan National Security Forces] in limited circumstances 
to prevent detrimental strategic effects to these Afghan security forces…We will no longer target 
belligerents solely because they are members of the Taliban,” the official said. “To the extent that 
Taliban members directly threaten the United States and coalition forces in Afghanistan or provide 
direct support to Al Qaeda, however, we will take appropriate measures to keep Americans safe.  
These briefings also indicate that the US now counted on some 3,000-4,000 allied forces 
remaining in Afghanistan: Italy in the East, Germany in the North and Turkey in Kabul, 
and that the US would provide these forces with support and with airpower in an emergency. 
At the same time, they also indicated that such forces would be cut during 2015 and 20-16 
in the same way as US forces. 81 
Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel followed these reports up on December 6, 2014, by 
announcing in a joint press conference with Ashraf Ghani that that up to 1000 more US 
troops might stay in Afghanistan, raising the total to 10,800 troops in Afghanistan for the 
first few months of 2015 and then restart the drawdown – although Hagel carefully 
qualified the limits to the change and said it would “last for a few months only,”82 
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Are there (security) gaps? Are there continued challenges? And threats? Absolutely…The recent 
wave of Taliban attacks has made it clear that the international community must not waver in its 
support for a stable, secure and prosperous Afghanistan…We have not forgotten what brought 
America to Afghanistan over a decade ago...And we will take appropriate measures against Taliban 
members who directly threaten U.S. and coalition forces in Afghanistan or provide direct support to 
al Qaeda. 
(President Obama) has provided U.S. military commanders the flexibility to manage any temporary 
force shortfall that we might experience for a few months as we allow for coalition troops to arrive 
in theater…But the president's authorization will not change our troops' missions or the long-term 
timeline for our drawdown."  
General Campbell followed Secretary Hagel by indicating that the US was ready to provide 
more air support than it has previously planned. Secretary Hagel also stressed that the US 
would keep pursuing a "limited" counterterrorism mission in Afghanistan after 2014. 83 
However, these announcements were followed by background briefings that indicated that 
the key reason for the increase was that allies were slow in providing the full contribution 
of some 2,200 allied troops -rather than 3,000-4,000 -- that the US and ISAF had previously 
counted upon. 84  
The Need for Transparency and to Decide on a 
Conditions-based Policy 
Only time can determine how effective the US and ISAF assessment of the combat 
situation has really been, and how credible it post-2014 plans for the development of the 
ANSF will prove to be. The spring and summer campaign season of will be one critical 
test, and the outcome of the political struggle between Ashraf Ghani and Abdullah 
Abdullah may provide more tangible indicators of how effective Afghan governance will 
be during the course of 2015.85 Look back, however, one needs to be very careful, the 
momentum of past US efforts of this kind in Vietnam and Iraq carried both forces through 
the first year and beyond without giving them lasting success. 
One thing is certain, the Administration may have talked about transparency, but it 
increasingly has tried to sell its policies without it. The clichés that President Obama issued 
after a newly elected President Ghani finally signed the bilateral security and status of 
forces agreements on September 29, 2014 did little more than disguise the real challenges 
to Transition:86 
Today we mark an historic day in the U.S.-Afghan partnership that will help advance our shared 
interests and the long-term security of Afghanistan. After nearly two years of hard work by 
negotiating teams on both sides, earlier today in Kabul the United States and the new Afghan 
Government of National Unity signed a Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA). This agreement 
represents an invitation from the Afghan Government to strengthen the relationship we have built 
over the past 13 years and provides our military service members the necessary legal framework to 
carry out two critical missions after 2014: targeting the remnants of Al Qaeda and training, advising, 
and assisting Afghan National Security Forces. The signing of the BSA also reflects the 
implementation of the Strategic Partnership Agreement our two governments signed in May 2012. 
Today, Afghan and NATO officials also signed the NATO Status of Forces Agreement, giving 
forces from Allied and partner countries the legal protections necessary to carry out the NATO 
Resolute Support mission when ISAF comes to an end later this year. 
These agreements follow an historic Afghan election in which the Afghan people exercised their 
right to vote and ushered in the first peaceful democratic transfer of power in their nation’s history. 
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The BSA reflects our continued commitment to support the new Afghan Unity Government, and we 
look forward to working with this new government to cement an enduring partnership that 
strengthens Afghan sovereignty, stability, unity, and prosperity, and that contributes to our shared 
goal of defeating Al Qaeda and its extremist affiliates. 
The situation did not become more reassuring when the US announced the formal end to 
Operation Enduring Freedom on December 29, 2014, and announced that it would begin 
its follow-on mission, Operation Freedom's Sentinel in 2015 – a statement made the same 
day as a Taliban statement that it had “defeated” the US and that “"ISAF rolled up its flag 
in an atmosphere of failure and disappointment without having achieved anything 
substantial or tangible." 87 
The US made its announcement with all the usual rhetorical flourishes and statements about 
success, future commitments, and host government progress it made at the end of the 
Vietnam and Iraq conflicts. President Obama implied that it had ended America’s longest 
war, although Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel made it clear that relabeling the mission 
did not fully end America’s military role: 88 
Operation Freedom's Sentinel, the United States will pursue two missions with the support of the 
Afghan government and the Afghan people. We will work with our allies and partners as part of 
NATO's Resolute Support Mission to continue training, advising, and assisting Afghan security 
forces. And we will continue our counterterrorism mission against the remnants of Al-Qaeda to 
ensure that Afghanistan is never again used to stage attacks against our homeland. 
The US had already withdrawn almost all of its combat forces from Afghanistan at the time 
the President and Secretary Hagel made their statements about Operation Enduring 
Freedom, and it ended the Operation without having issued any meaningful assessment of 
what some thirteen years of war had accomplished.  
Both the President and the Secretary of Defense sharply understated the risks inherent in 
the current US approach to Transition. Secretary Hagel did not mention the risks involve 
at all, and President Obama mixed claims that the war had succeeded in “devastating the 
core al-Qaida leadership, delivering justice to Osama bin Laden, disrupting terrorist plots 
and saving countless American lives,” and “helped the Afghan people reclaim their 
communities, take the lead for their own security, hold historic elections and complete the 
first democratic transfer of power in their country's history” with a short comment that, 
““Afghanistan remains a dangerous place, and the Afghan people and their security forces 
continue to make tremendous sacrifices in defense of their country.”89  
The US did not make any public attempt to provide meaningful strategic assessment of its 
future role and commitments in Afghanistan or the region, and did not provide any 
meaningful public analysis or metrics of the combat situation. It also did not issue any 
assessment of the political and economic prospects for Afghan security, and did not make 
any attempt to link its posture in Afghanistan to what was happening in Pakistan. 
No public plan existed at the end of 2014 for shaping and funding any element of the ANSF 
after 2014. The statement says that there are “two critical missions after 2014: targeting the 
remnants of Al Qaeda and training, advising, and assisting Afghan National Security 
Forces.” Cuts in US military and intelligence personnel strongly indicate that the first 
mission will only have marginal support, and it is unclear what caveats will exist on US 
operations and whether the kind of caveats included the letter transferring responsibility 
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for security and limiting US operations that the US and Afghanistan signed in June 2013 
will have a major impact. 90  
If the US does not abandon fixed deadlines, provide adequate military personnel and 
support, and shift to a condition-based approach to aiding the ANSF, it seems all too likely 
that US force levels will be too low, too short in duration, and too limited in their role to 
adequately support the transition of Afghan National Security Forces over the next few 
years. These are problems only a more realistic and conditions-based approach to the US 
advisory and support role can address, and no amount of spin and selling the war will be a 
substitute for providing such aid before some form of security crisis develops – a point 
where the size and cost of a US effort will be far higher, even if success is still possible. 
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VI. The Threat From Afghan Economic Challenges 
It is difficult to put the threat posed by Afghan economics into anything approaching an 
accurate perspective. Most of the data on the Afghan economy and population are based 
on uncertain estimates. Many are little more than “guesstimates,” although this is 
sometimes disguised by computer models and other ways of generating data that appear to 
be far more precise than they are and are extrapolated down to the district level with little 
or no meaningful input data.  
The failure to honestly express the uncertainty in most data on the Afghan population, 
economy, and impact of aid is one of the many areas where international organizations, 
donor countries, the Afghan government, and NGOs have lied by omission throughout the 
course of the war, and often issued data and estimates that exaggerate their 
accomplishments or serve their own interests. In fact, the need to provide honest 
assessment of uncertainty and the sources and limits to the data being issued is as important 
a priority as the need for transparency, and one where few governments and organizations 
can even begin to claim a meaningful degree of integrity. 
There are enough data, however, to warn that the exaggerated progress claims that the 
Afghan government and many aid donors made through 2010 to 2011 disguised major 
problems in the Afghan economy. They sharply underestimated the strains that would 
follow the withdrawal of US and other ISAF forces, and cuts in outside spending. Chapter 
III has already shown that Afghanistan faces a major budget crisis for at least the next half-
decade–a crisis that inevitably has a major impact on the more developed sector of an 
economy so dependent on government spending.  
Current aid pledges will ease the strain, but it is far easier to pledge aid than it is to actually 
deliver it and then make it effective – particularly in dealing with broad national economic 
problems. The international community has made significant pledges to sustain aid after 
2014. The NATO summit in Chicago in February 2012 resulted in pledges to finance 
Afghanistan’s security spending, estimated at around $4 billion annually over the following 
decade, although donors were assured that Afghanistan would make gradually increasing 
and substantial contributions toward security.  
A conference in Tokyo in July 2012 led to pledges for development aid of $16 billion 
through 2015 and to sustain aid at similar levels through 2017, although such aid was linked 
to the progress in reforms under a Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework.91 A series of 
additional conferences during 2012-2014 – including the London Conference at the end of 
2014 -- broadly reaffirmed these commitments.  
None of these conferences, or the supporting staff work, however, developed credible plans 
to show the timing of such aid, how it will be used, how the allocation of aid will be made 
and managed, how the Afghan government will improve its capability to use aid, how 
waste and corruption will be reduced, and how better audits and measure of effectiveness 
will be introduced. Much of the currently pledged economic aid is also tied to development 
and project aid, and not to dealing with the economic problems cause by Transition. 
Similarly, the Afghan government, the World Bank, and IMF have regularly issued a series 
of reform plans that could increase Afghan revenues, cut Afghan expenditures, reduce 
waste and corruption, and use both domestic revenues and outside aid more effectively. 
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They have also shown that Afghanistan could benefit from reduce the current barriers to 
business development. The World Bank and IMF have also issued estimates showing that 
the full implementation of such plans could sharply reduce the economic risks in Transition, 
and even avoid them in the best case.92  
Yet, all of these efforts remain largely conceptual. Major reform has not taken place. The 
real world budget and economic situation has continued to deteriorate. More and more aid 
activity has left the field and either concentrated in Kabul moved activity out of the country, 
The Afghan government has not been able to deploy competent (or in many cases, any) 
personnel to fully staff the administration of many of its programs at the provincial and the 
district level. 
It is also clear from recent World Bank and IMF reports that fantasies like the “New Silk 
Road” will not have a major impact on the Afghan economy at any point in the near future, 
and the same is true of mines and petroleum resources. The World Bank and IMF also 
make it clear that poverty has already been increasing, and that here is a serious risk of 
recession – an economic downturn that already is leading to capital flight and an Afghan 
brain drain, and has far more impact on a near-substance economy than a more developed 
one.  
This lack of effective governance, planning and management now makes projections based 
on reform largely moot, threatens to reduce popular support for the government, and cut 
its already limited revenue base. It also can have a major impact on those Afghans who 
have benefited most from foreign military spending and aid in past years:  
 At one level, some of those who have profited most from foreign spending, and the massive increase 
in corruption made possible by the lack of proper fiscal controls and measures of effectiveness, have 
already begun to stop investing in the country, moved more of their capital outside Afghanistan, and 
sometimes left the country. Few will be missed at the personal level, but their money will be and at 
least some departures have illegally taken money out of enterprises and contract efforts. 
 At another level, Afghans who have developed legitimate enterprises, Afghans in the construction 
and service industries that have had foreign contracts or served foreign military and aid worker, 
Afghans in government, and Afghans in the security services all face major uncertainties as to 
whether the government and outside aid can sustain the more modern sector of the Afghan economy 
as well as government operations and security efforts. Some may now be motivated to leave the 
country or find ways of ensuring they have enough “black” income and capital to compensate for 
reductions in profits and salary. Major problems may occur in morale and motivation, compounded 
by a desire to avoid service in the field or other high-risk positions given a combination of a growing 
threat and uncertain income. 
 Power brokers and warlords - the real core of Afghan political power and many aspects of its 
governance - may find it harder to fund their power base without added corruption, extortion, 
intimidation, and siphoning off revenues that should go to the government. 
 A recession and decline in outside funding will increase the incentive to grow, process, and export 
narcotics at every level. This trend is already broadly apparent in the increase in acreage and output 
of opium. 
 Young men with guns are not a normal sector for estimates of the behavior of the work force, but a 
broad decline in income and employment, coupled to uncertain security, makes them both a key 
aspect of the Afghan economy, and a potential source of violence, shifts to power brokers, and shifts 
to the insurgents. 
 A decline in the more modern and market-oriented aspects of the economy may push farmers back 
towards subsistence farming as well as narcotics, increase the number of Afghans working at jobs 
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with marginal productivity and who are unemployed, make young men more willing to accept 
money from the Taliban and other insurgents, and create growing unrest in both rural and urban 
areas. It is likely to push youth out of school and into marginal jobs and slow the overall rate of 
modernization and development.  
There are many different metric and indicators that warn how serious these problems may 
become.  As is the case with many of the other trends analyzed in this study, the full range 
of estimates and factors shaping the threat posed by the Afghan economy are too complex 
to do more than summarize in this analysis.  They are, however, laid out in detail in a 
separate Burke Chair study shows the range of governance and economic challenges. (The 
Civil Transition in Afghanistan, 
http://csis.org/files/publication/140630_Gov_Econ_Transition_Afghanistan_0.pdf.)   
Understanding the Pressure on the Afghan Economy 
Some key pressures on the Afghan economy, and the current threat they pose to Afghan 
Transition, are all too clear. As has been noted in the introduction to this study, Afghanistan 
is a state with deep ethnic, sectarian, cultural, and linguistic divisions. While estimates 
differ sharply from source to source, all agree that Afghanistan is still one of the poorest 
countries in the world. The CIA estimates it has a per capita income that is only around 
$1,100, which ranks a dismal 215th in the world, and high poverty and direct and disguised 
unemployment (past CIA estimates would put each figure at 35-40%).  
A Population at Economic Risk 
The UN World Food Program (WFP) puts the poverty percentage at more than 50%.93 The 
WFP provides food aid to some 3.6 million Afghans and describes the Afghan economy 
and Afghan living conditions as follows:94 
Afghanistan faces enormous recovery needs after three decades of war, civil unrest and recurring 
natural disasters. Despite recent progress, millions of Afghans still live in severe poverty with a 
crumbling infrastructure and a landscape that is suffering from environmental damage. This rugged, 
landlocked country remains one of the poorest in the world, with more than half the population 
living below the poverty line. 
Nearly one-third of Afghanistan's people are food-insecure, which means they cannot get enough 
nutritious food to support an active, healthy lifestyle. With an estimated total population of 27 
million, Afghanistan still faces enormous challenges after more than three decades of war and civil 
unrest. Despite recent progress, millions of Afghans still live in severe poverty with limited access 
to food and other basic requirements.  
According to the findings of the 2011/2012 National Risk and Vulnerability Assessment, 7.6 million 
people, roughly one-third of the population, are food-insecure, and a further 14 percent are 
considered to be borderline food-insecure. Insecurity is a major and growing concern. Insurgent 
activity and military operations have affected food security in some regions, undermined 
reconstruction efforts and restricted humanitarian interventions. 
Environmental degradation is also a severe problem. War, uncontrolled grazing, pastureland 
encroachment, illegal logging and the loss of forest and grass cover have worsened drought 
conditions and reduced agricultural productivity. 
The country suffers from one of the highest infant and maternal mortality rates in the world. Over 
half of children under 5 years are chronically malnourished (stunted) and one-fifth of Afghan 
women of childbearing age are underweight. Average life expectancy is 62 years, and adult literacy 
stands at just 28 percent. Nearly one-third of Afghanistan's people are food-insecure, which means 
they cannot get enough nutritious food to support an active, healthy lifestyle. 
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World Bank studies support these conclusions, and note that Afghanistan falls significantly 
below the level of grain production necessary to feed its people in years of bad rains. In 
2011, for example, the overall deficit in wheat production was nearly1.86 million tons out 
of a requirement of 4,687 million tons. Afghanistan is self-sustaining in wheat in a year of 
good rains like 2012, but had a deficit in every year from 2007-2011.95 
Demographic Pressure on Afghan Stability 
Afghanistan is a state that has suffered from invasion, war, and crisis since the Soviet 
invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 – a period of roughly 35 years. In spite of 
conflict and turmoil, the US Census Bureau estimates that the Afghan population more 
than doubled between 1979 and 2014 rising from 15.6 million in 1979 to 31.8 million in 
2014, and is projected to rise to 36.6 million in 2020, 45.7 million in 2030 and 54.7 million 
in 2040.96 UN, US Census Bureau, the CIA and other sources all agree that Afghanistan 
has an extremely young population. The CIA estimates that it has a rate of population 
growth where the Agency estimates that 392,000 men and 370,000 women annually reach 
the age where they enter a labor force estimated at only around 7.5 million. 97   
A World Bank study summarizes the demographic pressures created by this population 
growth as follows:98 
The country is facing huge demographic challenges that will add pressures to the labor market. 
The Afghan labor market is characterized by a young and fast-growing workforce. Decades of 
conflict, international migration and relatively high fertility rates make Afghanistan – together with 
Pakistan and Nepal – one of the youngest countries in South Asia. The proportion of population 
aged 15 or below is as high as 51.3 percent, meaning that more than one in every two Afghans is 
economically dependent. 
 Afghanistan’s population pyramid is characterized by a wide base that will maintain a sustained 
rate of growth in the number of new labor-market entrants for decades to come. Between 
2010/11 and 2015/16 alone, the labor force is expected to increase by 1,7 million people, and by an 
additional 4 million by 2025/26, not accounting for any return migration or changes in participation 
rates. This means that every year 400,000 to 500,000 will potentially seek jobs. 
Afghanistan has one of the highest fertility rates in the world – 5.1 percent in 2011/12. Unless 
the fertility rate decreases, demographic pressures will continue to rise and reduce the demographic 
dividend. A high fertility rate, coupled with declining mortality rates, tends to produce a “youth 
bulge”. Normally, a youth bulge presents an opportunity for growth in the impending years, since it 
would lower the age dependency ratio, i.e., the population younger than 15 or older than 64 as a 
share of the number of people of working age.  
A decreasing dependency ratio means that a higher proportion of the population contributes to 
productive, income-raising work, relative to non-active dependents (e.g., elderly and children) 
which would consequently increase domestic savings and GDP per capita growth. But, a youth bulge 
could also pose a risk to stability if young people are left without viable jobs or other economic 
opportunities. 
While estimates of the total population in Afghanistan often differ by several million, it is 
still clear that this kind of population growth, along with war and political extremism, has 
severely affected the pattern of traditional life in much of the country as well as ethnic and 
sectarian relations.99  
Moreover, war and crisis have pushed substantial refugee and other parts of the Afghan 
population into urban areas. Some 5.8 million Afghan refugees have returned since 2002, 
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often to dependence on outside aid for some of their income, and leaving something 
approaching 1.6 million Afghans in Pakistan and substantial numbers in Iran.100 The formal 
count of internally displaced persons is roughly 800,000, but the reality is substantially 
higher.  
Limited Progress in Human Development, and Uncertain Progress in 
Life Expectancy and Education 
The UN Human Development Indicators provide additional insight into both Afghanistan’s 
level of development and how it compares to other poor neighboring states. These data are 
shown in Figure 23. They show that Afghanistan has made progress in many areas, 
although its real per capita income is still lower than in the past.  
They also show, however, that Afghanistan then ranked (175th in the world) well below 
two other very poor countries: Bangladesh (157th) and Nepal (146th). (Afghanistan 
improved to 169th in 2014).  
Furthermore, the data in the supporting tables raise serious questions about the claims made 
by the Afghan government about increases in life expectancy, as well as similar claims by 
the US and various aid agencies – where some reports put the figure at 60 years rather than 
the 49-50 estimated by the UN and CIA.  
SIGAR notes that,101  
USAID’s Afghanistan Mortality Survey (AMS) results are frequently used as evidence that U.S. 
intervention efforts have contributed to remarkable improvements in Afghanistan’s health system. 
 In a Washington Post op-ed published on May 30, 2014, Dr. Rajiv Shah, the Administrator of 
USAID, cited Afghanistan’s “largest increase in life expectancy” to highlight Afghanistan’s 
progress in health. 
 However, there is an enormous gap between USAID estimates and the estimates of other 
institutions…. Most institutions estimate a two- to five-year increase in life expectancy over six 
years, while the mortality survey finds a 20-year increase for the same time period. Reasons why 
USAID’s estimates differ from those of other institutions could include factors such as AMS 
inability to survey completely in insecure southern provinces, and Afghan cultural reluctance to 
speak about female and infant mortality with strangers 
They also raise questions about the level of education in Afghanistan. There is no doubt 
that Afghanistan has made major progress over the days of the Taliban. The UN notes, 
however, that actual school years (3.1) fall far below the government’s goal of 8 years.  
The World Bank comparisons with other poor countries in the region in Figure 24 also 
show also that Afghanistan ranks far below similar countries, and its education is biased 
heavily towards government employment.    
SIGAR has also addressed this issue in its recent reporting:102 
The number of students attending school in Afghanistan is often cited as evidence of Afghanistan’s 
progress in education. For example, in a 
Washington Post op-ed published on May 30, 2014, Dr. Rajiv Shah, the Administrator of USAID 
wrote, “Education is another bright spot [in Afghanistan.] Three million girls and 5 million boys are 
enrolled in school.” However, the reliability of EMIS—the only database at the MOE tracking 
education metrics—cannot be confirmed. Data is not available on time, and indicators such as net 
enrollment ratios, repetition rate, and dropout rate are unavailable. Insecurity limits visits to schools. 
In the most recent EMIS Statistical Analytical 
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Report from FY 1390, the MOE admitted that only 1,000 schools (7% of all general education 
schools) were visited for data verification in FY 1390. 
Additionally, schools may be tempted to inflate their attendance figures because access to funding 
(such as EQUIP II School Grants) can be linked to enrollment levels. This quarter, SIGAR learned 
that USAID’s definitions of enrollment used in EMIS last quarter were double counting the number 
of students enrolled in Afghanistan. The previous definition of total enrollment added three figures: 
enrolled, present, and absent students. However, as USAID clarified this quarter, the number of 
enrolled students is actually the sum of present and absent students. Thus, the total enrollment 
figures reported last quarter counted each student twice. 
…SIGAR is concerned about the accuracy of the data provided on Afghanistan’s educational system.  
According to the most recent data available from the Ministry of Education’s (MOE) Education 
Management Information System (EMIS), Afghanistan had a total of 14,166 primary, lower-
secondary, and upper-secondary schools in FY 1391 (March 21, 2012–December 20, 2012).  
This quarter, USAID provided two inconsistent sets of MOE data for the number of students 
enrolled in 1391. Data generated from EMIS shows approximately 7.62 million students were 
enrolled in primary, lower-secondary, and upper-secondary schools in FY 1391. Of the enrolled 
students, 6.26 million were categorized as present, while 1.36 million students were considered 
absent. 
Another unspecified MOE source showed higher enrollment numbers—7.78 million students (an 
additional 160,000 students over EMIS data) enrolled in primary, lower-secondary, and upper 
secondary schools in FY 1391, with 6.86 million students present and approximately 922,000 
students absent. 
 USAID also provided a third MOE source containing Afghanistan’s total enrollment in general 
education for FY 1392—8.2 million students enrolled. This number was not broken down into the 
numbers of students present and absent. The number of days of attendance required for a student to 
be counted as “present” for the entire year was not known as this report went to press. 
According to USAID, the MOE includes absent students in the enrollment total until three years 
have elapsed, because absent students are considered to have the potential to return to school. 
However, a MOE Education Joint Sector Review from September 2013 recommended the MOE 
revise its regulations and no longer consider permanently absent students to be counted as enrolled. 
Figure 23: Afghanistan: The UN Human Development 
Assessment 
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Source: http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/Country-Profiles/AFG.pdf, may 5, 2014 
 
Figure 24: World Bank Comparison of Education Quality in 
South Asia 
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 Decades of conflict have had a long-lasting impact on the human capital stock of the country.  
 Despite significant improvements in school enrollment rates and education achievement in 
younger (urban) cohorts, the education gap remains substantial by international standards, 
also taking into account country’s level of development. 
 In each sector of the economy, the education level of the Afghan labor force is the lowest among 
South Asia countries.  
 Particularly challenging are education gaps in sectors crucial for future economic growth and 
development such as agriculture, mining, construction, commerce and manufacturing 
 
Source: Nassif, Claudia; Joya, Omar; Lofgren, Hans; Gable, Susanna; Redaelli, Silvia; Jordan, Luke; 
Jaffrin, Guillemette Sidonie. 2014. Full report. Vol. 2 of Afghanistan - Pathways to inclusive growth. 
Washington, DC : World Bank Group, Report No: ACS8228, Islamic State of Afghanistan, Pathways to 
Inclusive Growth, Full Report, March 2014, SASEP, SOUTH ASIA 43- 44. 
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Uncertain Economic Growth and Over-Dependence 
Agriculture 
While some official statements highlight Afghanistan’s economic growth and imply that 
living standards have been steadily rising, World Bank and other reporting warn that 
Transition is occurring at a time when claims of GDP growth have been highly dependent 
on the exceptional agricultural output that occurred from highly favorable rains in 2012, 
and that the level of poverty has actually been increasing.  
This has led to a number of highly misleading statements about the Afghan economy, 
including some from the White House, State Department, and USAID. 
Over-Reliance on Agriculture and Favorable Rains 
The key trends in Afghan GDP Growth and the impact of agriculture and favorable rains 
on GDP growth are shown in Figure 25. A World Bank study notes that,103 
…there are indicators as to why growth has failed to produce more jobs and income for the poor. 
First, the volatility of agricultural growth likely affects prospects for poverty reduction since 
agriculture accounts for more than half of employment. Although agriculture grew by 45 percent in 
2009, it actually contracted in 2008, 2010, and 2011, with limited irrigation and dependence on rain-
fed crops contributing to volatility. Poor households in Afghanistan, especially those who subsist 
on agriculture, have only few risk-coping mechanisms and are more strongly affected by agricultural 
output contractions than richer, wage-earning households. In many cases, livelihood risks are being 
managed by disposing household assets or deferring expenditures for health and education services 
which, in turn, have negative dynamic effects for future income. This would not only explain why 
growth has not benefited the poor but could also explain the increase in inequality.  
Second, the persistent high level of un- and underemployment implies that growth in Afghanistan 
did not produce sufficient employment opportunities, especially for the poor and underprivileged 
segments of the population. Finally, the increase in violence over the same period might have 
disproportionally affected the poor. A deteriorated security situation restricts public service delivery, 
the reach of humanitarian development efforts, and access to markets for the poor. Moreover, 
insecurity also restricts access to public services, especially for women and children who might 
refrain from visiting clinics or going to school 
The Risks in Transition 
It is still unclear that aid and military spending will be cut to the point where a major 
recession takes place, but a World Bank study that warned of the economic risks in 
Transition as early as 2011 noted:104 
Underemployment will increase because the activities affected by declining financial inflows 
(services, construction) are relatively labor-intensive. Unemployment and especially 
underemployment in Afghanistan—respectively estimated at 8% and 48%—are already high, even 
with today’s rapid economic growth. Roughly 6–10% of the working population has benefited from 
aid-financed job opportunities, most of these in short-term employment. Declining aid, therefore, 
can be expected to exacerbate underemployment levels (with fewer casual labor opportunities and 
lower pay for skilled employees).  
The impact of the decline will affect some groups more than others. Aid has not been evenly spread 
across the country. Because of the choices made by donors, and the predominant role of stabilization 
and military spending, the conflict-affected provinces have had significantly higher per capita aid 
than the more peaceful (and often poorer) provinces. As a result, the slowdown in aid will be felt 
more acutely in the conflict-affected areas and in urban centers. If aid declines gradually so that it 
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can be partly offset by growth of the security, mining, and civilian public sectors, the impact could 
be softened and spread over time. This would allow labor markets more time to adjust.  
The impact of declining aid on economic growth may be less than expected. Why? Because most 
international spending “on” Afghanistan is not spent “in” Afghanistan, and much of what is spent 
in Afghanistan leaves the economy through imports, expatriated profits and outward remittances. 
Nevertheless, projections suggest that, under even favorable assumptions, real GDP growth may fall 
from 9% a year over the past decade to 5-6% during 2011–18. Given Afghanistan’s annual 
population growth of 2.8%, this would mean only limited improvement in average per capita income, 
continuing high rates of underemployment and little progress in reducing poverty. Only growth at 
the very maximum of the range of plausible scenarios would enable Afghanistan to achieve 
meaningful reductions in poverty and higher average per capita incomes. For example, with real 
GDP growth of 6% a year, average per capita income – currently one of the world’s lowest at $528 
dollars – would take 22 years or about a generation to double.  
Much Depends on Agriculture and Rainfall 
One of the key problems in assessing the economic impacts of Transition is that there is no 
clear basis for assessing the current distribution of the Afghan economy by sector, but the 
CIA estimates that 20% of the GDP comes from agriculture (excluding opium), 25.6% 
from industry, and 54.4% from services in 2011.105  
Much of this income in industry and services was dependent on outside aid and military 
spending, but the US and other sources have never been able to estimate how much military 
spending aid money has actually been spent in Afghanistan and on Afghans, as 
distinguished from total spending – where as much as 40% of even the aid money may 
have been spent outside the country or on foreign staff and contractors.  
There are no reliable data on the labor force by occupation, but a CIA guesstimate dating 
back to 2008 makes a sharp contrast with the data on the role of each sector in the GDP: 
Agriculture is 78.6%, industry 5.7%, and service 15.7%. 106 
A focus on such numbers may seem academic, but the data in Figure 25 show all too 
clearly that the Afghan economy -- and much of the vulnerability of the Afghan population 
to cuts in military spending and aid – depends heavily on how the state of the Afghan 
economy during 2015 through roughly 2020 affects each of the major categories of the 
population discussed at the beginning of this chapter. 
It also highlights the importance of estimating how many Afghans are largely self-
supporting in subsistence agriculture in relying on the kind of macro-economic data that 
assesses the economy in the entire country. Some estimates put the total at around 80%, 
although the CIA puts urbanization at around 32%. Accordingly, there is only an uncertain 
basis for estimating the human impact of the economic shifts that will occur with Transition, 
particularly if the fighting produces more population shifts and internally displaced persons. 
  
Cordesman: Transition in Afghanistan                              January 2015 
110 
Figure 25: Afghan Economic Growth and Its Dependence on 
Agriculture and Rainfall- Part One 
 
 
• Real GDP growth (excluding opium production) was 14.4% in 2012, which 
represented a sharp uptick from 6.1% in 2011.  
• This strong performance was in large part due to an exceptional agricultural 
harvest supported by favorable weather conditions.  
• Agriculture accounts for about a quarter of GDP (excluding opium).  As a 
result, economic growth is influenced heavily by the volatile agricultural sector. 
Source: World Bank, Afghan Recent Economic Developments, April 2014, http://www-
wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2014/04/23/000456286_20140423092911/Rendere
d/PDF/875740WP0Afgha00Box382171B00PUBLIC0.pdf, and Afghanistan Transition Economics Update, 
http://www.worldbank.org/content/dam/Worldbank/Feature%20Story/sar/Afghanistan/Af-WB-Transition-Presentation-
Nov2014.pdf, November 27, 2014. 
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Figure 25: Afghan Economic Growth and Its Dependence on 
Agriculture and Rainfall- Part Two 
 
 
Source: Nassif, Claudia; Joya, Omar; Lofgren, Hans; Gable, Susanna; Redaelli, Silvia; Jordan, Luke; Jaffrin, Guillemette 
Sidonie. 2014. Full report. Vol. 2 of Afghanistan - Pathways to inclusive growth. Washington, DC: World Bank Group, 
Report No: ACS8228, Islamic State of Afghanistan, Pathways to Inclusive Growth, Full Report, March 2014, SASEP, 
SOUTH ASIA, pp. 23-24, 30-31.  
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Economic Stress and Poverty 
Once again, it is important to note that poverty per se is only one of the pressures that will 
affect the success of Transition. As has been outlined at the start of this chapter, educated 
Afghans, Afghans in government and the more modern market-driven sector of the 
economy, and Afghans in the security services will be sharply affected by any cut in aid, 
military spending in country, and overall economic activity.  
The economic pressure on this mix of wealthier Afghans will have a critical impact in 
increasing capital flight, the Afghan brain drain, and incentives for corruption, make it 
difficult to motivate and retain military personnel, and aid recruiting by the Taliban and 
other insurgents if they can find outside sources of money. 
At the same time, a serious recession would also increase poverty levels in urban areas and 
rural areas whose economy relies on cash transactions. It will increase the incentive to grow 
and process narcotics, and inevitably affect education, government services, and the ability 
to maintain infrastructure. Almost inevitably, it will also reduce support for both the 
government and the war. 
World Bank Assessments of Poverty 
The World Bank gave the following warning in March 2014,107 
Growth has so far failed to produce more jobs and income for the poor: First, the volatility of 
agricultural growth likely hampers prospects for poverty reduction since agriculture accounts for 
more than half of employment. Poor households in Afghanistan, especially those who subsist on s 
than richer, wage-earning households. This would explain why growth has not benefited the poor 
and also perhaps why inequality has increased. Second, the persistent high level of un- and 
underemployment implies that growth in Afghanistan did not produce sufficient employment 
opportunities, which might have reduced the poverty impact. Finally, the increase in violence over 
the same period might have disproportionally affected the poor. Deterioration in the security 
situation limits the possibilities for public service delivery, the outreach of humanitarian 
development efforts, and access to markets for the poor. Moreover, insecurity also restricts access 
to public services, especially for women and children who might refrain from visiting clinics or 
going to school. 
… four main population segments that have been largely excluded from the growth process and are 
at risk of being disadvantaged in future: 
 The low-skilled workforce. Literacy levels in the Afghan working population are 
extremely low, especially among adults and women. Both literacy and education level 
tends to correlate with lower levels of poverty in Afghanistan. 
 The rural poor. Agriculture provides income for around half of Afghanistan’s population; 
for 30 percent of households it constitutes the most important source of income. 
Agriculture is the main source of livelihood and subsistence for 70-80 percent of the rural 
population in Afghanistan. Employment in agriculture is characterized mainly by small 
family businesses that produce mainly for subsistence. 
 Youth. The proportion of population aged 15 or below is as high as 51.3 percent, meaning 
that more than one in every two Afghans is economically dependent. Young people tend 
to be better educated on average, especially in urban areas. However, they are also less 
likely to find paid employment. 
 Women. While almost every man in the age range of 25-50 is economically active, only 
one in every two women participates in the labor market. While the female participation 
rate does not appear very low within the South Asian cultural context, women in 
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Afghanistan are much less engaged in wage-earning employment. At the same time, the 
fertility rate is very high, at 5.1 percent in 2011/12. Increasing the share of female labor 
market participation will key to reducing fertility and reducing demographic pressures in 
the future. 
Given Afghanistan’s annual population growth of 2.8 percent, this would mean only limited 
improvement in average per-capita income, continuing high rates of un- and underemployment, and 
little progress in reducing poverty. For example, at a rate of 4.8 percent GDP growth per year, it 
would take Afghanistan more than 20 years to increase real GDP per capita from its current 
estimated level to that of the South Asian region (2011), which is US$786. Convergence to South 
Asian income levels would then become an even further distant goal. Only growth at the upper level 
of the range of plausible scenarios would enable Afghanistan to meaningfully reduce poverty and 
achieve higher per-capita incomes. 
It warned of slowing growth in April 2014:108 
Economic growth slowed considerably in 2013 despite robust agricultural production as heightened 
uncertainty surrounding the political and security transition led to a slump in investor and consumer 
confidence. Agricultural output reached record levels for a second consecutive year in 2013 due to 
favorable weather conditions, with cereals production increasing 2.7 percent over the bumper crop 
of 2012. On the other hand, uncertainty surrounding the political and security transition led to a 
slump in investor and consumer confidence, thus resulting in a sharp slowdown in private 
investment and growth in the non-agricultural sectors.  
Economic growth in 2013 is estimated at 3.6 percent, down sharply from strong growth of 14.4 
percent in 2012. Uncertainty remains over the security outlook after most international forces 
withdraw in 2014 and over whether a cohesive and broadly accepted government will take hold 
within a reasonable period of time following the April 2014 elections. Growth is projected to remain 
weak in 2014.  
A smooth political and security transition would help restore confidence in the economy and enable 
a pickup in growth in 2015.  Revenue collection weakened in 2013, while Afghanistan’s large 
security expenditure obligations and high aid dependence pose the risk of crowding out important 
civilian operating and development spending. After a decade of strong revenue growth, domestic 
revenues declined to 9.5 percent of GDP in 2013 from 10.3 percent in 2012 and the peak of 11.6 
percent in 2011. In nominal terms, revenues amounted to Afs 109 billion in 2013, almost level with 
the pro-rated figure for 2012.  
The decline in revenue collections is a result of the economic slowdown as well as weaknesses in 
enforcement in both tax and customs administration. In order to preserve fiscal sustainability, a 
concerted effort will be required going forward to improve revenue mobilization by strengthening 
tax and customs enforcement and by expediting introduction and implementation of the planned 
value-added tax. At the same time, given Afghanistan’s extraordinary security expenditure 
obligations, safeguarding important civilian operating and development expenditures is a priority. 
As security expenditures have continued to grow, austerity measures in 2013 disproportionately 
affected civilian expenditures and the 2014 budget projects a considerable further increase in  
And, it warned in October 2014 that,109 
Economic growth fell sharply in 2013 as uncertainty over the political and security transition 
led to a considerable slowdown in the nonagricultural sectors. Real (non-opium) GDP growth 
is estimated to have fallen sharply from 14.4 percent in 2012 to 3.7 percent in 20131. With 
uncertainty leading to a slump in investor and consumer confidence, growth weakened significantly 
across the board in the non-agricultural sectors, including manufacturing, construction and services. 
Growth in the services sector, which accounts for about half of GDP, fell from 16 percent in 2012 
to 5.3 percent in 2013, driven by a sharp slowdown in wholesale and retail trade and government 
services. Transport and communications, which accounts for half of the services sector, also 
experienced weaker growth, but fared somewhat better from the continued repatriation of 
international forces and increased number of broadband subscribers. Evidence on roads and building 
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constructed suggests that the construction sector also experienced slower growth in 2013. 
Meanwhile, manufacturing growth declined from 7.3 percent in 2012 to 2 percent in 2013, driven 
in large part by the food and beverages sector. 
Agriculture production was robust in 2013 but did not exceed the record levels of 2012. Total 
agriculture value added in 2013 was about flat (declining very slightly by 0.2 percent) from the 
record levels of 2012. Given favorable weather conditions, the cereals sector (which accounts for 
43 percent of agriculture value added) grew by 2.3 percent in 2013, reaching the highest level 
achieved over the past decade. The fruits sector also grew by 2.3 percent, but livestock and other 
products declined by 1.7 percent and 4.5 percent respectively. Agriculture accounts for about a 
quarter of GDP and also has strong links to the rest of the economy, so that the robust agricultural 
output in 2013 would normally have buoyed overall GDP growth. However, with total agriculture 
production flat from the bumper level of 2012, it was not sufficient to counterbalance the overall 
slowdown in GDP growth in 2013  
… The protracted political uncertainty has taken a further toll on Afghanistan’s economy in 
2014. A number of available short-term indicators on new firm registrations, imports, and fiscal and 
monetary trends indicate that the economic slowdown deepened during the first half (H1) of 2014. 
Private investment across all nonagricultural sectors appears to have dropped considerably in the 
first half of 2014 due to the increased uncertainty. Initial reports on the agriculture sector point 
toward another rich harvest in 2014, although overall agricultural production is expected to decline 
modestly. Economic growth could decline further to 1.5 percent in 2014. 
… New investment activity dropped further across the board in the first half of 2014. The 
number of new firm registrations had already fallen in 2013 to its lowest level in five years, with a 
reduction in both local and foreign new fixed investments…This downtrend worsened during the 
first half of 2014, when only half as many new firms were registered compared to the same period 
of the previous year…The further decline in new firm registrations occurred across all 
nonagricultural sectors, with construction and services particularly hard hit … Although no high 
frequency data are available on firm inventories and gross fixed capital formation, new firm 
registrations should be a relatively good proxy for business confidence and investment activity in 
the private sector. Decisions to establish new fixed investments in Afghanistan or to expand existing 
investments, horizontally (expanding existing products) or vertically (investing in the supply chain), 
are highly sensitive to confidence in market conditions and the political environment. The number 
of new firm registrations would particularly reflect new fixed investments and vertical investments 
in the economy. Though this is a not a perfect proxy for level of economic activity, it can fairly 
reflect the level of confidence of both local and foreign investors. 
Poverty is high and persistent in Afghanistan. According to the 2011-12 household survey, the 
poverty rate was 36 percent, meaning that about 9 million individuals (3 of every 8 Afghans) had 
consumption levels below the national poverty line. The national poverty rate remained substantially 
unchanged between 2007-08 and 2011-12. A number of factors could have contributed to this 
measured trend. First, the volatility of agriculture would affect measured trends, with the two years 
preceding the 2011-12 survey both featuring negative agriculture growth. Second, Afghanistan faces 
a daunting demographic challenge, with around 400,000 new entrants into the labor force each year 
and underemployment pervasive. Third, the high dependency ratio and low female labor force 
participation both serve as a drag on improving Afghanistan’s poverty profile. 
The IMF Risk Assessment Matrix 
IMF reporting has tracked closely with the World Bank assessments, and the IMF has 
developed the risk assessment matrix shown in Figure 26.110 
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Figure 26: IMF Risk Assessment Matrix for Transition in 
Afghanistan 
 
Source: IMF, ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN, 2014 ARTICLE IV CONSULTATION—STAFF REPORT; PRESS 
RELEASE; AND STATEMENT BY THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTORFOR THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN, 
IMF Country Report No. 14/128, May 2014, http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2014/cr14128.pdf, p. 10.  
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Narcotics 
There are other problems that will further complicate the economic “threat.” The history 
of counter-narcotics efforts in Afghanistan may not be an exercise in futility, but it is hard 
to describe it as anything else. Years of reporting of favorable trends were largely reversed 
well before the end of 2014. Moreover, much of this reporting followed the path of lying 
by omission that has distorted so much of the security and aid reporting on Afghanistan 
during the course of the war. 
Most economic studies chose to ignore the impact of narcotics on the overall economy. 
Reports on narcotics per se generally focused on the farm gate price, and the theoretical 
motivation of farmers in terms of alternative crop prices, rather than the real world 
economics of opium as it entered the distribution and processing system, grew sharply in 
value, impacted on power brokering throughout the country, and involved a massive 
network of narco-traffickers.  
The focus on the farmer to the exclusion of a massive criminal network involving key 
Afghan officials and power brokers, and massive amounts of corruption, was absurd. So 
was the focus on farm gate prices – although it reversed the kind of statistical exaggeration 
law enforcement officials use when they report the size of drug seizures in street prices – 
to the exclusion of the actual loss in value to narco-traffickers – common in the US. 
As noted in the discussion of Figure 25, many estimates of Afghan agricultural output do 
not take account of the nation’s leading cash and export crop. The World Bank did, 
however, provide a far more realistic assessment of the economic importance of narcotics 
in a report issued in October 2014: 111 
Both opium production and area under poppy cultivation increased considerably in 2013 –
and is expected to remain at a high level in 2014. According to UNODC data, opium production 
increased by almost 50 percent to 5,500 tons in 2013, while the total area under poppy cultivation 
expanded by 36 percent to 209,000 hectares…Opium production in 2013 appears to have recovered 
from the decline in 2012 triggered by adverse weather and disease. While the total value of opium 
production at farmgate prices remained at about 4 percent of GDP (or $950 million) in 2013 due to 
a decline in the farm-gate price, the export value of opiates (including drugs) increased from 11 
percent of GDP in 2012 to 15 percent of GDP – or $3.1 billion – in 2013. A number of factors could 
have contributed to the recent increase in poppy production, including (i) the introduction of new 
production technologies (e.g. irrigation); (ii) fewer livelihood opportunities or the expectation 
thereof; and (iii) the rollback of international forces and associated counternarcotic efforts from the 
provinces. Although opium’s importance in GDP has been declining over time (down from 13 
percent of GDP in 2007 to 4.1 percent in 2013 at farm-gate prices), it is likely an important source 
of livelihood for a segment of the rural population. 
SIGAR also provided an important assessment of the trends in opium growing and output 
in its October 2014 report,112 
Afghanistan is by far the world’s largest source of opium, producing over 90% of global 
supply…Opium production accordingly plays a key role in the political economy of Afghanistan. 
While occupying less than 3% of land under cultivation, opium is Afghanistan’s most valuable cash 
crop, and opiates—opium, morphine, and heroin—are its largest export, with an estimated value of 
$3 billion at border prices.2 Furthermore, the opium economy directly provides up to 411,000 full-
time-equivalent jobs—more than the entire Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF)—and supports 
additional secondary-effect jobs in the licit economy…In the coming weeks, the United Nations 
Office of Drugs and Crime  
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(UNODC) is expected to report further increases in the amount of opium poppy grown. Levels of 
cultivation have risen by more than 200,000 hectares (1 hectare, or ha, equals roughly 2.5 acres) 
since 2001…There is reason to believe that cultivation will continue to increase in 2015, after the 
NATO combat mission in Afghanistan has drawn to a close. 
… As Special Inspector General John F. Sopko told Congress earlier this year, “The narcotics trade 
is poisoning the Afghan financial sector and fueling a growing illicit economy. This, in turn, is 
undermining the Afghan state’s legitimacy by stoking corruption, nourishing criminal networks, and 
providing significant financial support to the Taliban and other insurgent groups.” In sum, Sopko 
warned, “the expanding cultivation and trafficking of drugs is one of the most significant factors 
putting the entire U.S. and international donor investment in the reconstruction of Afghanistan at 
risk.” 
…despite the threat that the burgeoning opium economy poses to the Afghan state and 
reconstruction, counternarcotics has largely fallen off the Afghan agenda of both the U.S. 
government and the international community. It rarely appears in the declarations and communiqués 
from the conferences on Afghanistan reconstruction that have become a mainstay of the 
international effort. And there are only oblique references to the issue… 
… UNODC estimates that opium poppy was grown on 209,000 hectares— more than half a million 
acres—in 2013, up 36% from 2012 and a “record high” for Afghanistan.11 This was not the first 
time Afghanistan set records for opium production. In 1999, at the height of the Taliban regime, 
opium poppy cultivation had reached an “unprecedented level” of approximately 91,000 
hectares…Another “unprecedented” level of 131,000 hectares of opium poppy was cultivated in 
2004.13 This occurred shortly after then finance minister Ashraf Ghani warned of the dangers of 
the burgeoning opium economy… 
Despite President Karzai’s declaration of a “jihad against opium” and redoubled U.S. efforts, 
another “unprecedented” peak of 193,000 hectares of poppy cultivation occurred in 2007… 
Nangarhar Province in eastern Afghanistan, declared “poppyfree” by the UN in 2008, “saw a 
fourfold increase in opium poppy cultivation between 2012 and 2013.” Farm-gate opium prices 
remain relatively high17 at around $140 per kilogram.18 The Afghan economy remains fragile: 
economic growth has declined, real wages are falling, and inflation has increased.19 The security 
situation in many rural areas of the country is increasingly uncertain. In such conditions, opium 
production should be expected to rise. 
Some of the key trends in Afghan narcotics activity are shown in Figure 27 It is all too 
clear that any major economic downturn is likely to make Afghanistan even more 
dependent on drug growing and exports – as well as be seen as a threat by Afghanistan’s 
neighbors, raise questions about aid to Afghanistan in outside nations, and increase the 
already massive drug use by Afghans – a problem endemic in the Afghan security services. 
That said, the US has already spent some $7.8 billion in counternarcotics to little effect. 
Although UNDOC, the World Bank, IMF, and organizations like SIGAR all propose a new 
round of attention to such efforts, it seems all too likely that such efforts will have marginal 
impact at best until and unless Afghanistan can achieve a far higher degree of security and 
economic stability and create a climate where enforcement efforts can be more effective 
and less corrupt, and there are fewer incentives for narco-trafficking at every level of the 
Afghan economy. In fact, it is more likely that the economic pressure on Afghanistan will 
lead to an even heavier emphasis on drugs over at least the period from 2015-2018 than 
most of the reforms proposed by the Afghan government, IMF, and Work Bank will 
actually be implemented. 
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Figure 27: Afghanistan as a Narco-Nation – Part One 
SIGAR Estimate of Key Trends in Cultivation and Effectiveness of Eradication 
 
 
Source: SIGAR, Quarterly Report, October 30, 2014, pp. 6, 10, 
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Figure 27: Afghanistan as a Narco-Nation – Part Two 
World Bank Estimate of Key Trends in Cultivation and Opium Output 
 
World Bank, Afghanistan: Economic Update. The World Bank, 91691, October 2014, p. 4   
 
IMF Estimate of Comparative Value of Opium versus Non-Opium Exports 
 
Source: ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN. 2014 ARTICLE IV CONSULTATION—STAFF REPORT; PRESS RELEASE; 
AND STATEMENT BY THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTORFOR THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN, 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2014/cr14128.pdf, p. 35 
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A Major Trade Deficit and No Miracles from a “New 
Silk Road” or Mineral Extraction 
Afghanistan also has a massive trade deficit – at least as measured in terms of the non-
narcotics aspect of its economy. This deficit is summarized in Figure 28. It has not been 
critical in the past because of the volume of outside military spending and aid. However, 
the downward trend in imports in 2013 shown in Figure 28 warns it could become a very 
serious problem if aid is not sustained or delivered on time, and it is difficult to see how 
Afghanistan could both begin to make a major reduction in its deficit and sustain its 
economy and security efforts before it can find a major new source of exports like mines 
or petroleum – developments unlikely to have a major impact before 2020. 
Neither the World Bank nor IMF see any form of “New Silk Road” as having a significant 
near-term impact on the Afghan economy. Moreover, the efforts to create an Afghan “ring 
road” to meet even Afghan needs now present steadily growing maintenance and security 
problems. SIGAR reporting notes that:113 
Afghanistan’s lack of transportation infrastructure hinders internal commerce, foreign trade, and 
economic growth. The World Bank said restoring the transportation sector is imperative for 
economic development. Afghanistan’s infrastructure shortcomings particularly constrain the service 
and agriculture sectors, currently the leading contributors to GDP. They also hold back the mining 
industry, whose future revenues the Afghan government and international donor community are 
counting on to offset declining aid. This quarter, the United States continued its efforts to assist 
Afghanistan in developing ministry capacity, sustaining operations and maintenance, and complying 
with international Standards.  
…While the United States has provided $2.2 billion cumulatively for road construction and O&M 
and currently spends about $5 million annually for O&M efforts, the World Bank said 85% of 
Afghan roads are in poor shape and a majority cannot be used by motor vehicles.  Afghanistan does 
not currently have sufficient funding and technical capacity to maintain its roads and highways, 
according to the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT). Moreover, the lack of a functioning 
roads authority has significantly affected road infrastructure across Afghanistan. Although the 
Cabinet and the President gave approval in August 2013 for the Ministry of Public Works (MOPW) 
to create a roads authority and road fund, the authority has not yet been established 
SIGAR reporting sums up what seems to be a similar consensus on the prospects for mines 
and mineral extraction,114 
The United States, the Afghan government, and the international donor community count on 
development of Afghanistan’s natural resources to underpin future economic growth in the face of 
declining external aid. Although mining has contributed less than 2% to the country’s GDP to date, 
the Afghan government expects to eventually receive significant revenues from large-scale 
investments in the Aynak (copper) and Hajigak (iron-ore)mines, and from oil and gas fields in the 
Afghan-Tajik basin. 
 The World Bank estimates annual extractive-sector revenues could reach between $0.7 billion and 
$1.5 billion by 2022–2024….8\ However, the United States Institute for Peace warned that revenue 
projections from mineral extraction are often difficult to make with any accuracy, given commodity-
price fluctuations and uncertainty whether identified resources can be fully extracted. Moreover, the 
government will not necessarily receive the full value of Afghanistan’s mineral wealth in revenues. 
SIGAR has long cautioned that the Afghan government may not be able to earn substantial revenues 
from Afghanistan’s natural resources any time soon because of the considerable infrastructure 
investment required to develop them, especially given the difficult security environment. In addition, 
the Revenue Watch Institute gave Afghanistan a failing grade in 2013 for its minimal oversight of 
the mining-licensing process and of state-owned mining companies. It said lawmakers do not 
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receive, regular reports on licensing decisions, which cannot be appealed, and are denied access to 
certain major mining contracts deemed confidential. 
Allegations that members of the executive and legislative branches benefit from contracts won by 
relatives cannot be confirmed; Afghanistan’s Audit and Control Office does not specifically review 
resource revenues, and the reports it does prepare are not published. An Integrity Watch Afghanistan 
report this quarter compared Afghanistan’s governance of its mining-industry to best practices in 
six countries in order to help highlight Afghanistan’s opportunities and challenges. 
It found that corruption is a major investor concern in Afghanistan, and that mining-sector 
transparency—in licensing process, tax and royalty data, distribution of funds, and public access to 
information—along with good governance were essential to sustainable development that benefits 
the public. 
Figure 28: The Afghan Trade Deficit 
 
Source: ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN. 2014 ARTICLE IV CONSULTATION—STAFF REPORT; PRESS RELEASE; 
AND STATEMENT BY THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTORFOR THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN, 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2014/cr14128.pdf, p. 33.   
Economic Reform and the Need for Aid 
The need for economic reform is all too clear, and Figure 29 shows it affects the need to 
remove key barriers to private sector investment, as well as all of the other problems that 
have already been listed. Ashraf Ghani, the World Bank, the IMF, and the donors at the 
London Conference have all called for Afghan economic reform and for improved efforts 
at Afghan revenue collection.   
Such steps, however, will take years to have a major impact and require an effective Afghan 
government to be in place. Here, some of the World Bank and IMF estimates that correctly 
assess the country’s problems but then go on to make unrealistic assessments of what an 
Afghan government can do during wartime need to be kept in careful perspective.  “Best 
cases” in reform– even defined in real world terms as the more limited effort possible in 
an “Afghan good enough” scenario – are improbable possibilities and not probabilities.  
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As Chapter III has shown, Afghanistan will still require major amounts of outside aid well 
beyond 2020 if the war continues. The gap between Afghan government revenues and 
expenditures discussed in Chapter III has shown the real world limits of what Afghanistan 
can do on its own. SIGAR estimates that Afghanistan’s domestic revenues for the Afghan 
FY 1392 (December 21, 2012–December 20, 2013) missed Ministry of Finance budget 
targets by 11.9%. Domestic revenues paid for only 37% ($2 billion) of Afghanistan’s total 
budget expenditures ($5.4 billion) in FY 1392; donor grants covered the remainder.”115 
A World Bank presentation at the London Conference -- that was held in early December 
2014 -- focused on Afghan reform also concluded, however, that even if all the right 
measures were taken, and Afghanistan could average 5% economic growth, the financing 
gap between government revenues and spending would still remain series through 2025. 
In the short term, “revenues might only rise to 12.8% of GDP in 2018 (lower than prior 
projection of 14% of GDP for 2018).116  
As a result, the major source of economic stability during the critical period between 2015 
and 2017, must be the volume of aid and its actual impact on the Afghan economy. This 
aid will be necessary to support the Afghan security forces, the ease the Afghan budget 
deficit, and to limit any recession. 
Providing the needed amount of aid will not be an easy sell. The US and its allies have 
already funded both the vast majority of Afghan reconstruction and development efforts 
with what the World Bank has assessed was marginal success in a country it sees as 
extremely corrupt, badly governed, and still largely reliant on agriculture in areas 
unaffected by aid and outside spending.117 
 In the case of the US, the US government has never issued an official estimate of the cost 
of the war, but Amy Belasco of the Congressional Research Service has estimated that the 
U.S. spent $557.1 billion on the Afghan War as of FY 2011. Later requests for OCO 
funding totaled $254 billion between FY2012 the FY2015 budget request, for a total of 
$811.1 billion. In the process, the US alone appropriated approximately $103.2 billion in 
reconstruction aid through FY2014, and still budgeted $6.5 billion in civil and military aid 
in FY2014.  
Some cuts have already taken place in US aid spending. SIGAR reported at the end of July 
2014 that US aid would drop from a total appropriation of $6,417 million in FY2014 to 
$5,827 in FY2015. The money available to the Afghan security forces was cut from about 
$5.2 billion to $4.4 billion, although economic and governance aid rose from $852 million 
to $1.2 billion. Many other categories of aid were largely eliminated and counternarcotics 
funding was cut by more than 50%.118 
Getting the required aid will be almost certainly be impossible if Afghanistan cannot 
achieve stable political leadership and more effective governance. It will be equally hard, 
however, without effective plans, management, and coordination of the aid effort.  
The US and other donors pledged at the London Conference to keep up a flow of military 
and civil aid after 2014, but there are no plans and reports that show the level of aid needed, 
how aid money would be spent and managed, what measures of effectiveness can be 
developed and reported, and that explore what would happen if the fighting continued to 
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serious intensity or Afghanistan faced a truly serious economic crisis after 2014-2105, as 
past aid money and military spending ran out. 
Both the Afghan government and donors also need some form of international help in 
planning, coordinating, managing, auditing and evaluating Afghan needs and making the 
aid effort effective. The UN created the UN Aid Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) to 
perform these tasks, and made it, “responsible for the direction and oversight of all UN 
relief, recovery and reconstruction activities in Afghanistan. One of the main functions of 
UNAMA’s Aid Coherence Unit is to coordinate the humanitarian development activities 
of UN agencies and to promote aid effectiveness and good development practice.  
The UN Secretary-General's reports to the Security Council provide an update on the 
implementation of the Kabul Process and aid coherence, and humanitarian assistance.”119  
In practice, UNAMA did a great deal of useful work in political and security areas, but 
never got the cooperation from donor countries or from the Afghan government to play a 
role in actually planning and coordinating aid, and never published plans and detailed 
reports on aid or its effectiveness. This will not be an effective approach to dealing with 
aid in the future, and it strongly argues that the World Bank rather than the UN could do a 
better job. 
So far, the closest thing to a real world plan for dealing with the civil elements of Transition 
are World Bank reports like the one on the Islamic State of Afghanistan: Pathways to 
Inclusive Growth, but this report can only have meaning if the World Bank and Afghan 
government can find a meaningful path to cooperate and implement it.120  
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Figure 29: World Bank Ranking of Ease of Doing Business 
in Afghanistan 
(Afghanistan ranks only 164th out of 189 Countries) 
 
 
 
World Bank, Doing Business in Afghanistan, http://www.doingbusiness.org/data/exploreeconomies/afghanistan/.  
 
Developing Effective Conditions-Based Aid  
If there is feasible policy recommendation for dealing with the economic threat in the near 
term, it is that the US needs to apply the same conditions-based approach to civil aid that 
it needs to provide to military support.  However, the US cannot and should not issue a 
blank check, or repeat the same lack of planning and effective management that aid has 
had up to date. It needs  to convince the American people, the Congress, and key allies that 
an effective mix of civil and military  aid, and  an adequate US military presence – is 
affordable, will be used effectively and with reasonable honesty, and that Afghanistan has 
sufficient strategic value to justify the required level of effort.  
This requires a level of objectivity, honesty, transparency, credible planning, and risk-
benefit analysis that US has failed to develop since 2001, and failed to provide in Vietnam, 
the Balkans, and Iraq.  
It also requires a successful resolution to the divisive mess that has emerged out of the 
Afghan election, a credible degree of national unity, and Afghan leadership that is 
interested in meaningful leadership rather than power brokering and corruption. No case 
can be made for reversing current US policy without a shift in the quality of Afghan 
governance that now seems all too improbable. 
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As noted earlier, Afghanistan has not yet shown itself to be a meaningful partner in terms 
of effective leadership and unity. Afghanistan has not set forth meaningful plans for future 
aid needs for either maintaining economic stability or moving towards post-Transition 
economic stability development that it can show it can implement or fund. It has not shown 
it can reduce corruption to acceptable levels or provide the quality of governance needed 
to become the “other half” of an effective counterinsurgency effort. 
Afghan leaders must take ultimate responsibility for both the success and failure of Afghan 
governance, security and civil programs, and do so with the clear understanding that the 
US commitment to Afghanistan will be steadily more dependent on their competence and 
integrity, and that Afghanistan is of limited strategic importance to the US. While no US 
political leader can openly say so, the risk of some form of Afghan failure now seems 
acceptable if Afghan leaders fail. 
Much depends on the new Afghan President, the future degree of Afghan unity, how well 
Afghan forces do as US advisors phase down below a critical minimum in 2015, and 
whether Afghanistan proves able to deal with the economic impact of the coming cuts in 
aid and military spending.  
At the same time, the US and its allies need to do more, and present clearly defined, 
practical, and fundable plans for providing the military and civil aid. They need to provide 
far more transparency with far more integrity. They need to develop a more functional 
organization to shape and coordinate aid and development. Most of all, the US needs to 
recognize that it cannot succeed in Afghanistan if the level and duration of its military 
advisory effort is so limited. 
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VII. Regional Threats: The Uncertain Impact of Pakistan   
Throughout the Afghan conflict, Pakistan has been a classic example of the fact that the 
“threat” posed by allies and regional powers can be as serious as the “threat” posed by the 
host country. The polite rhetoric of alliance is rarely the reality. Ever since 2001, the US 
and Pakistan have been caught up in the tensions caused by the fact that they have had 
different objectives in Afghanistan and the region, and by the tensions caused by Pakistan’s 
tolerance of Taliban, Haqqani Network, and Al Qaeda sanctuaries in Pakistan. While public 
opinion polls show that many Pakistanis see the US as more of a threat than India, the 
private US official view of Pakistan is equally negative. 
The US has seen Pakistan as a deeply divided and unstable country whose economy and 
social infrastructure have made it drift towards the status of a failed state, and whose 
military has kept its link to Afghan insurgent groups and  had presented the a constant 
threat of taking power. While Pakistan did made a peaceful transition to civilian political 
in a democratic election in May 2013, that election led to divisive and nearly paralyzing 
political tensions between Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif as two opposing political leaders 
-- Imran Khan and Tahir ul-Qadri –sought to push him out of power. 
Some aspects of this situation may be changing. Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif was able to 
survive the immediate political threat posed by Imran Khan and Tahir ul-Qadri. Sharif’s 
attempts to negotiate with the Pakistani Taliban failed.  and Pakistan acquired a new Chief 
of Staff – General Raheel Sharif – who took the extremist threat to Pakistan far more 
seriously than his predecessor. The Pakistani Army began to conducted steadily more 
intensive counterinsurgency campaigns in the areas where the Pakistani Talban operated 
in western Pakistan. And, Pakistani and Afghan relations seemed to improve after the 
election of President Ghani and his discussions with Sharif.   
This Pakistani decision to deal more realistically with it own terrorist and extremist threat 
was reinforced by a national tragedy. The Pakistani Taliban, or Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan 
(TTP), did much to alienate the nation’s civil and military leaders and public when it 
launched a bloody attack on a military school in Peshawar on December 16, 2014. The 
attack that killed over 145 people, most of which were young students.  
As a result, Prime Minister Sharif and General Raheel Sharif, sharply stepped up Pakistani 
counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism activity against the Pakistani Taliban, and did so 
while requesting at least some support from US UCAVs. They reached out to Afghanistan, 
talked about securing the Durand line zone without focusing on past border disputes, and 
signaled India that Pakistan would put more emphasis on internal security and less 
emphasis on India. 
It is still not clear, however, that the Pakistani government will launch a major campaign 
against Afghan insurgents, or deny Al Qaeda, the Afghan Taliban, or other insurgent 
groups like the Haqqani Network de facto sanctuary in Pakistan. As of the end of December, 
the Pakistani government  had not taken any steps to suppress the Quetta Taliban – the 
center of the Taliban’s operations and probable residence of its leader Sheik Omar in 
Pakistan.  
It also is not clear how much Pakistani and Afghan relations will really improve, or lead to 
real military cooperation in their border area. It is not clear how much Pakistan and US 
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relations will improve on any lasting basis. And, it is not clear how Indian and Pakistan 
rivalry for influence in Afghanistan will play out. Furthermore, is not clear how well 
Pakistan can deal with the broader threat of violence through much of the country.  
Pakistan’s politics remain uncertain, and its government has has so far done little to 
improve the life of most of its people. 
Strategic Differences 
The US and Pakistan do have common interests, but they also have important differences 
in their strategic objectives. Both countries saw a common need to support the Afghan 
resistance against the Soviet Union after the Soviet invasion, although Pakistan’s military 
also saw this as an opportunity to strengthen Pakistani influence, secure what Pakistan 
regarded as its rear area against India, reduce any problems over its disputed border with 
Afghanistan, and support its then Chief of Staff, General Zia’s interest in aiding Islamist 
extremist elements in Afghanistan. The US, in contrast, focused on weakening the Soviet 
Union and reducing the threat it might pose to the Gulf. 
Similar Pakistani strategic interests have affected Pakistani relations with Afghanistan ever 
since, and led to serious differences with a US that has given priority to defeating the 
Taliban and Afghan security and stability, while Pakistan has focused on its perceived local 
and regional strategic interests. These differences have been compounded by Pakistan’s 
past shift to military dictatorship, support of Islamist extremist terrorists in operation 
against India, focus on preparing for another conflict with India rather that dealing with its 
internal threats and problems, and the growing risks the US sees in the Pakistani-India 
nuclear and missile arms race. 
Before 9/11 and the start of the US military intervention in Afghanistan, Pakistan was a 
key supporter of the Afghan Taliban. Its key military intelligence and special operations 
center – the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI branch – established close relations with both 
the Taliban and relations with Al Qaeda once Bin Laden relocated to Afghanistan. 
Pakistan’s then military dictator, Pervez Musharraf, was a top army officer who had 
toppled Pakistan’s then Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif in a military coup d'état in 1999. 
Pakistan only agreed to support the US against the Taliban in 2001 after senior US officials 
effectively warned him that Pakistan would either side with the US or be seen as against it. 
The end result was the shell of an alliance where the US provided Pakistan with a massive 
aid package in return for military cooperation, overflight rights, and land transit for the 
supply of US and ISAF forces in Afghanistan.  
Pakistan’s military cooperation was always limited, and it used aid provided to deal with 
the Taliban threat to build up its capabilities with India. It came to treat Indian influence in 
Afghanistan as a major threat to Pakistan’s “rear area,” and gave the Taliban de facto 
sanctuaries and training areas in Pakistan while it at least tolerated significant command, 
propaganda, and fund raising operations by Al Qaeda central from within Pakistan. 
This led to serious tension between the supposed “allies” on a number of occasions in the 
years that followed. The situation only marginally improved when Musharraf fell from 
power, following the assassination of Benazir Bhutto in December 2007, and the election 
of her husband –Asif Ali Zardari -- as Prime Minister. Pakistan’s deeply divided politics 
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limited what the government could do from 2007-2014, and the fact it had real elections 
did not cripple the power of its military.  
Pakistan’s Chief of Staff during this period, General Ashfaq Pervaiz Kayani – who first 
came to power in 2007 -- did not attempt to change Pakistan’s strategic priorities. He did 
not challenge the Afghan insurgents based in Pakistan, or limit the role of the ISI in 
intervening in Pakistan.  
The end result was that the US and Pakistan continued to issue the public rhetoric of 
alliance while actual relations deteriorated. There were clashes over security in the border 
area, and continuing Pakistani ties to Afghan insurgents. There were tensions over the US 
raid that killed Bin Laden and US UCAV strikers, tensions over the size and use of US aid, 
and occasional Pakistani suppression of ISAF use of its land supply routes to put pressure 
on the US.  
This had a powerful impact on the public opinion in both nations. A BBC World Service 
Poll in 2014 found that, “16% of Pakistanis view U.S. influence positively, with 61% 
expressing a negative view, while 5% of Americans view Pakistan's influence positively, 
with 85% expressing a negative view, the most negative perception of Pakistan in the 
world.”121 
As noted earlier, however, Pakistan and US relations have improved since Nawaz Sharif 
became Prime Minister on June 5, 2013. Senior US officers and officials also feel that 
General Raheel Sharif, who replaced Kayani as Chief of Staff on November 27, 2013, has 
been more forthcoming and focused on the internal threats Pakistan faces and the need to 
secure Pakistan’s border areas with Afghanistan than his predecessors. 
A Rising Tide of Internal Violence 
Nevertheless, differing strategic interests, the Pakistani military and ISI’s role in 
Afghanistan, and Pakistan’s divisive and dysfunctional politics are only part of the problem 
that now shapes the Pakistani “threat.” It is not clear that Pakistan has abandoned the use 
of proxy extremist and terrorist groups in trying to pressure India over Kashmir, and its 
weak governance and uncertain development have triggered considerable internal 
instability and violence.  
The annual US State Department Country Reports on Terrorism issued in April 2014 
reported that Pakistan was making efforts to improve its counterterrorism programs but 
that no progress had been made in reduced the rising level of violence in 2013.122 
In 2013, Pakistan continued to confront terrorist groups, including al-Qa’ida (AQ), Tehrik-e Taliban 
Pakistan (TTP), the Punjabi Taliban, and Lashkar I Jhangvi (LJ), all of whom mounted attacks 
against police, military and security forces, or engaged in sectarian violence and criminal activities 
against all sectors of society. Pakistan did not confront Lashkare-Tayyiba, however, who continued 
to operate, rally, and fundraise in Pakistan with its front organizations.  
…In 2013, terrorists used remote-controlled improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in bicycles, 
motorcycles, parked cars, rickshaws, donkey carts, and alongside roads, used vehicle-borne IEDs, 
suicide bombers (including females), targeted assassinations, rocket-propelled grenades, and other 
armed combat tactics in attacks on mosques, churches, markets, journalists, aid workers, 
government institutions and officials. AQ and HQN continued to plot against U.S. interests in the 
region, including U.S. diplomatic facilities. TTP posed a threat to both U.S. and Pakistani interests, 
and carried out numerous attacks against Pakistani armed forces, Pakistani civilians, and 
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government institutions.  
The May 2013 national elections brought in new civilian leadership, which was reviewing a new 
counterterrorism strategy at year’s end. In the pre-election period, some terrorist groups forged 
alliances with certain political parties, including religiously-based political parties. Some violent 
extremists conducted election-related terrorist attacks against political parties, candidates, and 
government officials. Pakistan’s government has pursued negotiations with TTP while also targeting 
the group militarily. Pakistan continued to support the Afghan peace process.  
Karachi continued to suffer from political and ethnic violence inflicted by different groups, 
including militant organizations, fundamentalist religious groups, and the militant wings of political 
parties. Some militant groups worked to assert control over political parties and criminal gangs 
operating in the city and surrounding areas of southern Sindh. The security situation in Karachi was 
a priority concern for Pakistan’s president, prime minister, parliament, Supreme Court, and the 
military and law enforcement agencies.  
…During 2013, terrorist groups targeted the Pakistani government and military, engaged in 
sectarian violence, and perpetrated attacks against civilians. Terrorists organized armed assaults on 
police stations, judicial centers, border check posts, military convoys, and polio vaccination teams. 
Terrorists plotted against and attacked judges, prosecutors, police officers, defense lawyers, anti-
TTP peace committee members, intelligence officers, and elected officials. In the months leading 
up to the May national elections, terrorists attacked and killed political party workers and candidates, 
bombed political rallies, and, after the elections, killed newly elected and appointed officials. 
Terrorists mounted an armed attack on a Pakistan military and Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) 
office in Sukkur, and days later stormed a major prison, releasing several dozen imprisoned high-
profile terrorists.  
In separate incidents, terrorists assassinated a high-ranking Army general in the tribal areas, the 
Karachi Chief of Police, and the president’s chief of security. Terrorists targeted Shia and other 
religious minorities in all areas of Pakistan, especially in Sindh, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP), and 
Balochistan. Terrorists killed an international team of mountain climbers, including one U.S. citizen, 
on Pakistan’s famed Nanga Parbat Mountain.  
As of mid-December, over 1,025 civilians and more than 475 security forces personnel had been 
killed in terrorist-related incidents in Pakistan during the year. The presence of AQ, TTP, and other 
militant groups continues to pose a threat to U.S. citizens throughout Pakistan. The TTP claimed 
responsibility for the majority of the frequent attacks that targeted civilians and security personnel. 
Terrorist incidents occurred in every province.   
Pakistan not only faces a threat from its Taliban, but broader threat of violence from a wide 
mix of extremist and separatist groups. The terrorism data base attached to the State 
Department report showed a sharp rise in in the number of terrorism incidents in Pakistan 
from 2005 onwards and nearly vertical rise from 2010 to 2013, rising from less than 800 
incidents in 2010 to nearly 2,300 in 2014.123  
There are serious uncertainties in all terrorism statistics, and changes in the management 
of the database, and reporting made it difficult to make some of the comparisons provided 
in the text of the 2013 and previous year’s report. Figure 30 does show, however, that the 
2013 report found Pakistan to be the second most violent of the ten countries, with the 
second highest level of terrorist attacks in the world. Pakistan had 1,404 attacks in 2012, 
with 1,848 killed, and 3,463 wounded. It had 1,920 attacks in 2013, with 2,315 killed, and 
4,989 wounded. Only Iraq had more casualties, and attacks: Iraq had 2,495 attacks in 2013, 
and Afghanistan had 1,144 attacks. No other country exceeded 1,000, India was the fourth 
ranking country and had only 622 attacks.124   
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The State Department country profile for Pakistan in the 2013 report, -- which was issued 
in April 2014 and which does not count the rise in violent terrorist killings in 2014 --notes 
that:125 
 The total number of terrorist attacks reported in Pakistan increased 36.8 percent between 2012 and 
2013. Fatalities increased 25.3 percent and injuries increased 36.9 percent. 
 The Tehrik-i-Taliban ranked as the fifth most violent terrorism group in the world in 2013, with 134 
attacks and 589 killed.,  
 No specific perpetrator organization was identified for 86.2 percent of all attacks in Pakistan. Of the 
remaining attacks, nearly half (49%) were carried out by the Tehrik-i- Taliban Pakistan (TTP). 
Attacks attributed to the TTP killed more than 550 and wounded more than 1,200 in 2013. 
 Twenty other groups, including a number of Baloch nationalist groups such as the Baloch 
Republican Army, the Baloch Liberation Army, the Baloch Liberation Front, and the Baloch 
Liberation Tigers, carried out attacks in Pakistan, particularly in Baluchistan. 
 More than 37 percent of all attacks in Pakistan took place in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province, 28.4 
percent took place in Baluchistan, and 21.2 percent took place in Sindh province. The proportion of 
attacks in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) decreased from 19.6 percent in 2012 to 
9.4 percent in 2013. 
 The most frequently attacked types of targets in Pakistan were consistent with global patterns. More 
than 22 percent of all attacks primarily targeted private citizens and property, more than 17 percent 
primarily targeted the police, and more than 11 percent primarily targeted general (non-diplomatic) 
government entities. 
 However, these three types of targets accounted for a smaller proportion of attacks in Pakistan 
(51.1%) than they did globally (61.7%). Instead, terrorist attacks in Pakistan were almost twice as 
likely to target educational institutions (6.4%) and more than three times as likely to target violent 
political parties (4.4%), organizations that have at times engaged in both electoral politics and 
terrorist violence 
Independent analysts see the same trends. A study by Saira Yamin and Salma Malik of the 
US Institute for Peace found the patterns of violence that are shown in the Second Part of 
Figure 30. They concluded that:126 
 Over the past decade, Pakistan has experienced a significant rise in violence in terms of frequency, 
scope, and magnitude. The origins and intensity of violence vary regionally and involve both 
longstanding conflict actors and new groups. 
 Violence is most concentrated along the Afghan border in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas 
(FATA) and the province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP). Other regions of Pakistan lying along the 
border with Afghanistan, including Baluchistan and Gilgit Baltistan, have also experienced a 
significant escalation in violence. This escalation is in part a result of the nexus between sectarian 
militants and terrorist outfits. 
 In Sindh, most of the violence is concentrated in Karachi, which witnessed a tenfold increase in 
violence between 2006 and 2013. _The security landscape there has become increasingly complex 
over the years with the addition of many types of actors, including sectarian militant groups, terrorist 
outfits, political parties, and criminal gangs. 
 The scale, scope, and magnitude of violence in Baluchistan, the largest province in Pakistan in terms 
of territory, remain unprecedented and unabated. Sectarian and terrorist activities targeting the Shia 
Hazara community have compounded the effects of a high intensity conflict between a secessionist 
insurgency and the military that has been under way in the province since 2006. Baluchistan also 
provides safe haven to the Quetta Shura, a key Afghan Taliban group headed by Mullah Omar. 
 For the past decade, Punjab has experienced the least violence of any province in Pakistan. However, 
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the province is increasingly a breeding ground for terrorist and militant recruits engaged in violence 
in other regions. 
 Given the diverse and broad spectrum of conflicts affecting Pakistan, it is important to analyze and 
address each conflict in its own context and plan for comprehensive states stabilization and peace 
building processes entailing both short and long-term measures. 
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Figure 30: The Broadening Patterns of Internal Violence in 
Pakistan – Part One 
 
State Department Estimate of Ten Countries with Most Terrorist Attacks: State Department 
Statistical Annex for 2013 
 
  
Bureau of Counterterrorism, Statistical Annex, Country Reports on Terrorism 2013, US State Department, 
April 2014, pp. 4. For trend graph through 2013, see  
http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?chart=overtime&search=Pakistan. 
 
State Department Data Annex Trend Analysis of Pakistani Terrorist Incidents 
 
GTD, Global terrorism Data Base, “Pakistan,” 
http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?chart=overtime&search=Pakistan. 
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Figure 30: The Broadening Patterns of Internal Violence in 
Pakistan – Part Two 
State Department Data Annex Trend Analysis of Perpetrators of Pakistani Terrorist 
Incidents 
 
GTD, Global terrorism Data Base, “Pakistan,” 
http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?chart=overtime&search=Pakistan. 
USIP Map of Terrorist Incidents 
 
http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/PW93-Mapping_Conflict_Trends_in_Pakistan.pdf 
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An Ally that Has Also Been a Threat 
While US officials, officers, and experts will not say so publically, many have seen 
Pakistan as much as of a threat as an ally for most of the conflict in Afghanistan.. Many 
US officers and officials who have worked on Pakistan privately see Pakistan as a country 
whose military refused to take advantage of US efforts to help it in counterinsurgency 
warfare, and whose military is still committed to aiding Islamist extremist elements that 
threaten Afghanistan and Pakistan while increasingly fighting a domestic Islamist threat it 
has done much to generate.  
They have seen Pakistan create a de facto sanctuary for the Taliban and Haqqani Network, 
somehow fail to detect Bin Laden’s presence near a key military base, and be “unable” to 
find Omar and the headquarters of the Taliban in Quetta. They do not believe that Pakistan 
made serious efforts to find Bin Laden, deal with the Al Qaeda presence on its soil, limit 
the flow of arms and volunteers into Afghanistan, capture or expel the Quetta Taliban, or 
conduct counterinsurgency campaigns that were not limited to threats against Pakistan.  
They have equally little tolerance for Pakistani arguments that the US has illegally attacked 
targets in Pakistan territory. Nations must either secure their territory and borders or see 
outside states counter the enemy forces on their soil. Pakistan did not secure its borders or 
deny the Afghan Taliban and Haqqani Network effective sanctuaries on its territory. 
At the same time, US officials note that Pakistan often publically attacked the US for the 
UCAV strikes shown in Figure 31, and did so even in those cases where they were targeted 
against extremist that were hostile to the Pakistan government and Pakistan had provided 
some of the targeting data. Pakistani officials and officers criticized the US for acting when 
Pakistan lacked the capacity or will to act on its own, and when the strikes targeted 
extremist elements threatening Afghanistan that the Pakistani government claimed it did 
not tolerate or support.  
Figure 31: US Air and UCAV Strikes in Pakistan, Yemen, 
and Somalia: 2002-9/2014 
Country      2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008  2009  2010  2011  2012  2013  to 9/2014 
Pakistan - - 1 2 3 5 35 53 117 64 46 28 7 
Yemen 1 - - - - - - 2 4 10 41 26 16  
Somalia - - - - - 3 2 1 - 1 1 1 2 
Source: The Long War Journal and New York Times, September 12, 2014, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/12/world/middleeast/us-pins-hope-on-syrian-rebels-with-loyalties-all-
over-the-map.html?smprod=nytcore-ipad&smid=nytcore-ipad-share. 
US officials and officers have seen Pakistan’s claims to having fought Islamic extremists 
and insurgents as having focused almost exclusively on insurgents that threatened Pakistan, 
while tolerating the presence of Al Qaeda leaders like Bin Laden, and the Afghan leaders, 
cadres, training camps and bases of Afghan insurgents. They have seen see the ISI as a 
threat that encouraged the Pakistani military to support Afghan insurgents. and not as an 
ally. (It is interesting to note that Chinese experts also came to see the ISI as a major 
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problem in allowing the training of Islamic extremist from China to take place in 
Pakistan.127) 
Tensions between the US and Pakistan approached an open break in 2011, when Admiral 
Mike Mullen, then Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs, publicly described the Haqqani 
network as “a veritable arm” of the ISI.128 No currently serving US senior official or 
official has publically gone so far making such charges, or as Carlotta Gall has in The 
Wrong Enemy, but several privately make it clear that they do not regard Pakistan as a 
meaningful ally and see its conduct as having sustained the threat in Afghanistan. It is also 
interesting to note that Chinese experts now see ISIS as a major problem in allowing the 
training of Islamic extremist from China to take place in Pakistan.129 
It also helps explain why there has been little – if any – past real world US tolerance of 
Pakistani arguments that the US has somehow failed to support a Pakistan making 
sacrifices for the US. The US sees Pakistan as serving its own interests in ways that have 
ended in supporting Islamic extremism and making the war in Afghanistan far worse. A 
CRS report issued in 2013 reflected the private views of many US officials in noting that, 
“Pentagon officials have for some time been frustrated by the allegedly feckless 
counterinsurgency efforts of the internally squabbling Islamabad government.  
A Movement Towards Real Alliance? 
As noted earlier, the election of Nawaz Sharif as Prime Minister, and selection of General 
Raheel Sharif as Chief of Staff did change some of these perceptions during 2014. The new 
Pakistani military campaign in the FATA area was far more serious, and had some US 
intelligence aid and support in the form of drone strikes. However, the campaign also had 
had uncertain execution and success.  
Pakistan military operations sometimes simply displaced Taliban and Afghan insurgent 
elements rather than really defeated them, and also turned many civilians into IDPs. Several 
US experts  still felt the Pakistani military has been far too slow to shift away from a 
conventional war strategy focused on India, and has focused on a rising nuclear and missile 
arms race at a time it badly needs United States assistance in reorienting its army for 
counterinsurgency efforts.130  
Many Afghan officials and officers were more negative. They saw the Pakistani campaign 
as having pushed some insurgents back into Afghanistan, making things worse in 
Afghanistan’s troubled east, and see Pakistan as likely to launch growing efforts to control 
the region once the US leaves.  
President Karzai raised such charges to ridiculous extremes as he left office in September 
2014. He accused both Pakistan and the US as being the cause of the fighting in 
Afghanistan, “One of the reasons was that the Americans did not want peace because they 
had their own agenda and objectives…Today, I tell you again that the war in Afghanistan 
is not our war, but imposed on us and we are the victims…No peace will arrive unless the 
US or Pakistan want it.” He also had his National Security Council publically say that 
Pakistan was deliberating pushing fighters out of the FATA and to attack Afghan 
government targets in a de facto “declaration of war.”131  
These words ignored the positive trends in Pakistan, which continued during the fall of 
2014.. Karzai’s statement came only days after the new Pakistani military chief, Gen. 
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Raheel Sharif, had made Lt. Gen. Rizwan Akhtar, a close ally the new head of the Inter-
Services Intelligence agency. Akhtar had a reputation as a strong opponent of Islamist 
extremist forces and had led the paramilitary Sindh Rangers. He was to replace Lt. Gen. 
Zaheer ul-Islam, who had headed the ISI since 2012, and was a sign that the Army 
recognized at least some of the problems in the ISI. 132 
There was at least some truth, however, in the charges made at roughly the same time by 
figures like Mohammad Umer Daudzai, the Afghan Minister of the Interior. Daudzai stated 
that, “We know they have not given up their dream of controlling Afghanistan…They want 
Afghanistan to be their satellite.”  He spoke at a time when Afghanistan had already lost 
some 2,000 soldiers and police in the previous year – roughly twice the total in the same 
period in 2013. While some of these losses came as a result of the US and ISAF withdrawal, 
others were killed in the border area and Afghan intelligence officers felt that Pakistan’s 
ISI and Army had sent in Advisors and commandos to train and aid the Taliban and 
Haqqani fighters. 133  
It was also clear from a wide range of media sources that the campaign that Pakistan started 
in the Waziristan area in June 2014 pushed both Pakistani and foreign fighters across the 
border – including Maulana Fazlullah, the commander of the Pakistani Taliban. While 
Pakistan accused Afghanistan of becoming a sanctuary for the Pakistani Taliban, Pakistani 
officers knew all too well that Afghan forces could not secure the border area.  
Pakistani forces did not then try to secure the border, and had fired extensively into 
Afghanistan to push fighters out of Pakistan. They still failed to limit the operations of Al 
Qaeda central in Pakistan, check the operations of the Haqqani network, or those of 
Mohammed Omar, the head of the Afghan Taliban. 134  Few US experts doubted that 
Ayman al-Zawahiri, the head of Al Qaeda “central” operated out of Pakistan, and he raised 
new questions about the Pakistani ties to al Qaeda when he announced a new Al Qaeda 
affiliate in India in September 2014. 135 
Once again, however, things may be changing. President Ashraf Ghani took a far a more 
positive approach to Pakistan than Karzai. He visited Islamabad in mid-November 2014, 
after Pakistan’s acting foreign minister, army chief and the head of the ISI had visited 
Kabul to deliver “messages of support and cooperation.”136 Both Afghanistan and Pakistan 
then emphasized options for cooperation rather than tensions between them, although 
Ghani still made it clear at a November 26, 2014 meeting of South Asian leaders in 
Kathmandu that “"We will not permit anybody (India and Pakistan) to conduct proxy wars 
on our soil."137   
Much still depends of how serious Pakistan really is in making improvements in Pakistani 
and Afghan relations that ignores past disputes of the border and the Durand line, and 
focusing on both countries’ real security needs. Once again, the horrifying Pakistani 
Taliban, or Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), attack on a military school in Peshawar that 
killed 145 students may be a catalyst in achieving such a goal, along with Ghani’s 
pragmatism.  As of the end of December 2014, however, it was still far too early to tell.  
Bribery Rather than True Alliance 
Much will also depend on the size and nature of future US aid, and the US motives behind 
granting such aid. Until recently, many American officials and officers had come to see 
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US aid to Pakistan has come to be seen in the US as a necessary bribe to keep overflight 
and land transit rights – a bribe that totaled some $26 billion in appropriations by the time 
of Transition.  
They also felt that far too much of this aid has not gone to counter-insurgency and counter-
terrorism forces, but has been used to build up Pakistani conventional warfare capabilities 
against India at a time when the steady increase in the nuclear armed missile forces on both 
sides, and steady increases in the number of Pakistani tactical nuclear weapons are sharply 
increasing the risks and costs of any future war.  
As a Congressional Research Service report notes,138  
The Defense Department has characterized F-16 fighters, P-3C patrol aircraft, and anti-armor 
missiles as having significant anti-terrorism applications. The State Department has claimed that, 
since 2005, FMF funds have been “solely for counterterrorism efforts, broadly defined.”54 Such 
claims elicit skepticism from some observers, and analysts who emphasize the importance of 
strengthening the U.S.-India strategic partnership have called U.S. military aid to Pakistan 
incompatible with U.S. strategic goals in the region.  
Moreover, U.S. officials are concerned that Pakistan has altered some conventional U.S.-supplied 
weapons in ways that could violate the Arms Export Control Act. Such alleged modifications 
include expanding the capability of both Harpoon anti-ship missiles and P-3C naval aircraft for land-
attack missions. The Islamabad government categorically rejects the allegations.55 Indian observers 
were unsurprised by the claims; New Delhi’s leaders continuously complain that Pakistan diverts 
most forms of U.S. defense assistance toward India. Some more suspicious analysts even see 
purpose in such a dynamic: a U.S. wish to maintain Pakistan’s viability as a regional balancer to 
Indian hegemony 
The same report lists aid and EDA related arms transfers, plus Pakistani arms purchases, 
whose value in counterinsurgency and counterterrorism is questionable at best:139 
 Eight P-3C Orion maritime patrol aircraft and their refurbishment (valued at $474 million; four 
delivered, but three of these were destroyed in a 2011 Islamist militant attack on Pakistan Naval 
Station Mehran); 
 2,007 TOW anti-armor missiles ($186 million); 
 Six AN/TPS-77 surveillance radars ($100 million); 
 Six C-130E transport aircraft and their refurbishment ($76 million); 
 the USS McInerney, an ex-Perry class missile frigate (via EDA, $65 million for refurbishment, 
delivered and now the PNS Alamgir);  
 Up to 60 Mid-Life Update kits for F-16A/B combat aircraft (valued at $891 million, with $477 
million of this in FMF; Pakistan’s plans are to purchase 45 such kits, 8 have been delivered); and 
 115 M-109 self-propelled howitzers ($87 million, with $53 million in FMF). 
 18 new F-16C/D Block 52 combat aircraft (valued at $1.43 billion); 
 F-16 armaments including 500 AMRAAM air-to-air missiles; 1,450 2,000-pound bombs; 500 
JDAM bomb tail kits for gravity bombs; and 1,600 Enhanced Paveway laser-guided bomb kits, 
also for gravity bombs ($629 million); 
 100 Harpoon anti-ship missiles ($298 million); 
 500 Sidewinder air-to-air missiles ($95 million);  
 six Phalanx Close-In Weapons System naval guns ($80 million). 
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 14 F-16A/B combat aircraft;  
 59 T-37 military trainer jets. 
Some US officials and officers felt that significant portions of USs aid had been wasted or 
effectively stolen by a government and military that rival Afghanistan in terms of 
corruption and a failure to meet the needs of its people. Once again, World Bank, IMF, and 
UN reporting raise deep concerns about the degree to which Pakistan is becoming a failed 
state.  
Many US officials and experts privately see Pakistan as a nation whose politics have 
paralyzed effective action that still suffers from rising tensions with India, and has made 
little progress in the mix of economic and educational reforms that are critical to a stable 
future. There is a great deal of outside analysis that supports such conclusions. The  key 
trends involved are summarized in a CSIS report called Pakistan and Afghanistan: 
International Indicators of Progress 
(http://csis.org/files/publication/140820_afghan_pakistan_indicators.pdf.).  
It is important to note, however, that Pakistan has considerable potential to make more 
effective use of aid. Pakistan is better off in many metrics of human development than 
India and Bangladesh, and far better off than Afghanistan, although the summary data on 
Domestic trends in Pakistan shown in Figure 32 shows that it desperately needs economic 
growth, jobs, and social infrastructure, rather than arms.  
It also is all too clear that even if US military aid was focused on Pakistan’s need to fight 
terrorism and fully secure its FATA and other troubled areas, this alone could not bring 
Pakistani stability or security. This can only come with fundamental improvements in 
governance and security. Transparency International ranks Pakistan as the 127th most 
corrupt country in the world, and Figure 33 shows that the World Bank ranks it only 
marginally higher than Afghanistan in the overall quality of governance. 
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Figure 32: Pakistan and the Human Development Challenge 
– Part One 
 
Trends in Key Elements of Pakistan’ HDI: 1980-2012 
 
 
 
 
Trends in Key Elements of Afghanistan’s HDI: 1980-2012 
 
Source: UN Human Development Reports, http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/Country-
Profiles/PAK.pdf, and http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/Country-Profiles/AFG.pdf .
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Figure 32: Pakistan and the Human Development Challenge – Part Two 
Trends in Pakistan’ HDI 1980-2012 
 
Trends in Afghanistan’s HDI 1980-2012 
 
 
Source: UN Human Development Reports, http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/Country-Profiles/PAK.pdf, 
and http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/Country-Profiles/AFG.pdf .  
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Figure 33: The World Bank Assessment of Pakistan: High 
Violence and Corruption; Poor Governance 
 
 
Source: World Bank, http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/worldwide-governance-indicators.  
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Transition in Afghanistan Means Transition in 
Pakistan 
Pakistanis often accuse the US of abandoning it when Pakistan is not critical to US interests. 
At the same time, their public anger at the US is matched by more quiet US anger with 
Pakistan, and by a near total lack of real world US tolerance for Pakistani rhetoric about its 
role in counterterrorism, sacrifices, and the lack of continued US support. Figure 34 shows 
a sharp decline in US aid has already taken place, and it seems likely that US relations with 
Pakistan will be reduced to little more that diplomatic norms by the end of 2016 unless 
Pakistan proves to be sincere about ending its tolerance of Afghan insurgents and securing 
the border areas.  
While Pakistani and US relations have improved in 2014, limited steps forward will not be 
enough. Without sustained shifts in Pakistan’s effort to deal with both its own terrorists 
and Afghan insurgents, and real improvements in Pakistan’s security cooperation with 
Afghanistan, the US will not see Pakistan as a real strategic partner. The US will also have 
steadily less reason to provide more than limited aid and proper diplomatic relations. 
There is still serious US doubt that that Pakistan can become a meaningful partner in 
counterterrorism, that the US can really change Pakistani behavior in Afghanistan or 
dealing with terrorism, that US aid will be used where Pakistan really needs it, or that 
Pakistan will be a meaningful strategic partner in the future. Actions like Pakistan’s 
offensive against its own Islamist extremists are not seen as any substitute for ISI and other 
efforts that have been a constant source of problems since 2002. 
In spite of some reporting to the contrary, there still is little belief among senior US military 
planners that US ties and to Pakistan affect the security of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons, or 
that US bases and forces in Afghanistan can play any role in the unlikely event that Islamist 
extremists somehow acquire control of some weapons.140 There is equally little belief that 
any form of US civil or military aid – or aid from any other power – will materially affect 
Pakistan’s tensions with India, ties to China, or be decisive in limiting its decline towards 
becoming a failed state without far stronger political unity and effort than Pakistan has 
shown to date. 
This does not mean the US will write off Pakistan, cancel all aid, give up on diplomatic 
efforts to bring an end to the India-Pakistan conflict, cease cooperation of some kinds in 
counterterrorism and military aid if Pakistan does not become serious in dealing with 
Afghan insurgents. At least for the next few years, the US will take account of the fact that 
Pakistan will continue to play an important role in shaping the success of Transition in 
Afghanistan given the critical role that Pakistan plays as a trade route, giving the United 
States and NATO air-sea-land access to Pakistan, and in providing a sanctuary to the 
Taliban and other Afghan rebels. 
And, a far more positive relationship may develop. The Pakistani Taliban’s murder of some 
150 teachers and civilians in a Pakistani military school at Peshawar has at least changed 
Pakistani attitudes towards its own terrorists and religious extremists. The Pakistani 
government gave the Pakistani military authority to arrest, try, and execute terrorists, and 
such arrests and executions have begun. The Pakistani military have stepped up their 
operations in the FATA area, and the US has officially recognized this shift. Secretary of 
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State Kerry has visited Pakistan to encourage these actions, military  attacks on the Afghan 
insurgents based in Pakistan, and release some $250 million in additional US aid as an 
incentive.141 
Pakistani and Afghan relation also continued to improve. President Ghani reduced 
Afghanistan’s ties to India and improved relations with Pakistan in early 2015. The BBC 
reported in January 2015 that,142 
The Afghan president is looked upon favorably by Pakistan's generals. This is in large part because 
he has avoided any anti-Pakistan rhetoric and his long stints in government never led to open 
hostility with Islamabad. 
Even more remarkable is that Mr Ghani has so far not visited India - Pakistan's long-standing 
regional rival - despite organising trips to all of Afghanistan's other major neighbours, including 
China. He has even suspended construction of a $400m tank and aircraft refurbishing plant funded 
by India, while agreeing to greater military co-operation and the training of officers by Pakistan.  
An overwhelming fear of Indian influence in Kabul has made Pakistan's military and spy chiefs 
suspicious of Afghan leaders until now and led to them supporting the Afghan Taliban in the past. 
Afghanistan has taken steps to quell Taliban influence which have so far not been replicated by 
Pakistan. About 1,500 Afghan troops have been battling Pakistani Taliban for more than a month in 
the north-eastern Afghan province of Kunar. Afghan officials say they have killed 183 insurgents 
and wounded another 122 in a month-long campaign that is still continuing. 
It was the Pakistani Taliban based in Kunar which carried out the December bombing of the 
Peshawar army school that killed 150 people. The group has also been responsible for other attacks.  
So far the Pakistan military have not carried out any transparent measures in trying to deter the 
Afghan Taliban from orchestrating attacks in Kabul and other cities, which continue unabated. 
Moreover, Pakistani arms dealers and smugglers are still providing logistics and war materials to 
the Afghan Taliban.  
Once again, however, the acid test for both the US and Afghanistan will be whether 
Pakistan directly takes on the Afghan Taliban, the Haqqani Network, and the elements of 
Al Qaeda that still remain in Afghanistan, and whether it establishes good relations with 
the new President and government of Afghanistan. Any major continued flow of US aid 
will a require Pakistan to deal with its overall extremist and terrorist threats, and see its 
government actually make good on decades of promises regarding reform. The Sharif 
government has made a start in such efforts, but unless this start it proves to be serious, the 
US will have no real reason to help a Pakistan that will not help itself.  
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Figure 34: US Aid to Pakistan: FY2002 to FY2014 
Direct Overt U.S. Aid and Military Reimbursements to Pakistan, FY2001-FY2012 (available funds 
via appropriations, with disbursements in parentheses, rounded to the nearest millions of dollars) 
 
 
 
Sources: Susan B. Epstein and K. Alan Kronstadt, Pakistan: U.S. Foreign Assistance, CRS R41856, July 1, 2013, and 
U.S. Departments of State, Defense, and Agriculture; U.S. Agency for International Development 
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VIII. Regional Threats: Strategic Minimalism in Central 
Asia 
Central Asia has not presented a threat to US interests or the security and stability of 
Afghanistan, but the US withdrawal from Afghanistan, and competing US strategic 
interests in other areas, do call for strategic triage. 
 
US forces have effectively left Central Asia, but the US has not announced a strategy to 
deal with Central Asia in the future and adjust to the growing tension with Russia that has 
resulted from its invasion of the Ukraine. The war in Afghanistan no longer requires the 
US to seek basing and transit rights through Central Asia, and the days in which the Central 
Asian “front-line” states provided easy over-flight support and Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and 
Uzbekistan hosted coalition forces, provided airbase facilities, and, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan 
supported military action in Iraq are long over. 
Uzbekistan ended U.S. basing rights to support operations in Afghanistan in 2005 after 
United States criticized the government for killing civilians and Kyrgyzstan notified the 
US it would not extend its basing agreement and use of the “Manas Transit Center” after 
mid-2014 and move operations to other locations in June 2013. The US and its allies have 
no clear need for the Northern Distribution to move supplies into and out of Afghanistan 
after the end of 2014.143 
As for US strategic and economic interests in Central Asia, the near vacuum in current US 
strategic statements seems to reflect the fact that in spite of all its usual diplomatic activity 
and rhetoric, the US increasingly sees Central Asia as of marginal interest to the US. The 
US will not maintain a military presence in Central Asia, and limited interest in regional 
trade. It has even less to gain in the real world from US investment in pipelines and mines, 
developing the region’s natural resources, or from encouraging the now largely discredited 
myth of a “New Silk Road.”  
Making Central Asia a Routine US Diplomatic 
Interest 
The recent and current levels of US aid to Central Asia are shown in Figure 35. They seem 
to approach the practical limit of what aid may do to serve US interests, if not exceed them. 
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Figure 35: U.S. Foreign Assistance to Central Asia, FY1992 
to FY2015 
 
Source: Jim Nichol, “Central Asia: Regional Developments and Implications for U.S. Interests,” 
Congressional Research Service, RL33458, March 21, 2014, p. 76. 
Unstable and Unpleasant Regimes 
The US now has little incentive to tie itself closely to any current Central Asian government. 
Figure 36 shows, the authoritarian character of the regimes in all of the Central Asian 
states, and this and their internal tensions make relations with existing regimes uncertain 
at best. The US should continue to make human rights an issue in each country, and an 
important aspect of its annual State Department Country Reports on Human Rights, but it 
is all too clear that deeper US involvement and more US aid will not make any Central 
Asia regime give human rights a new precedence over its perceived desire to maintain itself 
in power, or move that state towards added stability. 
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Figure 36: The Uncertain Regimes of Central Asia 
State Department Country Reports on Human Rights for 2013, summarized by Jim Nichol of the US 
Congressional Research Service 
 Kazakhstan: the president and his Nur Otan Party dominated the political system. Significant human 
rights problems included severe limits on citizens’ rights to change their government and restrictions on 
freedom of speech, press, assembly, religion, and association. There was lack of due process in dealing 
with abuses by law enforcement and judicial officials. Other reported abuses included: arbitrary or 
unlawful killings; detainee and prisoner torture and other abuse; arbitrary arrest and detention; 
prohibitive political party registration requirements; restrictions on the activities of NGOs; sex and labor 
trafficking; and child labor. Corruption was widespread, although he government took modest steps to 
prosecute some officials who committed abuses. 
 Kyrgyzstan: the constitution established a parliamentary form of government intended to limit 
presidential power and enhance the role of parliament and the prime minister. Some security forces 
appeared at times to operate independently of civilian control in the South and committed human rights 
abuses. Significant human rights problems included abuses related to continued ethnic tensions in the 
South; denial of due process and lack of accountability in judicial and law enforcement proceedings; law 
enforcement officials’ use of arbitrary arrest; and various forms of mistreatment, torture, and extortion 
against all demographic groups, particularly against ethnic Uzbeks. The following additional human 
rights problems existed: harassment of NGOs, activists, and journalists; pressure on independent media; 
restrictions on religious freedom; pervasive corruption; discrimination and violence against ethnic and 
religious minorities; child abuse; trafficking in persons; and child labor. The central government allowed 
security forces to act arbitrarily, emboldening law enforcement officials to prey on vulnerable citizens, 
and allowing mobs to disrupt trials by attacking defendants, attorneys, witnesses, and judges. 
 Tajikistan: an authoritarian president and his supporters, drawn mainly from one region of the country, 
dominated the political system. The government obstructed political pluralism. Security forces reported 
to civilian authorities.  Significant human rights problems included torture and abuse of detainees and 
other persons by security forces; repression of political activism and the repeated blockage of several 
independent news and social networking websites; and poor religious freedom conditions. Other human 
rights problems included arbitrary arrest; denial of the right to a fair trial; corruption; and trafficking in 
persons, including sex and labor trafficking. Officials in the security services and elsewhere in the 
government acted with impunity. There were very few prosecutions of government officials for human 
rights abuses. 
 Turkmenistan: an authoritarian president and his Democratic Party controlled the government. 
Significant human rights problems included arbitrary arrest; torture; and disregard for civil liberties, 
including restrictions on freedoms of speech, press, assembly, and movement. Other continuing human 
rights problems included citizens’ inability to change their government; interference in the practice of 
religion; denial of due process and fair trial; arbitrary interference with privacy, home, and 
correspondence; and trafficking in persons. Officials in the security services and elsewhere in the 
government acted with impunity. There were no reported prosecutions of government officials for human 
rights abuses. 
 Uzbekistan: the authoritarian president dominated political life and exercised nearly complete control 
over the other branches of government. Significant human rights problems included torture and abuse of 
detainees by security forces; denial of due process and fair trial; and widespread restrictions on religious 
freedom, including harassment of religious minority group members and continued imprisonment of 
believers of all faiths. Other continuing human rights problems included: incommunicado and prolonged 
detention; arbitrary arrest and detention; restrictions on freedom of speech, press, assembly, and 
association; governmental restrictions on civil society activity; restrictions on freedom of movement; 
and government-organized forced labor. Authorities subjected human rights activists, journalists, and 
others who criticized the government, as well as their family members, to harassment, arbitrary arrest, 
and politically motivated prosecution and detention. Government officials frequently engaged in corrupt 
practices with impunity. 
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CIA World Factbook   
 Kazakhstan: authoritarian presidential rule, with little power outside the executive branch… Non-
Muslim ethnic minorities departed Kazakhstan in large numbers from the mid-1990s through the mid-
2000s and a national program has repatriated about a million ethnic Kazakhs back to Kazakhstan. These 
trends have allowed Kazakhs to become the titular majority again. This dramatic demographic shift has 
also undermined the previous religious diversity and made the country more than 70 percent Muslim. 
Kazakhstan's economy is larger than those of all the other Central Asian states largely due to the country's 
vast natural resources. Current issues include: developing a cohesive national identity; managing Islamic 
revivalism; expanding the development of the country's vast energy resources and exporting them to 
world markets; diversifying the economy outside the oil, gas, and mining sectors; enhancing 
Kazakhstan's economic competitiveness; developing a multiparty parliament and advancing political and 
social reform; and strengthening relations with neighboring states and other foreign powers. 
 Kyrgyzstan:  Kyrgyzstan became a Soviet republic in 1936 and achieved independence in 1991 when the 
USSR dissolved. Nationwide demonstrations in the spring of 2005 resulted in the ouster of President 
Askar Akaev, who had run the country since 1990. Former Prime Minister Kurmanbek Bakiev 
overwhelmingly won the presidential election in the summer of 2005. Over the next few years, he 
manipulated the parliament to accrue new powers for the presidency. In July 2009, after months of 
harassment against his opponents and media critics, Bakiev won re-election in a presidential campaign 
that the international community deemed flawed. In April 2010, violent protests in Bishkek led to the 
collapse of the Bakiev regime and his eventual fleeing to Minsk, Belarus. His successor, Roza Otunbaeva, 
served as transitional president until Almazbek Atambaev was inaugurated in December 2011, marking 
the first peaceful transfer of presidential power in independent Kyrgyzstan's history. Continuing 
concerns include: the trajectory of democratization, endemic corruption, poor interethnic relations, and 
terrorism.. 
  Tajikistan: Tajikistan became independent in 1991 following the breakup of the Soviet Union, and 
experienced a civil war between regional factions from 1992 to 1997. Tajikistan endured several 
domestic security incidents during 2010-12, including armed conflict between government forces and 
local strongmen in the Rasht Valley and between government forces and criminal groups in Gorno-
Badakhshan Autonomous Oblast. The country remains the poorest in the former Soviet sphere. 
Tajikistan became a member of the World Trade Organization in March 2013. However, its economy 
continues to face major challenges, including dependence on remittances from Tajikistanis working in 
Russia, pervasive corruption, and the major role narco-trafficking plays in the country's informal 
economy with impunity. There were very few prosecutions of government officials for human rights 
abuses. 
 Turkmenistan: defines itself as a secular democracy and a presidential republic; in actuality displays 
authoritarian presidential rule with power concentrated within the presidential administration… 
President for Life Saparmurat Nyyazow died in December 2006, and Turkmenistan held its first multi-
candidate presidential election in February 2007. Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedow, a deputy cabinet 
chairman under Nyyazow, emerged as the country's new president; he was chosen as president again in 
February 2012, in an election that the OSCE said lacked the freedoms necessary to create a competitive 
environment. 
 Uzbekistan: authoritarian presidential rule with little power outside the executive branch…Independent 
since 1991, the country has lessened its dependence on the cotton monoculture by diversifying 
agricultural production while developing its mineral and petroleum export capacity and increasing its 
manufacturing base. However, long serving septuagenarian President Islom Karimov, who rose through 
the ranks of the Soviet-era State Planning Committee (Gosplan), remains wedded to the concepts of a 
command economy, creating a challenging environment for foreign investment. Current concerns 
include post-Karimov. 
 
Source: U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2013, February 27, 
2014; Jim Nichol, “Central Asia: Regional Developments and Implications for U.S. Interests,” 
Congressional Research Service, RL33458, March 21, 2014, pp. 40-41; CIA World Factbook, country 
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sections as listed, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/kz.html, accessed 
September 25, 2014. 
Investment, Trade and Strategic Linkage: The Real 
Silk Road Doesn’t Go Through Afghanistan or Serve 
UN Interests 
The strategic geography of Central Asia is shown in Figure 37. Its key feature is that the 
Central Asian states are former FSU states caught in the middle between Russian and China, 
and whose key infrastructure is based on links to Russia and China, and growing trade to 
the north.  
To the extent there is any new major link from Central Asia to the south, it consists of road 
and potential rail links that India is partially funding and that go from Iran’s port of Chah 
Bahar to Mashhad in northeastern Iran, with links to Ashkabad and Mary in Turkmenistan, 
and potentially to Shindand and Herat in Afghanistan. These improved road links, and any 
rail links, seem likely to have only marginally increased impact on Afghanistan’s economy 
and Central Asian independence from Russia even when and if they are completed.144  
The US should encourage Central Asia cooperation with Afghanistan, but should not 
exaggerate the probable result or assume that that any such efforts somehow will weaken 
Russian and Chinese influence in Central Asia. For example, Kazakhstan did announce 
that it would increase its support of Afghanistan in December 2014, but it had also formally 
recognized the referendum that annexed the Crimea to Russia in March 2014. It seems 
unlikely that Kazakhstan is going to choose the US over Russia in a crisis, and much more 
likely that it will focus on its own interests in its immediate region. 
The US should also encourage Central Asia trade, pipelines, and other measures that would 
make such states less dependent on Russia, and potentially encourage cooperation between 
Pakistan and India in securing such pipelines. The US has no reason, however, to offer any 
investment incentives or guarantees to US or any other firms in supporting such efforts, 
and the timescales and political tensions that affect the real-world creation of such pipelines 
make any arguments about ending or containing Iran’s nuclear weapons efforts moot. 
US trade and investment may grow as a result of natural market forces, but scarcely seem 
likely to achieve the kind of volume that will give the US major strategic leverage. The 
occasional efforts of Central Asia states to use the US and play it off against Russia seem 
unlikely to give the US any serious strategic leverage in either the region or in dealing with 
Russia, and the US needs to focus its tensions with Russia on resolving the Ukraine crisis, 
and securing the Baltic States, Poland, and other members of NATO. The US role in 
Central Asia is more likely to be a strategic irritant to Russia in an area of the “near abroad” 
of marginal practical interest to the US that will play out negatively in other more important 
areas. 
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Figure 37: The Strategic Geography of Central Asia 
Source: Jim Nichol, “Central Asia: Regional Developments and Implications for U.S. Interests,” 
Congressional Research Service, RL33458, March 21, 2014, p. 78. 
 
As for the US volume of trade shown in Figure 38, it justifies normal US diplomatic 
support, but scarcely any subsidies, guarantees, or special strategic emphasis. 
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Figure 38: US Imports and Exports from Central Asia in 
2013 
(Millions of Current Dollars 
 
 
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, U.S. International Trade Data; Jim Nichol, “Central Asia: Regional 
Developments and Implications for U.S. Interests,” Congressional Research Service, RL33458, March 21, 
2014, p. 44. 
The reality is that Afghanistan and Pakistan are not going to be critical trade partners with 
Central Asia states, and the volume of Afghan trade with Central Asia will only have a 
limited impact in aiding Afghan development and stability. The central focus of trade and 
transit is not a new Silk Road based on rail or road transit through Afghanistan. It will be 
trade and transit from Central Asia to Russia and China with steadily improving links to 
the north of Afghanistan. 
Minimal Strategic and Security Interests 
It is also unclear what the US can gain by playing off Central Asian states against Russia 
and China. Simply adding to the tension that already exists does not serve any clear purpose, 
and letting Central Asia remain a growing Russian and Chinese sphere of influence might 
actually ease tension in any areas where the US has no reason to become deeply involved. 
Russian efforts to recreate a Soviet bloc level of economic and political influence seem 
tenuous at best, and China is a natural competitor for economic influence. Organization 
like the Shanghai Cooperation Organization may help produce stability and development, 
but seem unlikely to create some firm bloc that will threaten US interests. 
The US does have an incentive to offer low-level cooperation in counterterrorism and in 
helping Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan work with Afghanistan, but it scarcely 
seems to have a reasons to provide them with serious aid to meet their own strategic needs, 
and it is far from clear that any amount of aid or US strategic involvement will have a 
material impact on how they treat developments in Afghanistan after Transition occurs at 
the end of 2014. 
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In practical terms, the US should see Central Asia as a region with uncertain authoritarian 
leaders and that is primarily of interest to China and Russia. It can virtually count on Russia 
and China to intervene in dealing with extremism and terrorism, to compete to some extent 
in terms of trade and influence, and have each state in the region try to play Russia, China, 
and other states off against each other in an effort to serve its own interests.  
Once again, it is important to stress that this kind of strategic triage does not mean the US 
should write off the region, or fail to encourage development and democracy. It does mean 
that Central Asia should be treated as a region where a limited US role seems suitable and 
where the US can best serve its interests by shifting as much of the strategic burden as 
possible to other states and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.  
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IX. Regional Threats: The Real US Strategic Interest in 
India 
The US has a strong strategic interest in India’s emergence as a successful and major part 
of the world’s economy, and as a strong and secure voice for democracy in Asia. It shares 
a common interest in fighting terrorism and religious extremism, and in India’s security. 
India is also a potential counterweight to China, and an increasingly important player in a 
multipolar world. 
At the same time, the US has no strategic interest in tilting towards India at the expense of 
Pakistan, and should not give up on diplomatic efforts to bring an end to the India-Pakistan 
conflict. It is important to note, however, that years of pasts efforts, and attempts to create 
some kind of broad regional security negotiations, have had no more success that the 
repeated direct negotiating efforts between the two countries.  
As Figure 39 and Figure 40 show, the India-Pakistan arms race continues, and so does the 
destabilizing impact of having both nations deploy more nuclear weapons and nuclear-
armed missiles. Their competition for influence in Afghanistan also remains yet another 
divisive and disruptive aspect of an already uncertain Transition. 
Limiting the US Role in Easing India-Pakistani 
Tensions and the Role in Afghanistan 
It is one thing to encourage peace and another to commit major diplomatic resources with 
there is little practical chance such US efforts will achieve it. The US should only make 
peace efforts a major US diplomatic effort if (a.) India and Pakistan reach a point of 
confrontation where giving such action such priority becomes vital in spite of the chances 
of success, or if events should create a major new opportunity in which to act, and one 
where the US can do so while avoiding any serious strategic risks or military involvement 
in the tensions between the two states. 
For all of the reasons discussed earlier, the US is also unlikely to be able to play more than 
a largely diplomatic role in limiting the continuing Indian and Pakistani struggle for 
influence in Afghanistan if this accelerates after 2014. The US expects Afghanistan’s 
neighbors to take a more active role, and sometimes to compete with each other and the 
government in Kabul. 
It is not surprising, therefore, that the US has moved a long way in real world terms from 
the statement Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and Minister of External Affairs S.M. 
Krishna issued at the U.S.-India Strategic Dialogue in June 2012,145 
The two leaders stressed the importance of sustained international commitment to Afghanistan as it 
assumes full responsibility for governance, development and security. They intend to explore 
opportunities to work together to promote Afghanistan’s development, including in areas such as 
agriculture, mining, energy, capacity building and infrastructure. Noting the importance of women’s 
economic empowerment for Afghanistan’s economic success, they plan to work to further increase 
their ongoing vocational training and empowerment initiatives.  
To support their efforts in Afghanistan, they agreed to hold a trilateral dialogue with the Government 
of Afghanistan. They welcomed the announcement at the 2012 NATO Summit in Chicago of 
progress in the security transition process and the participants’ commitment to supporting 
Afghanistan’s security and development needs into the “transformation decade” (2015-2024). The 
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two leaders discussed the vision for enhanced regional connectivity through South and Central Asia. 
They reiterated the importance of taking concrete steps to promote expanded private investment and 
trade in Afghanistan.  
They acknowledged the critical importance of improving Afghanistan’s integration and linkages 
within the South and Central Asia region . . . They acknowledged that success in Afghanistan 
requires, in addition to building up Afghanistan’s capacity to defend itself, an Afghan-led and 
Afghan-owned reconciliation process. They reiterated that success in Afghanistan and regional and 
global security require elimination of safe havens and infrastructure for terrorism and violent 
extremism in Afghanistan and Pakistan.  
The US also has many higher priorities than India-Pakistani relations or their role in 
Afghanistan. It will support efforts at “regional solutions” and development in the abstract, 
but do little above the level of working diplomacy unless the chance of real progress is far 
greater than it seems today. It will be more than happy to leave “bright ideas” that do not 
have such support in the inbox of conference building measures and diplomatic 
indifference. 
Focusing on the Real US Strategic Interest  
The key US strategic interest in India that remains is the possibility that India may emerge 
as a major counterweight to China, and that its increasing air and sea power in the Indian 
Ocean will help stabilize and secure maritime and air traffic throughout the Indian Ocean 
Region.  Some US policymakers hope for a close strategic and military relationship to 
achieve this, but the history of such efforts to date indicates that India will pursue its own 
strategic interests in ways that may help bring broader stability in Asia but will not make 
the US a direct strategic partner in dealing with China or other regional security issues.  
If one looks beyond the issue of the war in Afghanistan, this indicates the US should be 
careful about the extent to which it should try to form a direct and meaningful strategic 
partnership with India. While former US Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta may have 
described it as a “linchpin” of US strategy in Asia in 2012, India has so far seemed more 
determined to treat the US as one more country that can sometimes serve India’s interests 
than as a partner.146 
A report by the US Congressional Research Service puts the issue as follows:147 
…although considerable enthusiasm for deepened security engagement is found in both capitals—
and not least in the U.S. Congress—there is also a persistent sense that this aspect of the bilateral 
relationship lacks purpose and focus. Some observers argue that the potential of the relationship has 
been oversold, and that the benefits either hoped for or expected may not materialize in the near 
future. While Obama Administration officials variously contend that India is now or will be a net 
provider of security in its region, many independent analysts are skeptical that this aspiration can be 
realized, at least in the near-term. 
Nongovernmental analyses of the course and pace of U.S.-India security relations are oftentimes 
incompatible or even conflicting in their assumptions and recommendations. Such incompatibility 
is frequently the result of the differing conclusions rooted in short-term versus long-term 
perspectives. The Obama Administration—along with numerous pro-India analysts in 
Washington—has tended to emphasize the anticipated benefits of long-term engagement as opposed 
to a short-term approach that seeks gains derived through more narrow transactions. This latter tack 
can have the effect of raising and then thwarting expectations in Washington, as was the case with 
the ultimate failure of U.S. defense firms to secure the multi-billion-dollar contracts to supply new 
combat aircraft to India. At the same time, frustrations among many in the United States have arisen 
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from the sense that India’s enthusiasm for further deepening bilateral security cooperation is limited, 
and that New Delhi’s reciprocity has been insufficient. 
Looking ahead, there is widespread concurrence among many officials and analysts that the security 
relationship would benefit from undergirding ambitious rhetoric with more concrete action in areas 
of mutual agreement. In their view, defining which actions will provide meaningful gains, even on 
a modest scale, appears to be the central task facing U.S. and Indian policy makers in coming years. 
A Good Strategic Ally Does not Necessarily Make a 
Good Military Partner 
Indian forces and arms imports do not yet reflect major ties to the US in spite of 
considerable US efforts to sell such arms and strengthen US and Indian military ties. US 
estimates indicate that India ranked second in the world new arms transfer agreements during 
2008-2011, with $21.3 billion (in current dollars), or 10.3% of the value of all developing-
world arms-transfer agreements. Many came from Russia, although a report by the 
Congressional Research Service notes that.148 
India, while the principal Russian arms customer, during recent years has sought to diversify its 
weapons supplier base, purchasing the Phalcon early warning defense system aircraft in 2004 from 
Israel and numerous items from France in 2005, in particular six Scorpene diesel attack submarines. 
In 2008 India purchased six C130J cargo aircraft from the United States. In 2010, the United 
Kingdom sold India 57 Hawk jet trainers for $1 billion. In 2010 Italy also sold India 12 AW101 
helicopters. In 2011, France secured a $2.4 billion contract with India to upgrade 51 of its Mirage-
2000 combat fighters, and the United States agreed to sell India 10 C-17 Globemaster III aircraft for 
$4.1 billion. This pattern of Indian arms purchases indicates that Russia will likely face strong new 
competition from other major weapons suppliers for the India arms market, and it can no longer be 
assured that India will consistently purchase its major combat systems. Indeed, India in 2011 had 
eliminated Russia and the US from the international competition to supply a new-generation combat 
fighter aircraft, a competition won by France. 
A 2014 estimate by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) indicated 
that India was spending some $11 billion a year on arms and had some $39 billion in 
outstanding arms orders. It also estimated that Russia had provided 79% of India’s arms 
imports during 2008-2012, Britain had provided 6%, Uzbekistan had provided 6%, Israel 
4% and the US only 2% -- although SIPRI also felt that India wanted to reduce its future 
dependence on imports from Russia.149  
India’s current order of battle reflects this lack of dependence on the US. The CRS 
estimates that:150 
 The Indian army, comprised of 1.13 million active duty personnel, operates some 3,300 main battle 
tanks (the vast majority of them Russian-built T-72s and outdated T-55s, but also including at least 
444 modern T-90s, along with 124 indigenously designed Arjuns); 3,000 towed artillery tubes; 1,500 
armored infantry fighting vehicles; and 232 multirole helicopters.  
 The Indian air force (IAF) flies 798 combat-capable aircraft. Of these, 698 are ground attack jets, 
more than one-third of which are deteriorating Russian-built MiG-21s, but also including 153late-
model Su-30 MKI Flankers, as well as 52 French-built Mirage and 106 Anglo-French Jaguar 
aircraft (the MiG-21s are to be phased out by 2017). The 64-plane fighter fleet is entirely MiG-29 
Fulcrums. The IAF also possesses modest airborne early warning (AEW) and in-flight refueling 
capabilities, the latter provided by six Russian-made Il-78 Midas tankers. Russian-built Il-76 
platforms have been fitted with advanced Israeli-supplied suites to provide three Phalcon airborne 
AEW planes. 
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 India’s navy has grown rapidly in recent years, currently operating 21 principal surface combatants 
(1 aircraft carrier, 10 guided-missile destroyers, 10 missile frigates) and 15 tactical submarines, one 
of which is a nuclear-powered acquisition from the Russian Navy. There are more than 60 patrol 
and coastal combatants, nearly half of them missile-capable corvettes (the coast guard operates 
another 63 smaller patrol boats). The IN also has a significant amphibious capacity: 17 landing ships 
(the largest acquisition from the U.S. Navy) can carry 4,000 troops or 88 tanks. The navy is 
developing an indigenous nuclear-powered attack submarine (INS Arihant) to be armed with 
nuclear-tipped cruise missiles, as part of its “sea-based strategic deterrence. 
The same CRS analysis shows that India’s major arms import agreements had little US 
content as of 2013.151 More recent work by SIPRI, IHS Jane’s, and the 2014 edition of the 
IISS Military Balance all indicate that this remains the case. The US also needs to be 
careful about arms transfers to India for the same reason it needs to be careful about arms 
transfers to Pakistan. It does not want to be seen as either taking sides or exacerbating the 
arms race between the two states, or become caught in the middle politically and 
strategically between two powers whose political efforts at accommodation are offset by a 
steady rise in their nuclear forces.  
Moreover, India’s long history of seeking outside aid in creating what is probably the least 
competent and most wasteful defense industry per dollar in the world, and in playing off 
one arms supplier against another, is not a game the US has great incentive to play. The 
US needs to be very careful about arms deals with India, and to avoid deals that do more 
to profit India’s defense industry than India’s security.152 
Finally, it is one thing for the US to encourage India’s rise as a counterweight to China in 
a multipolar world, and another to create links that China may see as a conspiracy to contain 
it and reason for confrontation with the US, and India may see as some form of US 
commitment to supporting it in boundary claims and other India disputes with China. 
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Figure 39: The India-Pakistan-China Conventional Balance 
 
    China India Pakistan 
Number 
of 
Troops 
Army 1,600,000 1,129,900 550,000 
Navy/ Marine 235,000 58,350 23,800 
Air Force 398,000 127,200 70,000 
Reserves 510,000 1,155,000   
Strat Missile 
Forces 
100,000     
Paramilitary 660,000 1,403,700 304,000 
Total Troops: 3,503,000 3,874,150 947,800 
Army 
MBT 6,840 2,874 2,501 
LT TK/ RECCE 1,023 110   
APC 4,502 336 1,390 
AIFV 3,450 1,455   
Artillery 13,054 9,702 4,472 
Total Land Forces: 28,869 14,477 8,363 
Navy & 
Coast 
Guard 
Amphibious 240 40 4 
Aircraft Carrier 1 1   
Mine Warfare/ 
Countermeasures 
53 8 3 
Patrol and Coastal 
Combatants 
216 84 33 
Principle Surface 
Combatants 
69 24 12 
Submarines 70 14 8 
Support 212 55 14 
Total Naval 
Forces 
861 226 74 
Air 
Force, 
Navy & 
Army 
Aviation 
Fighter 890 78 199 
Bomber 120     
Fighter/Grnd 
Attack 
759 748 174 
Transport 393 278 37 
Training 1,056 281 143 
Support 
Helicopters 
71 105 63 
ISR 51 11 40 
Total Air Forces: 3,340 1,501 656 
Source: Adapted From IISS, The Military Balance, 2014, Chapter Six: Asia. 
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Figure 40: The India-Pakistan Nuclear Delivery System 
Balance 
   India  
Combat Missile Units 
1 gp with Agni I 
1 gp with Agni II 
1 gp (reported forming) with Agni III 
2 gp with SS-150/250 Prithvi I/II 
Missile Strength 
Strategic: 54  
IRBM/ICBM: Agni V (in test) 
IRBM: 24+: ε12 Agni I (80–100 msl);  
12 Agni II (20–25 msl); some Agni III (entering 
service);  
Agni IV (in test) 
SRBM 30+: ε 30 SS-150 Prithvi I/SS-250 
Prithvi II;  
Some SS-350 Dhanush (naval testbed) 
LACM Nirbhay (likely nuclear capable;  
Pakistan 
Strategic 60 
MRBM ε 30 Ghauri/Ghauri II (Hatf-
5)/Shaheen-2; (Hatf-6- in test) 
SRBM ε 30 Ghaznavi (Hatf-3 - PRC M-
11)/Shaheen-1(Hatf-4); 
LACM Babur (Hatf-7 - in development);  
Ra’ad (Hatf-8- in development) 
ARTY • MRL Nasr (Hatf-9 - likely nuclear 
capable in development) 
Aircraft 
1-2 sqn of F-16A/B or Mirage 5 may be 
assigned a nuclear strike role 
Space 
Satellites ISR 3: 1 Cartosat 2A; 2 RISAT 
Aircraft 
Mirage 2000H or Su- 30MKI) may be tasked with a 
strategic role in development) 
 
Source: Adapted From IISS, The Military Balance, 2014, Chapter Six: Asia. 
The Need to Focus on Other Aspects of US Relations 
with India 
There is a case to be made for close diplomatic US relations with India, close cooperation 
in counterterrorism in fighting extremism, US efforts to help India emerge as a modern 
economic power, and for maintaining what has become a regular US and Indian Strategic 
Dialogue.  
President Obama provided a more realistic focus for US relations with India in a speech to 
a Joint Session of Indian Parliament in 2010, and one that focused far more on common 
interests than strategic partnership – although he could not resist such a reference:153  
…India is not the only emerging power in the world. But the relationship between our countries is 
unique. For we are two strong democracies whose constitutions begin with the same revolutionary 
words—“We the people.” We are two great republics dedicated to the liberty and justice and 
equality of all people. And we are two free market economies where people have the freedom to 
pursue ideas and innovation that can change the world. And that’s why I believe that India and 
America are indispensable partners in meeting the challenges of our time 
At the same time, there seems to be an equal case for avoiding policies that appear to try 
to create a formal alliance with India, particularly one that focuses India’s development as 
natural counterbalance to the emergence of China. It seems doubtful that the US can ever 
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create a strategic partnership with India as distinguished from being one more outside 
power that India seeks to exploit for its own strategic interests. It is also very possible that 
such efforts would increase tension between China and the US without increasing regional 
stability. 
Much will depend in the near term, on how Narendra Modi and the Bharatiya Janata party 
approach Indian strategy in the future. Modi made it clear it he wanted better strategic 
relations during his May 2014 campaign, and for all the near silence on India in the 2014 
QDR and the President’s West Point speech, the US clearly sees India as a critical power 
in Asia and the Indian Ocean Region in ways that go far beyond its limited strategic interest 
in Afghanistan, Central Asia, and South Asia per se. 
The US might do best by responding to Indian initiatives of the kind that Modi discussed 
in broad terms in his speech to the UN and visit to the US in September 2014, and in the 
statement he issued on the US and Indian strategic partnership. 
Modi’s speech at the UN stated that,154 
I am prepared to engage in a serious bilateral dialogue with Pakistan in a peaceful atmosphere, 
without the shadow of terrorism, to promote our friendship and cooperation. However, Pakistan 
must also take its responsibility seriously to create an appropriate environment. Raising issues in 
this forum is not the way to make progress towards resolving issues between our two countries. 
Instead, today, we should be thinking about the victims of floods in Jammu and Kashmir. In India, 
we have organized massive flood relief operations and have also offered assistance for Pakistan 
Occupied Kashmir. 
The world is witnessing tensions and turmoil on a scale rarely seen in recent history. There are no 
major wars, but tensions and conflicts abound; and, there is absence of real peace and uncertainty 
about the future. An integrating Asia Pacific region is still concerned about maritime security that 
is fundamental to its future. Europe faces risk of new division. In West Asia, extremism and fault 
lines are growing. Our own region continues to face the destabilizing threat of terrorism. Africa 
faces the twin threat of rising terrorism and a health crisis. Terrorism is taking new shape and new 
name. No country, big or small, in the north or the south, east or west, is free from its threat. Are we 
really making concerted international efforts to fight these forces, or are we still hobbled by our 
politics, our divisions, our discrimination between countries. We welcome efforts to combat 
terrorism's resurgence in West Asia, which is affecting countries near and far. The effort should 
involve the support of all countries in the region. Today, even as seas, space and cyber space have 
become new instruments of prosperity, they could also become a new theatre of conflicts.  
His statement on the US-Indian “Strategic Partnership” -- 'Chalein Saath Saath: Forward 
Together We Go' – deserves even closer attention,155 
As leaders of two great democratic nations with diverse traditions and faiths, we share a vision for 
a partnership in which the United States and India work together, not just for the benefit of both our 
nations, but for the benefit of the world. 
We have vastly different histories, but both our founders sought to guarantee freedoms that allow 
our citizens to determine their own destiny and pursue their personal aspirations. Our strategic 
partnership rests on our shared mission to provide equal opportunity for our people through 
democracy and freedom. 
The currents of kinship and commerce, scholarship and science tie our countries together. They 
allow us to rise above differences by maintaining the long-term perspective. Every day, in myriad 
ways, our cooperation fortifies a relationship that matches the innumerable ties between our peoples, 
who have produced works of art and music, invented cutting-edge technology, and responded to 
crises across the globe. 
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Our strategic partnership is a joint endeavor for prosperity and peace. Through intense consultations, 
joint exercises, and shared technology, our security cooperation will make the region and the world 
safe and secure. Together, we will combat terrorist threats and keep our homelands and citizens safe 
from attacks, while we respond expeditiously to humanitarian disasters and crises. We will prevent 
the spread of weapons of mass destruction, and remain committed to reducing the salience of nuclear 
weapons, while promoting universal, verifiable, and non-discriminatory nuclear disarmament. 
We will support an open and inclusive rules-based global order, in which India assumes greater 
multilateral responsibility, including in a reformed United Nations Security Council. At the United 
Nations and beyond, our close coordination will lead to a more secure and just world. 
Climate change threatens both our countries, and we will join together to mitigate its impact and 
adapt to our changing environment. We will address the consequences of unchecked pollution 
through cooperation by our governments, science and academic communities. We will partner to 
ensure that both countries have affordable, clean, reliable, and diverse sources of energy, including 
through our efforts to bring American-origin nuclear power technologies to India. 
We will ensure that economic growth in both countries brings better livelihoods and welfare for all 
of our people. Our citizens value education as a means to a better life, and our exchange of skills 
and knowledge will propel our countries forward. Even the poorest will share in the opportunities 
in both our countries. 
Joint research and collaboration in every aspect—ranging from particles of creation to outer space 
-- will produce boundless innovation and high technology collaboration that changes our lives. Open 
markets, fair and transparent practices will allow trade in goods and services to flourish. 
Our people will be healthier as we jointly counter infectious diseases, eliminate maternal and child 
deaths, and work to eradicate poverty for all. And they will be safer as we ensure the fullest 
empowerment of women in a secure environment. 
The United States and India commit to expand and deepen our strategic partnership in order to 
harness the inherent potential of our two democracies and the burgeoning ties between our people, 
economies, and businesses. Together we seek a reliable and enduring friendship that bolsters 
security and stability, contributes to the global economy, and advances peace and prosperity for our 
citizens and throughout the world. 
We have a vision that the United States and India will have a transformative relationship as trusted 
partners in the 21stcentury. Our partnership will be a model for the rest of the world. 
This is scarcely a call for military partnership. The US should not ignore India’s critical 
role in establishing a broader balance of security in Asia, and the value of India’s growing 
security ties to a US ally like Japan, and both countries set the right tone in dealing with 
security issues in the statement the White House issued after the two leaders met on 
September 30, 2014, 156 
The Prime Minister and the President stated their intention to expand defense cooperation to bolster 
national, regional, and global security.  The two leaders reaffirmed that India and the United States 
would build an enduring partnership in which both sides treat each other at the same level as their 
closest partners, including defense technology transfers, trade, research, co-production, and co-
development. 
To facilitate deeper defense cooperation, they welcomed the decision to renew for ten more years 
the 2005 Framework for the U.S.-India Defense Relationship and directed their defense teams to 
develop plans for more ambitious programs and activities.  The two leaders also agreed to 
reinvigorate the Political-Military Dialogue and expand its role to serve as a wider dialogue on 
export licensing, defense cooperation and strategic cooperation.   
The leaders welcomed the first meeting under the framework of the Defense Trade and Technology 
Initiative in September 2014 and endorsed its decision to establish a Task Force to expeditiously 
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evaluate and decide on unique projects and technologies which would have a transformative impact 
on bilateral defense relations and enhance India's defense industry and military capabilities. 
The President and Prime Minister welcomed cooperation in the area of military education and 
training, and endorsed plans for the United States to cooperate with India's planned National 
Defence University. They also decided to expand military-to-military partnerships including expert 
exchanges, dialogues, and joint training and exercises. They also committed to enhancing exchanges 
of civilian and military intelligence and consultation.  
The leaders agreed to intensify cooperation in maritime security to ensure freedom of navigation 
and unimpeded movement of lawful shipping and commercial activity, in accordance with accepted 
principles of international law.  To achieve this objective, the two sides considered enhancing 
technology partnerships for India's Navy including assessing possible areas of technology 
cooperation. They also agreed to upgrade their existing bilateral exercise MALABAR. 
The leaders reaffirmed their deep concern over the continued threat posed by terrorism, most 
recently highlighted by the dangers presented by the ISIL, and underlined the need for continued 
comprehensive global efforts to combat and defeat terrorism.  The leaders stressed the need for joint 
and concerted efforts, including the dismantling of safe havens for terrorist and criminal networks, 
to disrupt all financial and tactical support for networks such as Al Qaeda, Lashkar-e Taiba, Jaish-
e-Mohammad, the D-Company, and the Haqqanis.  They reiterated their call for Pakistan to bring 
the perpetrators of the November 2008 terrorist attack in Mumbai to justice.  
They pledged to enhance criminal law enforcement, security, and military information exchanges, 
and strengthen cooperation on extradition and mutual legal assistance.  Through operational 
cooperation through their law enforcement agencies, they aimed to prevent the spread of counterfeit 
currency and inhibit the use of cyberspace by terrorists, criminals, and those who use the internet 
for unlawful purposes, and to facilitate investigation of criminal and terrorist activities.   The leaders 
also committed to identify modalities to exchange terrorist watch lists.  President Obama pledged 
to help India counter the threat of improvised explosive devices with information and 
technology.  The leaders committed to pursue provision of U.S.-made mine-resistant ambush-
protected vehicles to India.  
The President and Prime Minister looked forward to easing travel between their two countries, as 
India introduces visa-on-arrival for U.S. citizens in 2015 and works toward meeting the 
requirements to make the United States’ Global Entry Program available to Indian citizens.  
There are reasons the two leaders issued a statement focused on climate change and other 
civil aspects of US and Indian relationships – and stressed this focus in an Op Ed that 
Obama and Modi placed in the Washington Post just after Modi’s visit. 157  Strategic 
partnerships do not have to have an overt military focus, and sometimes work better if they 
define security in much broader terms and focus on other areas. 
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X. Regional Threats: Iran, China, Russia, and Other 
External Powers 
The US needs to be careful about extending its strategic tensions and problems with states 
outside Afghanistan, Central Asia, and South Asia into Afghanistan and the region. Iran 
has never confronted the US at more than the most marginal levels in Afghanistan, and the 
US has much to gain if Russia and China are forced to engage more deeply at the security 
and economic level in Afghanistan and deal with the broader threat of violent Islamic 
extremism. The interests of other states like Turkey do not conflict with US interests, and 
having bodies like the Shanghai Cooperation Council expand their role may help both 
Afghanistan and Pakistan. 
The US does need to be careful, but Iran has so far played a stabilizing role in northwest 
Afghanistan, is a key route for grain and food shipment into Afghanistan, and has a strong 
interest in trying to stabilize western Afghanistan and counter its narco-trafficking.  Unless 
US and Iranian tensions in the MENA region lead to Iranian actions that threaten Afghan 
stability, this may well be a case where both the US and Iran can benefit from acting in 
parallel at a time they cannot formally cooperate. 
As has been noted earlier, the US has no clear strategic incentive to compete with Russia 
and China, and may well benefit if it makes it clear it is not attempting to use the region to 
contain them. Russia and China have an obvious interest in regional and Afghan stability, 
and China is the most likely nation to place major investments in Afghan mines if 
Afghanistan becomes more secure. Both countries are reluctant to expand their security 
and aid roles in Afghanistan, and have tended to try to put the focus on action by the 
“international community.”  
The US withdrawal of most of its forces from Afghanistan also seems likely to force Russia 
and China to expand both their regional counter-terrorism role and their role in supporting 
Afghanistan to protect their own strategic interests – which are far more direct than those 
of the US. They also seem far more likely to try to expand their influence and role in states 
actually in the Indian Ocean than to try to create some kind of direct route south in seeking 
ports or other facilities – if indeed these should become a goal. 
These are not trends that can be taken for granted, or where the interest of key state like 
Iran, China, and Russia may not change over time in ways that may change US priorities. 
At least for the present, however, the US seems to have more to gain from open or tacit 
cooperation that anticipating problems. It also seems probable that all three states – as well 
as other outside regional powers – will be natural competitors with each other in many 
ways, even though they will cooperate in others. At least in the near term the resulting 
checks and balances may again serve US interests – as well as those of Afghanistan and 
the other states in the region. 
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XI. US Strategy: Conditions-Based Commitments or Limit 
the US Role in Afghanistan and the Region 
The US now seems all too likely to fill the present strategic vacuum in its policies towards 
Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Central Asia by default. It will end most of its combat presence 
in the region by the end of 2014, and end virtually all of its military commitments in the 
region by the end of 2016. It will then focus on a set of limited strategic goals – using 
diplomacy and sharply cut levels of aid – with the possible exception of encouraging 
India’s emergence as a major regional power and counterweight to China. 
Is Strategy by Default a Good Strategy? 
There are good reasons to limit the US strategic role in the region. The US needs to use its 
resources far more carefully, it must apply strategic triage to its military commitments, and 
the region seems to offer limited opportunity and limited cost-benefits. As the current US 
involvement in Yemen and Iraq makes all too clear, the legacy of 9/11 has shifted to other 
threats in other areas and countries.  
The case for minimal involvement seems strongest in Central Asia. Central Asia is a 
marginal US strategic interest at best, and one that may well be left to the internal 
competition between Central Asian states as well as the competition for influence and bring 
some form of stability and security between Russia, China, and its other neighbors. To 
paraphrase the US film “Wargames,” the best way for the US to win any new Great Game 
in Central Asia is not to play it. 
Pakistan is not yet a real ally, and unless it shows it is willing to come to grips with the 
presence of Al Qaida central and Afghan insurgents, it will become steadily less useful or 
necessary as an ally as the US withdraws from Afghanistan. More broadly, it is unclear 
what the US has to gain from more than correct diplomatic relations until – and if – Pakistan 
achieves effective political stability, focuses on its rising internal violence, creates 
meaningful reasons to provide military and economic aid, and shows it will secure its 
border with Afghanistan.  
If this should happen, it would both strengthen the role US ties to Pakistan and significantly 
lower the cost of conditions-based support to Afghanistan. It should be stressed, however, 
that this is now only a possibility and the US should only act if it becomes a strong 
probability or a reality. 
The US has reason to see India as a potential counterweight to China, but has not seen its 
past efforts to build closer strategic relations produce significant results or benefits. The 
US is also focusing on “rebalancing to Asia” on Pacific states, and less on the Indian Ocean. 
It is unclear that the US has a role to play beyond encouraging India military and economic 
development and better Indian and Pakistani relations – a role that is largely diplomatic. 
The best options lie in encouraging India to make the right choices on its own, and not in 
some dramatic US intervention. 
The US also has little current reason to try to increase its direct military role in the region, 
and once needs to be careful about the seemingly unending calls from area experts for the 
US to play a major role in trying to shape regional cooperation or play a major role in 
ending the military tensions between India and Pakistan. While the US does want to see 
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peaceful and stable relations between the two states, neither seems likely to make more 
progress because of outside efforts that each state will make on its own.   
The US cannot intervene if there is another round of fighting, or use more than diplomacy 
to try to ease the region’s nuclear and missile arms race. The US also little reason to 
maintain a major role military or aid role in the region beyond its maritime and air presence 
in the Indian Ocean or to make major expenditures in military aid.  
This form of strategic triage may not reflect the policy choices desired by US and European 
area specialists. Area experts and diplomats tend to focus on their own areas of interest. 
But if the US is to make different choices, they need to make a much better and more 
realistic case for different options. They also need to take full account of the challenges the 
US faces in strategic triage given Russian actions in the Ukraine, and challenges in the 
Middle East because of events in Iraq, Syria, Iran and other states.   
The Afghan Dilemma 
As the previous chapters make clear, however, there still is an urgent need for an honest 
debate over the current US approach to Transition. It may ending in imposing a relatively 
a high cost in aid while enforcing deadlines and an approach to military support that poses 
unacceptable risks to Afghanistan’s chances of success. The key practical issue is the cost 
benefits to the US in shifting to a more pragmatic and conditions-based approach to 
Afghanistan, and the case is unclear. 
While the US is formally committed to maintaining a military presence in Afghanistan 
through 2016, the previous analysis warns that the currently planned US presence and aid 
effort is probably to be too small and too short to help Afghanistan through Transition. The 
same is true of the lack of clear plans to ensure the effective use of US military and civil 
aid present equal problems, as do the prospects for Afghan unity and ability to make the 
necessary reforms.   
The Case for Conditions-Based Involvement 
There is a case for more serious US involvement in Afghanistan. Strategic triage indicates 
that Afghanistan is a marginal US strategic interest. However, the US cannot ignore the 
issue of ethical and moral responsibility. The previous analysis has shown that the US 
played a critical role in Afghanistan’s present lack of readiness to deal with the security 
aspects of Transition, and that there are critical weaknesses in the US approach to 
Afghanistan that raise key uncertainties as to Afghanistan’s ability to fight and support its 
economy during 2015-2018.  
The marginal cost of an effective US presence and aid effort also seems relatively marginal 
by past warfighting standards. Even doubling the official US military presence would raise 
the totals to around 2,000 personnel. Creating an effective US civilian presence would only 
require minimal increases if the US and its allies made a major effort to speed up the 
transfer of aid to the Afghan government and could get workable terms for effective Afghan 
action.  
While no clear cost data are available, it seems likely that the annual cost could be kept 
under $20 billion, and if the US effort is to be effective at all, it seems unlikely that it would 
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have to be extended beyond some point in 2018-2020 – two to four years above the current 
schedule for a near total US withdrawal. 
Current developments like the progress in the Ghani Abdullah government and Pakistan’s 
willingness to fight a real war against its terrorists could also strengthen the case for the 
US to stay longer. This would, however, at least require the new Afghan government to 
remain unified, and be far proactive in political reform and in making Afghan forces 
effective. It would also require the government and aid to be successful in fundamental 
adjustments in the Afghan economy to far lower levels of outside spending, effective 
governance, and economic planning.  
The Case Against Conditions-Based Involvement 
At the same time, there is also a case for pursuing the current policy of rigid deadlines and 
US force withdrawals. Past military involvement is not a reason for future strategic 
commitments. The Taliban, Haqqani Network and other insurgents in Afghanistan and 
Pakistan may present limited security challenges, but – as the war against the Islamic State 
shows – so do many other extremist threats whose challenges are more immediate and 
serious.  
Afghanistan and Pakistan are no longer the key centers of terrorist threats to the US. The 
US has already said it will not maintain bases in Afghanistan, and US planners have never 
seriously believed that a forward US presence could somehow effectively secure Pakistani 
nuclear weapons against internal upheavals in Afghanistan.  
There is little serious US or allied public support for the war. As for the political cost of a 
“defeat” in Afghanistan, the world already effectively sees the US as having lost in 
Afghanistan and is far more concerned with US involvement in Iraq, Syria, Yemen, and 
other regions. The world has already largely discounted the impact of US withdrawal from 
Afghanistan and the US has already paid most of the political cost of failure. If that failure 
actually occurs, the current plan for withdrawal will allow the US to shift much of the 
blame to the almost inevitable failures in Afghan politics and forces. To be blunt, ending 
the conflict in this way will cost the US little and will free it to better pursue its interests in 
other areas. 
Moreover, America’s European allies face the same challenges, and no one now seems to 
give much credence to the idea that Afghanistan is a critical test of NATO. Once NATO 
ministers have papered over NATO’s departure with suitable rhetoric and vague promises, 
it is increasingly unclear that that the last NATO country will even bother to shut the door 
on the way out.  
It is also important to stress that the time window for shift to a conditions-based US effort 
is becoming a steadily increasing problem, and seems unlikely to extend much beyond 
2015. The US has also already cut is presence to point where US policy towards the Afghan 
conflict must be tied to Afghan success in the field from 2015 onwards, and to the success 
of the Afghan government. There also is little reason for the US to pursue and fiancé a 
condition-based option unless the new Afghan government makes the necessary changes 
for such a policy to be successful. Afghans need be held accountable and promises cannot 
be treated as a substitute for performance.  
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Choosing Between the Options 
Unfortunately, public relations spin and strategic momentum have all combined to help 
make outside efforts to fully assess the marginal cost of shifting the US position impossible 
to determine. In spite of all the Obama Administration’s talk about transparency, there has 
been a fundamental lack of any real information. Worse, many of the data that have been 
issued raise critical question about the integrity and honesty of those who issued them.  
Most critically, the US is still pursuing fixed cuts in its forces at fixed time windows. It is 
doing so without having never publically examined the implications of such decision, 
having made public choices about strategic triage, or having announced meaningful public 
plans, cost-benefit analysis, and risk assessment to justify its current policy choices. 
A major shift towards a conditions-based US effort would require the Obama 
Administration to be willing to make a fundamental shift in US plans and to provide 
adequate advisors and enablers for as long as it takes on a conditions-based timetable. It 
would also require far more leadership and transparency in dealing with the Congress and 
the American people than the US has shown in the past.  
Given the past history of US warfighting, the unfortunate outcome may be that the US will 
pursue its present policies by default, or only try to change them when and if they 
conspicuously fail in ways that present a major political embarrassment and there is a clear 
domestic political reason to try to salvage the cost of past mistakes. At best, this means 
trying to act under far worse circumstances than exist before and at the moment of  
Transition. At worst, it is a recipe for expensive failure. 
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